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Thesis Abstract
This study examines China's relations with the Middle 
East. Its primary objective is to determine to what extent, 
and in what ways, China's involvement with the region has 
evolved. To accomplish this aim I have adopted an historical 
approach, examining China's relations with the Middle East 
between 1950 and 1988. The study is therefore subdivided 
into seven chapters, each of which treats a 'distinctive' 
period in the history of China's foreign relations since the 
founding of Lhe L'RC in 19/19. L;’ot purposes of this study, the 
'Middle East' is defined as the 'zone of Arab--Israeli 
confrontation', comprising the states of Israel, Egypt, 
Jordan, and Syria as well as including the PLO; plus the 
Persian Gulf:, with emphasis on the states of Iran, Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Each chapter begins with a discus­
sion of China's relations with the superpowers, and with 
developing countries. By indicating China's general foreign 
policy concerns, these sections hopefully shed light on the 
relative priority China attached to the Middle East in any 
given period. Thereafter, each chapter provides a country- 
by-country analysis of China's interaction with the Middle 
East, highlighting the opportunities and dilemmas that China 
encountered in the course of such involvement with the 
region. All chapters end with an 'evaluation' which assesses 
the nature of China's objectives and efforts as well as the 
success of its involvement. The chief findings of this study 
are: (1) that the Middle East has never been politically ir­
relevant or strategically inconsequential to China; (2) that 
the number of partners with whom China has engaged, along 
with the range and scale of Chinese involvement with the 
region (especially in the economic and military spheres), 
has expanded; (3) that the alternating pattern of 
'involvement' and 'retraction' that once characterised 
China's interaction with the Middle East has, since the 
early 1970s, given way to a pattern of 'sustained 
engagement'. Accordingly, the study recommends attention to 
the prospects for, and possible ramifications of, China's 
future interaction with the region.
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Introduction
A. A Neglected But Important Subject
Literature devoted to China's relations with the Middle 
East is sparse. Only three authors have dealt exclusively 
and at length with this subject.1 Of these three, only 
Hashim Behbehani and Yitzhak Shichor, have considered Sino- 
Middle East relations from the perspective of Chinese 
foreign policy. Whereas Behbehani's study is confined to 
Sino-Arab relations, the work of A.H.H. Abidi focuses on 
China's interaction with the countries of the Persian Gulf, 
principally Iran. These initial remarks raise questions 
about the salience of the subject on the one hand; and the 
way(s) in which this study might contribute to a fuller 
understanding of Sino-Middle East relations on the other.
Numerous books and articles have examined the extension of 
Cold War competition to the Middle East, accurately 
reflecting the impact and importance of superpower 
interests, activities and influence in the region. Next to 
superpower rivalry in the Middle East, French and British 
involvement there has received the most media and scholarly 
attention. This too is not astonishing. As U.S. allies and 
former colonial powers, France and Great Britain are 
presumed to be involved in the Middle East, thereby drawing 
attention even when the scale of their actual involvement 
might not necessarily warrant it. In contrast, to suggest 
that China has played a role of any kind in the Middle East 
seems a bit far-fetched. After all, China is only a putative 
world power, culturally distinct and for the most part
geographically distant from the Middle East.
In 1987 events challenged the presumption that China had 
no interests in the Middle East, nor the capacity to promote 
and protect them if it had. At that time U.S. naval vessels 
deployed to the Persian Gulf were discovered to be 
vulnerable to Chinese missiles sold to Iran. The ensuing 
political crossfire brought to public attention the extent 
of Chinese penetration of the Middle East arms market. These 
revelations provoked concern within the Reagan 
Administration that a new, potentially destabilizing round 
of regional arms competition might be under way. Suddenly, 
Chinese involvement in the Middle East mattered.
Perhaps China's instant promotion to relevance (vis-a-vis 
the Middle East) was merely belated recognition of an 
historical fact. Perhaps China's arms sales to the Gulf 
represented only one form of interaction among several in a 
relationship between China and the region which had 
developed incrementally. These propositions have not been 
tested. In any event, the scale and possible implications of 
these weapons transactions are reason enough to consider the 
context which made the sales possible.
A fresh study of Sino-Middle East relations is important 
for a second reason. It is well-recognised that the Middle 
East is a region of great complexity, volatility and global 
significance. It is also widely acknowledged that, in the 
past, developments originating outside the region (e.g. 19th 
Century European imperial rivalry, the outbreak of the First 
World War) have affected, indeed have crucially transformed
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the region's politics. It is not suggested that China's 
activities in the region have crucially influenced the 
course of Middle East politics. Nevertheless, given the 
general significance of external players in shaping Middle 
East history, coupled with the region's international 
importance, some consideration of the way(s) in which China 
has, or might in future, affect the Middle East or any part 
of it, is needed.
A new study of Sino-Middle East relations serves a third 
important purpose; namely, shedding additional light on the 
subject of the evolution of Chinese foreign policy behavior. 
This study proposes to explore Sino-Middle East relations 
primarily from the point of view of Chinese foreign policy. 
It is not expressly aimed at deciphering what is meant by 
China's 'foreign policy interests'; nor does it seek to 
determine the degree to which the foreign policy instruments 
within China's possession are sufficient or appropriate to 
serve those interests.
Yet, in the course of investigating China's relations with 
the Middle East, these are naturally-occurring questions. 
Unavoidably, in identifying instances of Chinese involvement 
in the region, one is led to consider what has prompted 
these activities; that is, to seek to determine what 
'interests' are at stake. Similarly, it is commonly 
recognized that, in the post-WWII era, China's relations 
with the superpowers have been its singlemost important set 
of foreign relations; and widely accepted that during this 
time the superpowers have been the predominant external 
players in the Middle East. It is therefore inconceivable
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that a study of Sino-Middle East relations would fail to 
consider how China's relations with the U.S. and U.S.S.R., 
and how superpower rivalry in the Middle East, might have 
affected the PRC's interests and activities in the region.
B. An Original Contribution
This study does not purport to uncover new information.
The originality of its contribution to knowledge lies 
elsewhere. First, no study of Sino-Middle East relations 
develops the subject beyond the mid-1970s. This study, in 
that it covers the years 1950-1988, extends the analyses 
provided by other authors. Moreover, as will be shown, the 
period from the mid-1970s onwards is perhaps the most 
revealing in terms of the expansion of Sino-Middle East 
relations. Most of Chapter 5, all of Chapters 6 and 7, and 
the majority of the findings of this study are drawn from 
the changes and developments in Sino-Middle East relations 
which occurred since the mid-1970s.
Second, this study, unlike others devoted to the subject, 
seeks to highlight throughout, and emphasize in the 
Conclusion, those factors which appear to have facilitated 
and constrained China's involvement in the region. The 
attempt to discuss, where evidence permits, how domestic 
factors (economic or political) within China might have 
impinged on China's efforts to build relations in the Middle 
East is notable in this regard (e.g. Chapter 2, Additional 
Constraints; and Chapter 3, The Cultural Revolution and 
Foreign Policy).
Third, even in the opening four chapters -- which span the
12
same period treated previously by Shichor and others -- 
there are numerous passages which reconsider or dispute the 
findings of these authors (e.g. Chapter 2, pp. 24-26); or 
simply contribute additional information as well as, 
hopefully, fresh insight (e.g. Chapter 4, Relations with the 
PLO) .
C. An Historical Approach and 'Multicausal' Explanation
The approach adopted in this study is mainly historical. 
The structure of the thesis reflects its chief aim; namely, 
drawing some general conclusions about the ways in which 
China's interests, activities, and fortunes in the region 
may or may not have changed. Accordingly, this study 
proceeds chronologically. Each chapter, moreoever, treats a 
relatively 'distinct' period in the evolution of Chinese 
foreign policy generally.
The contents of each of the seven chapters consist mainly 
of analyses of China's involvement in the region occurring 
within that time frame. As previously mentioned, it is a 
fundamental aim of this study to trace the evolution of 
Chinese involvement in the region. As will become clear, the 
form and scale of this involvement has indeed changed. 
Accordingly, this study will examine China's political, 
economic, and military involvement with the Middle East, 
rather than confine itself to any one of these areas.
An historical -- or chronological -- approach is a 
convenient way to map the changes and continuities in 
China's relations with the Middle East. Yet, this study 
seeks to accomplish more than merely to describe a course of 
events or a set of interactions. It aims also to explain
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recurring patterns of behavior, or for that matter, the 
emergence of new trends in Sino-Middle Eastern relations. It 
is therefore necessary to indicate at the outset how the 
second objective will be fulfilled.
The spectrum of literature on Chinese foreign policy 
offers several explanatory approaches.2 J.K. Fairbank and 
M. Mancall, for example, suggest that the elite perception 
of a sinocentric world order (ie. a 'Middle Kingdom 
complex') is the principal determinant of China's foreign 
policy.3 J. Gittings, S. Kim and L. Pye (among others) 
assert that Mao's decisive voice was the key causal 
variable.4 Others, like K. Lieberthal, indicate that 
factional struggles within the Chinese leadership are 
determining.5 P. Van Ness and H. Hinton, meanwhile, 
represent the view that ideology as well as national 
interests offer powerful explanations for Chinese foreign 
policy behavior; unlike, J.D. Armstrong, however, they 
emphasise the importance of national interests rather than 
revolutionary doctrine.6
Each of the approaches cited above sheds light on the 
nature of Chinese foreign policy. However, there are 
pitfalls in all of them. The historical legacy approach, for 
instance, posits an unbroken line of continuity between the 
external policies of Imperial China and the PRC. Yet, it 
fails to establish firmly the causal link between China's 
'traditional' image of the world and its current 
international conduct. The Mao-dominant thesis, besides 
being time-bound, runs the risk of treating the Chinese
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leadership during Mao's lifetime as though it were 
monolithic. The coalition politics approach also has its 
shortcomings; for one thing, it tends to suggest that 
differences within the leadership are evidence of factional 
strife, not mere policy divergences.
The defect which all of the explanatory approaches listed 
above have in common is their monocausality. This study 
favors a multicausal explanation. In that respect, it 
borrows from and builds on the work of V.P. Dutt, R. North, 
A. Whiting and others.7 This study takes the position that 
Sino-Middle Eastern relations within any given period is the 
product of a changing framework consisting of three main 
elements: (1) China's relations with the superpowers; (2)
opportunities and constraints supplied by developments 
occurring in the Middle East; and, from time to time, (3) 
significant developments (either economic or political) 
occurring inside China. Thus, Chinese involvement in the 
Middle East will be seen to have arisen from a blend of 
domestic as well as international factors.
D. Some Basic Assumptions
Locating the 'correct' time lines with which to subdivide 
China's involvement in the Middle East is a process that 
proceeds from certain fundamental assumptions. Perhaps the 
most important of these is the assertion that Chinese 
foreign policy has rather consistently operated from a 
strategic logic. The implications of this are several. 
Initially, it suggests that the Middle East may have figured 
more prominently in China's calculations on some occasions 
than on others. Next, it implies that China's leaders may at
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times have assigned the Middle East an importance that bears 
little resemblance to the region's distance from China.
Above all, it suggests that the Middle East has been a 
changing rather than a static priority for China; its 
priority moreover, subject to revision, is set within the 
global strategic picture which in turn is painted by 
periodic re-evaluations of the world situation.
A second, equally important assumption is that -- whether 
one chooses to view Chinese foreign policy as emanating 
chiefly from ideological considerations, from reasons of 
'state interests', or from some combination thereof -- what 
China has endeavored to do in the international arena, if 
not what it has been able to do, has been strongly 
conditioned by its position with respect to the superpowers. 
In the Middle East, where Soviet-American rivalry has been 
particularly intense yet where the region's politics have 
remained peculiarly fluid, the presence and activities of 
the superpowers have supplied not only incentives and 
opportunities for China to act, but have also imposed 
constraints and costs on China's acting. Thus, of the three 
variables variables identified earlier, the influence of the 
superpowers on China will be assumed to carry the greatest 
weight in guiding China's conduct in the region.
This assumption has a direct bearing on the geographic 
scope of the study. Understanding China's relations with the 
superpowers and the superpowers' relations with each other 
is central to understanding China's involvement in the 
Middle East. As a whole, the Middle East is notable for its
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unusual degree of instability and its special importance to 
the superpowers. Yet, on the whole, superpower attention and 
activity has been geographically concentrated in the 'zone 
of Arab-Israeli confrontation' (that is, in the area which 
includes Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan) and the Persian 
Gulf. Accordingly, this study will explore Chinese 
involvement in the Middle East with special attention to 
these two sub-theaters of superpower rivalry.
A third and final assumption holds that China's domestic 
political and economic situation can have important 
implications for the conduct of its foreign policy. It is 
the perceptions of Chinese leaders interacting with the 
capabilities at their disposal which ultimately determine 
China's interests, obligations and aspirations. Through the 
eyes of the leadership, the global situation, China's place 
in it, and (for purposes of this study) developments in the 
Middle East acquire their image, meaning and relevance. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties of attempting to see the 
world as the Chinese leadership does, it is none the less 
necessary to recognise and to point to those apparent 
episodes in China's history when domestic economic and 
political turmoil may have impinged on Chinese foreign 
policy.
It is beyond the scope of this study to offer a precise 
account of the foreign policy debates that may have taken 
place since 1949 within the Chinese leadership. Still, it is 
important to acknowledge that such debates did in fact occur 
from time to time. This analysis argues from the position 
that Chinese foreign policy has, on the whole, enjoyed a
17
consensus within the Chinese leadership, though that 
consensus has not always prevailed, nor has it always been 
easily achieved. Consideration of competing and contending 
foreign policy viewpoints within the Chinese leadership will 
be offered in those instances when: (1) there is reasonably
clear evidence of such foreign policy divergences; (2) the 
identities and respective positions of the contending 
'factions' are readily ascertainable; and (3) there is a 
strong indication that such divergences may have had a 
direct bearing on China's involvement in the Middle East.
E. Chinese Perceptions of and Interests in the Middle East
As this analysis will demonstrate, Chinese interests and, 
correspondingly, the range of Chinese activities in the 
Middle East gradually expanded over time. Some preliminary 
indication of what those interests originally were, and what 
they later became, might be helpful to the reader.
First, China has continuously striven to win diplomatic 
recognition from Middle Eastern regimes while at the same 
time campaigning for the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan. 
Second, China has consistently attempted to curry favor 
among Middle East leaders in order to win support for its 
political positions. Many, if not most, of these positions 
have reflected Beijing's preoccupation with competing with, 
but more often, seeking to undermine the influence of one or 
the other superpower, or both.
For much of Mao's tenure as the PRC's paramount leader, 
and for several years afterwards, China faced strategic 
pressure from either the United States or the Soviet Union.
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Briefly in the 1960s, China's relations with both 
superpowers were hostile. Whether or not Beijing was partly, 
or even principally, responsible for its strategically 
precarious situation is not at issue here. Assume that the 
threat of 'encirclement', for example, was real rather than 
imagined, or at least genuinely believed rather than simply 
portrayed that way for propagandistic purposes. Because of 
its vital geostrategic position, the Middle East, in this 
context, served as a strategic buffer for China. China's 
attention to the Middle East will be seen to increase during 
peak periods of hostility between China and either 
superpower; and during periods of perceived global 
expansionism by the U.S. or U.S.S.R. Thus, China has had a 
continuing strategic interest, of fluctuating importance, in 
the region. This interest has expressed itself in efforts to 
oppose, to the extent possible, superpower domination of, or 
condominium in, the region.
China's economic interests in the region will be seen to 
have developed relatively recently. The timing, magnitude 
and composition of Sino-Middle Eastern economic transactions 
moreover will be seen to derive from overall shifts in 
Chinese foreign policy; namely, the commitment to 
modernisation, and gradual acknowledgment of the importance 
of foreign economic relations in that process. It will be 
shown that amrs sales are an integral component of that 
process. However, the argument will not be made that Sino- 
Middle East economic relations have at any time been deemed 
crucial to China's modernisation efforts.
19
PART ONE
PROBING WITHOUT PROGRESS
1950--1965
20
Chapter I 
'Leaning to one side'
1950 —  1957
The birth of the People's Republic of China in 1949 was 
part of the Cold War. This 'bipolar beginning' determined 
China's central strategic concern: its relations with the 
superpowers based on the superpowers' relations with each 
other. Since that time, the United States and the Soviet 
Union have provided (by virtue of their preponderant power) 
the 'maneuvering space' that has simultaneously freed and 
constrained China's ability to navigate in international 
waters. Samuel Kim reinforces this view by arguing:
At bottom, the superpowers have remained 
central to China's definition of global 
reality with attendant constraints and 
opportunities setting the outer limits and 
possibilities of Chinese foreign policy.8
After nearly four decades there is remarkably little to 
suggest either in China's rhetoric or behavior that the 
superpower rivalry occupies other than a paramount position 
in its strategic thinking. If anything, its ideology and 
capabilities support this contention.
In the early 1950s, China's need for rapid socialist 
economic transformation and the consolidation of political 
power arose within a context of mutual suspicion, reciprocal 
provocation and generally implacable enmity between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Yet, at that time 
China's ideological affinity for the Soviet Union did not 
necessarily preclude a relationship of some kind with the
21
capitalist West (and the U.S. in particular). The U.S. 
decision to apply its then-indisputable political, economic 
and military pre-eminence to the task of Chinese 
'containment' (which featured diplomatic and economic 
blockades, support for the Republic of China and the inter­
vention in Korea) increased China's vulnerability. In 
response, China sought cover beneath the Soviet security 
umbrella and economic viability within a Soviet socialist 
framework. 'Leaning to one side,' therefore, provided the 
antidote to total isolation and potential catastrophe.
The Soviet remedy was particularly successful in attacking 
the economic ills of a backward country by supplying much- 
needed advice on the state organisational structure and the 
economic planning system; by assigning priority to in­
dustrial development; and by furnishing technicians as well 
as factory blueprints.9 Being a Soviet ally also had impor­
tant implications for China's quest for international 
legitimacy. Within the Soviet bloc, China gained the instant 
recognition of its members; this, in turn, enhanced China's 
credentials outside the bloc.
Yet, from the beginning, Mao insisted on a marriage be­
tween Marxist--Leninist principles and concrete Chinese ex­
perience. He made it clear that China would and must con­
tribute to the development of socialist theory as well as to 
the Sino--Soviet alliance (although he did not elaborate on 
the precise content of that contribution). But the nature 
and extent of the partnership with the Soviet Union con­
templated by China failed to coincide with the role which
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the Soviet Union appeared to expect Chjina to play, even­
tually poisoning their relations.10 Nevertheless, strategic 
alignment with the Soviet Union, entailing as it did a sub­
ordinate and dependent position for China, remained 
tolerable for as long as it was deemed necessary. Into the 
1950s, even as issues of dispute between them proliferated, 
China's alliance with the Soviet Union was the framework 
within which its security was preserved and its economic 
viability was ensured.
The Korean conflict was an initial testing ground. Its 
outbreak as well as its outcome posed the dilemma of China's 
status and behavior: capturing the prize of opportunity 
required snatching it from the jaws of strategic danger; ex­
ploiting it entailed reconciling ambition and limited 
capability. On the one hand, the Korean war enhanced the 
confidence and prestige of the new regime by dispelling any 
notion that China was an impotent giant. On the other hand, 
it stimulated new fears and hostilities in the non-communist 
world, contributing to the postponement of China's full 
entry into interstate politics. Above all, it postulated an 
international role for China enhanced and delimited by the 
combination of Sino--Soviet cooperation and American hos- 
t i 1 i t. y .
Other than Korea (and perhaps partly because of it) such 
international initiatives as were taken by China in the 
early '50s occurred within the Sino--Soviet framework: as an 
extension of the alliance. U.S. hostility and China's re­
lated dependence on the Soviet Union had virtually compelled 
the PRC to operate on the margins of international rela-
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tions. At the same time, however, a number of foreign policy 
breakthroughs occurred whose cumulative effect on China was 
to instill confidence. From April 1952, for instance, China 
had succeeded in entering a series of commercial relation­
ships with West European countries. Also, China's invitation 
to participate in the Geneva Conference (April 1954) - 
though outside the framework of the United Nations - con­
stituted an important step in the quest for both interna­
tional legitimacy and international recognition as a world 
power.
Several additional factors converged to supply the impetus 
and opportunity for China's adoption of a more active, in­
creasingly autonomous foreign policy. In 1955, the PRC was 
enjoying a second consecutive year of peace, following three 
decades of uninterrupted war. China had just begun to draw 
from the $130 million loan extended by its Soviet ally. Fur­
thermore, Stalin's death and the ensuing leadership transi­
tion in the U.S.S.R. furnished an occasion for China to 
pursue a more assertive foreign policy partly as a means of 
acquiring special status within the Soviet bloc. An active 
foreign policy also promised to assist China in safely coun­
teracting the United States' continuing efforts to isolate 
it, thereby compensating for China's inability to launch a 
major frontal challenge to the international status quo it 
repudiated.
The rising tide of anti-colonial nationalism, manifesting 
itself in Afro--Asian solidarity and in the nascent concept 
of nonalignment concentrated China's attention on the
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developing world. While recognising that few Afro-Asian 
leaders shared its ideological sympathies China nonetheless 
appreciated the advantages of cooperating with the 
nationalists.
A. The 'Bandung Spirit':
The attendance and participation of its delegation at the 
First Afro--Asian Solidarity Conference at Bandung was a 
watershed in China's international relations: signifying 
China's official identification with Afro--Asian 
nationalism; reflecting China's determination to exercise a 
degree of foreign policy autonomy while remaining committed 
to the Soviet alliance; and representing a 'fresh start' for 
China's foreign relations, underpinned by a fresh set of 
guiding foreign policy principles.
As early as 1951 a transformation of events in the 
Afro--Asian landscape had helped to produce a gradual 
transformation in the thinking of the Chinese leadership. A 
31 October People's Daily editorial, commenting on 
developments in Iran and Egypt, remarked that Afro--Asian 
societies had begun to move from under the yoke of 
imperialism, establishing themselves as centers of effective 
anti-imperialist resistance.11 The conviction that this trend 
had matured - along with China's capacities to help further 
nurture it - was the driving force behind China's 
participation at Bandung.
Yet, China's heightened interest in Afro— Asian 
nationalism did not automatically ensure a receptive 
audience at Bandung. On the contrary, China had acquired a 
reputation as a combative state with strong ideological
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predispositions. In preparation for the conference, there­
fore, China took measures to allay suspicions about its ul­
timate intentions. China's 'spectacular success' at Bandung 
was preceded by a carefully crafted campaign to dispel 
doubts, which included Chou En-lai's meetings with Nehru and 
U Nu; suspension of verbal attacks on India; and the estab­
lishment of trade links with Indonesia, India and Burma.
At Bandung, Chou En-lai's proclamation of the 'Five Prin­
ciples of Peaceful Coexistence' as the basis of China's for­
eign relations was important both as an act and as a state­
ment of principles. By stressing China's natural affinities 
with Afro— Asian states, the declaration expressed China's 
conception of its unique international identity: Soviet ally 
and putative Afro--Asian leader. The theme of 'peaceful 
coexistence' promised a foreign policy,
marked by a readiness to resolve any dif­
ference by negotiation at the governmental 
level with all countries (including the U.S.) 
in the moderate tone of diplomatic language 
and by a willingness to recognise a com­
monality of purpose and interest between 
socialist China and national bourgeois 
governments of Afro--Asian countries.12
How much of a departure from past practice was the foreign 
policy launched at Bandung? The commitment to peaceful 
coexistence essentially amounted to the commitment of new 
means to the fulfilment of familiar aims. Those aims in­
cluded the discouragement of new states' accession to U.S. 
efforts to isolate China; the acceleration of their 
strategic drift from the West; and the demonstration of
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China's usefulness to, as a way of improving its status 
within, the Soviet alliance.
What was new, and by no means inconsequential, was the
spirit of cooperation' embodied in the Five Principles; and
the pledge to bury differences in order to collaborate with
the nationalists. China officially foreswore subverting
nationalist regimes in the interest of advancing common
aims. Chou En-lai's Supplementary Speech at Bandung captures
the essence of this approach. In it, Chou declares:
The Chinese delegation has come here to seek 
common ground, not to create divergence... The 
overwhelming majority of the Asian and 
African countries and peoples have suffered 
and are still suffering from the calamities 
of colonialism. This is acknowledged by all 
of us...We have to admit that among our Asian 
and African countries, we do have different 
ideologies and different social systems. But 
this does not prevent us from seeking common 
ground and being united... China has no inten­
tion whatsoever to subvert the governments of 
its neighboring countries. On the contrary, 
it is China that is suffering from the sub­
versive activities which are being openly 
carried out without any disguise by the 
United States of America.13
China's interest and efforts in the Middle East during 
this period can therefore be located within the framework of 
the 'spirit of Bandung.' The purposes and activities as­
sociated with Bandung incorporated the Middle East. Little 
conceptual or semantic juggling by China was required to ac­
complish this. After all, the People's Republic of China and 
the contemporary Middle East shared a Cold War beginning: 
while China confronted the dangers and opportunities of its 
revolutionary success, many of the countries of the Middle
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East faced the problems and possibilities of recently ac­
quired independence. These were commonalities that China 
recognised, emphasised and sought to exploit.
Until Bandung, China had paid scant attention to, and had 
had limited contact with, the Middle East. One commentator 
has aptly characterised China's involvement in the region up 
to that time as 'tentative dealing with marginal issues.'14 
The personal relationships forged at the 1955 Bandung Con­
ference - in particular between Chou En-lai and Nasser - 
formed the basis of China's extending its relations in the 
Middle East. In its overtures to Nasser, and to the Arabs 
generally, China framed its desire to win friends in 'sweet 
reasonableness,' shrewdly refraining from hard-pedalling its 
ideology.15 Thus, the 'Bandung approach' was extended to the 
Middle East.
B. 'Revolutionary' Arab Nationalism:
In order to appreciate fully China's initial interest in, 
and the scope available for its involvement in the region, 
it is useful to provide some further indication of the major 
developments occurring within the region at this time. 
Between the end of the Second World War and the time that 
China inaugurated relations with Middle East countries (the 
mid-1950s), two related developments had already taken 
place: the creation of the state of Israel (1948) and the 
Free Officers' Coup in Egypt (1952).
The '48 Arab-Israeli war, which led to the creation of the 
state of Israel, further discredited Arab regimes and 
undermined their legitimacy. At the same time provided 
additional impetus for the growth of 'revolutionary' Arab
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nationalism. In a sense, therefore, this first event set the 
stage for the Officers' Coup, which subsequently brought 
Nasser to power in Egypt. Commenting on the importance of 
the Coup, Peter Mansfield argues that it
...was the seminal event of the mid-twentieth 
century. It was not only a milestone in the long 
history of Egypt -- the 'most important country' 
in Napoleon Bonaparte's words -- but it profound­
ly influenced the other Arab states and much of 
the Afro-Asian world.16
'Nasserism', with its commitment to Arab unity, socialism, 
and freedom from foreign domination took some time to 
develop. First it had to be conceptualised; then it had to 
be applied. The 1954 publication of The Philosophy of 
Revolution was an important turning point. From that moment 
forward, Nasser came to be associated not only with a 
revolutionary act, but also with a political ideology. 
Moreover, the ideas and ambitions contained in that body of 
doctrine linked Nasser's ambitions for Egypt with those of 
the Arab world (as well as the much wider Islamic world).
In the following two years (1955-56), Nasser's display of 
courage and defiance -- in concluding the Czech arms 
agreement, nationalising the Suez Canal, and surviving the 
tripartite invasion -- earned him a wide following. 
'Nasserism', meanwhile, became the dominant current of 
'revolutionary' Arab nationalism. With the fall of the Iraqi 
monarchy and the formation of the U.A.R. in 1958, Nasser 
attained the summit of his accomplishment.
Ba'thism, a second important form of 'revolutionary' Arab
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nationalism began to develop in the 1950s, concentrated in 
Syria and Iraq. Unlike Nasserism, however, Ba'thism was an 
eclectic ideology, not identilied with an individual of 
comparable achievement.17 Ba'thism in the 1950s was 
initially purveyed by a small circle of largely Western- 
educated intellectuals. As an organisation, the Ba'th Party 
only began to develop in Syria after the fall of Shishakli 
in 1954. Thus, into the early 1960s, the dominant 
ideological current in the area was 'revolutionary' Arab 
nationalism: anti-colonial, anti-monarchist, with a 
socialist orientation. Among these, Nasserism was clearly 
bettor organised and possessed a wider base of popular 
support.
ijJ._Qhina.lS. rglati on § wi th ,_E
In the 1950s Egypt was the natural focus of China's 
interest in the region. In addition to Nasser's charismatic 
leadership, Egypt itself possessed a set of characteristics 
which warranted China's attention: a large state, 
increasingly at odds with the West, a predominantly Muslim 
country in a predominantly Muslim region.
d i no ~ l .< j y pi i an re 1 at ions w« • re cemented in the signing of 
the two countries' first commercial agreement (August 1955), 
calling for a a trade balance strongly in Egypt's favor.18 
Reportedly, China played an indirect role in securing the 
1955 Egyptian--Czech arms accord.19 The PRC also agreed to 
purchase Egyptian cotton in 1955, capitalising on the 
failure of traditional Western markets to buy at acceptable 
prices.20 In this way, the PRC sought to build credit with
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Middle East nationalists, among whom Nasser was the most 
charismatic figure.
Following Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal, the 
PRC demonstrated its approval and solidarity by extending a 
prepaid loan of 20 million Swiss francs (about $5 million) 
and an additional donation of 170,000 Swiss francs through 
its Red Cross; offering rolled steel which it badly needed
i o  1itself; and accelerating Egypt i an-bound exports. These 
measures constituted a stronger moral commitment than a 
material one. Nonetheless, they won Egypt's gratitude as 
well as Arab goodwill, though at the expense of inching 
China closer to the dilemma of taking sides against Israel.
The Suez affair made an impression on China. Besides fur­
nishing an occasion for the PRC to demonstrate its 
friendship, Suez served as confirmation of the power of 
anti-colonialism. In March 1957 Chou En-lai, reflecting on 
Suez, commented that it was
a great revelation to us, showing that al­
though the Asian and African countries are 
not yet powerful in material strength, that 
all aggression by the colonialists can be 
frustrated, as long as we maintain our 
solidarity and firmly unite with all peace- 
loving forces of the world and wage a 
resolute struggle.22
As this statement indicates, the Suez crisis was as impor­
tant to China for what it signified as for what it con­
cretely furnished by way of improving Sino--Egyptian rela­
tions. Chou's testimony is equally revealing in its suggest­
ion that Sino-Egyptian relations constituted a single strand 
in the broader fabric of the struggle against imperialism.
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Yet, one should not overrate the significance of the Suez 
affair to China, nor underestimate the potential problems 
that support for Nasser posed for China. When Chou En-lai 
made the address mentioned above, he had only just completed 
a tour of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Asia. An im­
portant purpose of that tour - and this speech which 
reported on it - was to deflect criticism arising from the 
Soviet intervention in Hungary. It well may be that China's 
emphasis on Suez was - as part of a broader public relations 
appeal - primarily targeted at rescuing the Soviet alliance, 
and by extension, China, from embarrassment.
In addition, some months earlier, when Nasser had 
nationalised the Suez Canal, China did not rush to heap 
praise upon him. The Renmin Ribao editorial, which albeit 
commended Egypt, did not surface until four days after the 
event (i.e. until 30 July). Moreover, two weeks elapsed 
before the Foreign Ministry issued its official statement of 
support. Even when the tripartite intervention took place, 
China behaved with comparative restraint, cautiously recom­
mending a peacefully negotiated resolution to the dispute. 
One can observe in these instances China's reluctance to 
embrace tactics which might taint the image that it had so 
carefully cultivated.23
If it had some initial reservations about Nasser's tac­
tics, these in no way diminished the importance that China 
attached to Egypt. One indication of the degree of Chinese 
interest in Egypt was the background of the individual 
selected to head China's new trade office in Cairo. Chang 
Yueh, a man with stronger political than commercial creden­
32
tials, prior to his assignment to the PRC trade mission in 
Cairo, had served for seven years as deputy director of the 
foreign ministry's West European and African Affairs Divi­
sion. Meanwhile, the Egyptian--Chinese trade link itself was 
limited in economic, but hardly insignificant in political, 
terms. At Bandung, Chou En-lai had issued a blanket invita­
tion to all delegates in attendance to consider establishing 
ties with China. At first, only Egypt responded.24 Nasser's 
prestige in the Afro--Asian world inflated the importance of 
this breakthrough.
In pursuing ties with Egypt, China's statist and inter­
nationalist aims comfortably meshed, yielding the additional 
benefit of diplomatic recognition, though not until 1956. 
Moreover, to the extent that Bandung symbolised Afro--Asia 
as what appeared to the participants to be a viable politi­
cal concept, China's successful overtures towards Egypt 
carved a place for China in its development.
Unhappily, however, China's activities on behalf of, 
produced no discernible enhancement of its role within, the 
Soviet alliance. Furthermore, the fact that Egypt's recogni­
tion of the PRC (16 May 1956) was intended as a blow to the 
West25 to some degree depreciated it. One commentator sug­
gests that general Arab cordiality towards China at Bandung 
and thereafter reflected more the Arabs' desire to enlist 
China's verbal support in their dispute with Israel than to 
forge an enduring partnership with China based on common 
interests.26
Nasser's anxiety over reports that the Soviet Union might
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agree to Western proposals to cooperate with the West in an 
arms embargo on the Middle East furnishes further evidence 
of the tenuousness of China's toehold in Egypt at this 
time.27 Finally, though Beijing's efforts assisted China in 
breaking political isolation, it. did so at the hidden cost 
of supporting the very cause it would expend much of its fu­
ture energies to undercut: Soviet penetration of the Middle 
East.
(ii) China's Relations with Yemen;
China's initial involvement in the Yemen in the mid-'50s 
was both facilitated and constrained by the roles of Nasser 
and the Soviet Union; and especially by the intricacies of 
Yemeni domestic politics. It was Nasser who reportedly per­
suaded King Saud to finance the Yemen's purchase of Soviet 
weapons when, in 1956, Britain successfully lobbied to 
prevent Western arms transfers to the regime of Imam 
Ahmed.28 Thus, for as long as Nasser's regional ambitions 
roughly paralleled those of Moscow, and for as long as the 
Sino--Soviet alliance remained firmly intact, China appeared 
to have an entree in the Yemen.
A Chinese legation to Taiz and a complement of Chinese 
workers were dispatched to the Yemen not long after the 
January 1957 arrival of the first Soviet mission.29 On 20 
March 1958 China and Yemen signed a Treaty of Friendship.
The accompanying agreement on scientific, technical and cul­
tural cooperation included China's offer of a non-interest 
bearing loan of 70 million Swiss francs.30 Yemen was by no 
means, however, the sole beneficiary of China's attention 
and resources. Such help as China offered to Yemen was part
34
of a broader Chinese effort to extend economic assistance to 
Afro--Asian countries.31
By the end of 1958, while five hundred Soviet technicians 
worked to construct a hospital as well as the port of 
Hodeida, and to improve the international airfield at 
Sana'a, one thousand of their Chinese counterparts labored 
to engineer and build the 143-mile Sana'a--Hodeida 
highway.32 Therefore, China's modest activities in the 
Yemen, as well as being fostered by the influence of Nasser, 
were undertaken within the context of the Sino--Soviet al­
liance .
Neither the personal prestige of Nasser nor China's acting 
in concert with the U.S.S.R., however, was sufficient to en­
sure that Chinese efforts would yield significant and endur­
ing benefits. Imam Ahmed, in whose hands official power was 
highly concentrated, resorted to foreign policy as a means 
of holding in check restive tribal factions, in whose hands 
actual (though fragmented) power resided. In this context, 
the Imam's invitation to the Soviets, and to the Chinese who 
accompanied them, was a reluctant undertaking: chiefly a 
response to a domestic political imperative.33 What is more, 
the Sino--Soviet option was an alternative rather than a 
preference, thrust upon the Imam by the reluctance of the 
United States to reply favorably to his overtures.
Having negotiated successfully for Soviet weapons, the 
Imam - whose fears of dissidents reportedly led him to hold 
one tribal hostage for every ten rifles he distributed - 
left heavy equipment to rust, lest it fall into the wrong
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hands.34 The Imam's conduct was probably no less exasperat­
ing to the Chinese than to the Soviets, for he flatly 
refused to pay either for arms or for construction work.35 
Therefore, from the beginning, Chinese involvement in the 
Yemen was tied to the vagaries of local politics. Yet, at a 
time when the PRC languished in diplomatic isolation, rela­
tions of any kind, particularly at relatively low cost, 
remained important to the Chinese leadership.
,(iji) China:.s -.Relations,- with igrae,Lj-
Up to the 1956 Franco--British--Israeli invasion, China 
had entertained the idea of relations with Israel without 
actually establishing them. In their separate struggles to 
earn international legitimacy, China and Israel faced a 
similar challenge.36 Of particular appeal to China, Israel's 
early signs of nonalignment and neutrality had happily con­
trasted with the pro-Western orientation of some of the Arab 
regimes. Also, Israel appeared to offer a possible link to 
West European and U.S. industries.37
Although Israel had been the first West Asian country to 
have recognised the PRC (9 January 1950) and had supported 
the first resolution to admit Chinese representatives to the 
U.N. (19 September 1950), relations between the two 
countries remained cool.38 The joint Suez invasion, however, 
marked the point at which China's anti-Western Middle East 
policy acquired a distinctly anti-Israeli dimension, as for 
the first time China publicly denounced Israel as an instru-
O  Q
ment of Western imperialism. Only from this time did rela­
tions with Israel and those with the Arabs appear to be 
mutually exclusive.
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The events of 1956 that involved Israel, and that produced 
a shift in Chinese policy regarding Israel, had implications 
that were not confined strictly to Sino--Israeli relations. 
The developments at Suez encouraged perhaps more than they 
disconcerted China. The 'loss' of Israel was amply counter­
balanced by the further alienation of the Arabs (principally 
Nasserist Egypt) from the West; and by the friction arising 
within the Atlantic alliance. The nationalisation suggested 
to China that a general anti-imperial awakening was under 
way, and that the Arabs were at its forefront.40 In addi­
tion, China's analysis of the inherent aggressiveness of 
capitalist imperialism was again confirmed, though at the 
price of its actual manifestation.
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Chapter I
An evaluation
What were China's objectives?
In the early and mid-1950s, China's objectives and tactics 
as well as the outermost boundaries of its success in the 
Middle East were determined by: domestic political and 
economic consolidation; the unabated hostility of the United 
States; the related strategic alignment with the Soviet 
Union; and the upsurge of anti-Westernism embodied in Nas­
serism. Prior to, and during, the Korean conflict, China 
fixed its strategic attention on its immediate international 
neighborhood. Immediately thereafter, China rebounded with a 
strategic confidence that enabled it to shed its tentative 
posture towards the developing world. China's initial immer­
sion in global politics, however, occurred within the con­
fines of its limited capabilities and was insulated from the 
dangers of its potential excesses by its alliance with the 
Soviet Union.
The Middle East in the mid-1950s constituted a region of 
strategic opportunity: encouraging China to seize the in­
itiative from the West, in collaboration with the Soviet 
Union, by exploiting anti-Western sentiment. By promising to 
shift the strategic battleground away from Chinese territory 
and to challenge the West to defend its monopolistic 
presence in the region, the Middle East offered China the 
occasion to pursue its statist and internationalist aims 
simultaneously. In addition, by predicating its relations
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with nationalist regimes on opposition to a common enemy, 
China sought to gain the establishment of formal diplomatic 
Lies, thereby strengthening its international legitimacy.
Yet another set of related political aims underlay China's 
efforts in the region at this time: the elevation of its 
status within the Soviet bloc through the acquisition of in­
fluence in the Middle East, and the increase of its in­
fluence in the Middle East through the improvement of its 
standing within the Soviet bloc.
What were China's tactics?
Perhaps as much the result of necessity as of choice,
China adopted a tactically flexible approach to the Middle 
East compatible with its limited means. First, beginning 
with the Bandung Conference, China encouraged and par­
ticipated in Afro--Asian meetings and conferences, both to 
forge an anti-Western consensus and to promote its own 
image. Second, although it may have preferred nationalist to 
monarchical regimes, in practice China displayed little 
ideological rigidity. Further evidence of its flexibility 
lay in China's de-emphasis of support for local communist 
parties in favor of ties with governments in power.Third, 
Beijing offered its good offices as well as generous (though 
limited) material support in helping to offset the West's 
campaign against Nasser. Finally, China cautiously amended 
its position of rather strict impartiality on the 
Arab--Israeli issue as circumstances confirmed Israel's 
growing ties to the West.
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Were China's efforts successful?
It quickly became apparent that whereas Chinese activities 
in the Middle East were anchored in safety, economy and con­
venience, its influence in the region was not safely, 
economically and conveniently anchored. China's alleged role 
in facilitating the Czech arms accord is unsubstantiated. 
There is no doubt, however, about Chou En-lai's impressive 
performance at Bandung. The figure of responsible statesman­
ship that Chou cut at the Conference almost certainly en­
hanced China's image in the Afro--Asian world generally, in­
cluding the Middle East. Nevertheless, China between 1949 
and 1957 primarily filled a collaborative and subordinate 
role in the Middle East.
China's position as junior partner to a Middle East 
latecomer was an important, yet by no means the exclusive, 
impediment to its realising its aims in the region. If, at 
times, the PRC expressed its disappointment with Moscow's 
over-cautiousness, it developed a similar dissatisfaction 
with the independent-mindedness of Arab statesmen, prin­
cipally Nasser.
Generally during this phase, China's efforts in the Middle 
East were confined to preliminary probing. Certainly, China 
made the important breakthrough of earning diplomatic 
recognition from Egypt, Syria and Yemen. At Bandung Chou En- 
lai's impressive personal diplomacy persuaded Arab states to 
support China's stand against Western imperialism, but this 
merely reflected a position that the Arabs themselves had 
already adopted. Not surprisingly, China's activities 
yielded no other concrete gains. On the contrary, China's
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efforts were in several ways counterproductive.
First, to the extent that China was helpful to the Soviet 
Union's quest to carve a place for itself in the region, 
such assistance as China actually rendered - seen in the 
light of the eventual dissolution of the Sino--Soviet al­
liance - was ultimately harmful to Chinese interests in the 
region.
Second, China's activity in the Middle East almost in­
stantly posed a dual dilemma: choosing sides and finding 
justification for doing so. China's courtship of nationalist 
leaders, for instance, risked the alienation of conservative 
Arabs, solidifying rather than eroding Western influence 
among them. At the same time, it compromised local com­
munists, spawning mistrust while raising the twin issues of 
reliability and ideological consistency. China's position on 
the Arab--Israeli question was equally problematic. Main­
taining impartiality in the Arab--Israeli conflict became 
increasingly awkward under the pressure of Arab opinion.
Gradual abandonment of it, however, effectively barred the 
door to official Sino--Israeli relations.
Still, at affordable costs, China's activity enabled it to 
break into the international community. This happened at the 
same time that the Western monopoly in the Middle East was 
being challenged, a development which, though occurring 
somewhat independently of Beijing's efforts, was nonetheless 
important to its long-term prospects in the region. Finally, 
however unsusceptible to measurement, China's pro-Arab ges­
tures earned Arab goodwill and built long-term political credit.
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Chapter II 
The cost of militancy 
1958 —  1965
A. Strains in the alliance:
Developments outside the Middle East from 1956 to 1958, 
with important implications for Chinese policy in the 
region, had furnished cause for China to be optimistic about 
the anti-imperialist struggle. The Soviet Union's successful 
ICBM testing, followed by the launching of the Sputnik earth 
satellite (at a time when Beijing saw Moscow's fate entwined 
with its own) reinforced an individual confidence resting on 
a firm, if not ideal, collective foundation.1
In hindsight China's confidence at the time seems to have 
been unjustified. Yet, whether or not it was warranted, 
China's enthusiasm was important: first because it differed 
substantially in its intensity from that of the Soviet 
Union; and second because it generated a degree of Chinese 
militancy which was unacceptable to its alliance partner and 
therefore detrimental to the Sino— Soviet partnership.
Optimism about the prevailing strength of socialism and 
realism about the need to maintain a solid socialist edifice 
led China at first to submerge its dissatisfaction with the 
inadequacy of Soviet leadership (which it held responsible 
for disturbing the cohesion upon which China's security 
depended). In its reaction to the 1956 uprising in Poland, 
Beijing's disapproval of 'Great Russian chauvinism' was
45
clearly detectable, but not scathingly critical.2 Commenting 
on the subsequent unrest in Hungary, Beijing reverted to 
strong support for the Soviet intervention,3 and forcefully 
argued the need to preserve the integrity of socialism as 
well as socialist solidarity. Likewise, the PRC initially 
couched its disapproval of de-Stalinisation in the language 
of wise fraternal advice.4
Certainly, China was concerned about developments in 
Eastern Europe and about the quality of Soviet leadership in 
managing the affairs of the 'socialist camp.' Furthermore, 
China's foremost strategic concerns were resolving disputes 
over, and ensuring the security of, its borders.
Nonetheless, Beijing devoted considerable attention to the 
developing world as a whole.
By 1958 a subtle but significant shift in the thinking of 
the Chinese leadership appears to have occurred which 
modified their attitude and approach towards Afro--Asia. In 
contrast to the thesis propounded during the brief Bandung 
phase, there seemed to emerge in China the revised view that 
peace was possible, but not imminent; and that peace could 
only be attained if and when national struggles were won.5 
Kuo Mo-jo, China's chief delegate to the 1958 Afro--Asian 
Solidarity Conference, described his country's position 
succinctly: 'We regard their struggles and their victories 
as our own.'6 It is in this context that the devlopment of 
China's policy towards the Middle East can best be 
understood.
-li). Crises and the Middle East;
China's interest in, and posture towards, the Middle East
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conformed to these general patterns of sustained attention 
to developing countries and increasing militancy. Vice­
premier Ch'en Yi asserted that the focal point of the 
struggle against imperialism was the East -- including the 
Middle East -- not Europe:
At present, the Egyptians and the peoples of 
other Arab countries stand on the Western 
advance line of struggle against colonialism.7
The enunciation of the Eisenhower Doctrine had been the first 
in a series of events related to, or occurring in, the Middle 
East which appeared to reinforce this thinking. To China, 
the Eisenhower Doctrine furnished evidence of 'rising 
imperialist contention' in Asia and Africa. In addition to 
indicating clearly America's hostile intentions, the 
Eisenhower Doctrine forewarned of a new round of Western 
interventionism, pinpointing the Middle East as a prime 
target. Mao drew the conclusion that the Middle East had 
become 'of great significance in the American plan for 
aggression.'8
In that this apparent imperialist thrust seemed to be 
aimed at the periphery of, not directly at, socialist 
countries, Beijing considered the new U.S. 'offensive' more 
of an opportunity than a direct threat to China. Still, Mao 
U.S. interventionism in the Third World generally, and in 
the Middle East in particular, to be dangerous:
The U.S. imperialists obstinately try to 
interfere in the internal affairs of other 
countries... The U.S. is still planning to 
invade independent Syria through Turkey and
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Israel; it is still conspiring to subvert 
the anti-colonialist Egyptian government.
This maniac aggressive policy of the U.S. 
has not only precipitated a crisis in the 
Middle East, but has also created the dan­
ger of a new world war.9
Assisting the countries and peoples of Afro--Asia to resist 
imperialist aggression was viewed by China as an 
ideological imperative. In addition, considering that the 
U.S. threat was aimed at the Middle East rather than at 
China itself, support for Afro--Asian resistance constituted 
a relatively safe form of socialist self-strengthening. The 
Middle East was considered a buffer or protective shield, 
which not only required support, but safely permitted it.
From this perspective, Mao's bold, sweeping and unequivocal 
response to the Eisenhower Doctrine is less surprising:
Then shall we speak or not? Yes, we shall. We 
shall certainly support the anti-imperialist 
struggles of the people in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America and the developing struggles of 
the people of all countries.
Yet, Beijing's apparent conviction that a battle could be 
successfully waged against the 'imperialists' without 
inviting catastrophe was not necessarily shared by Moscow. 
Seen in this light, events in the Middle East, beginning 
with the enunciation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, functioned 
as a catalyst for a debate between China and the Soviet 
Union concerning under what circumstances and by what means 
to address the 'imperialist challenge'. The Eisenhower
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Doctrine therefore can be said in effect to have tested the 
practical limits of Khrushchev's newly proclaimed commitment 
to 'peaceful coexistence'. Ironically, just as China's 
assessment of the world situation argued the merits and 
potentials of a confrontation with the West over the Middle 
East, the Soviet Union officially committed itself to 
avoiding one.
On 18 January 1957, Moscow and Peking issued a joint 
declaration which included a pledge to support the peoples 
of the Middle East and a vague promise to 'prevent' 
aggression against them. Sino-Soviet divergences were 
successfully submerged in the language of the communique. 
However, they were forced closer to the surface by Moscow's 
conduct in the ensuing month which included its proposal to 
ban arms transfers to the Middle East. In responding to the 
Soviet initiatives, Peking hinted at its displeasure by 
emphasising that the peoples of the Middle East alone should 
determine their needs.11
The winter of 1957--58 was an important juncture in the 
evolution of China's foreign policy. Events in the Middle 
East during that time contributed to changes in the overall 
structure of China's foreign relations; in turn, 
developments not specifically related to the Middle East had 
a pronounced effect on China's future posture towards the 
region. In summer 1958, following nearly one year during 
which the Sino--Soviet dispute over strategy had been 
confined to words, developments in the Middle East - 
beginning with the 13 July Iraq coup and leading to the 
Western interventions in Lebanon and Jordan - blossomed into
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a crisis. That crisis clarified the differences between the 
degree of risk that Khrushchev was willing to accept and the 
degree that Mao wanted him to accept. Stuart Schram 
describes the significance of this season of change as
a major watershed in the history of the 
contemporary world. Before it, China's 
economic and other policies appeared 
basically similar to those of the Soviet 
Union, and the monolithic unity of the 
Communist bloc was taken for granted by most 
observers, despite the Yugoslav precedent. 
After it, China was embarked on a series of 
policies radically different from those of 
the Soviets both in style and content, and an 
evolution was in progress that would soon 
lead to an open clash between Europe-centered 
and Asia-centered forms of Communism.12
Concerning the interventions in Lebanon and Jordan, China 
appealed to the Soviet Union for a demonstration of its 
resoluteness. A Renmin Ribao editorial captures the 
seriousness with which China viewed the situation:
In the face of this U.S.-British war 
provocation, the peaceful and freedom-loving 
peoples of the world definitely cannot afford 
to look on with folded arms.13
The Chinese were scornful of Khrushchev's exclusive use of 
diplomacy to ward off the the U.S. and British troop 
deployments in Lebanon and Jordan. On the day of 
Khrushchev's arrival in Beijing (31 July), an article 
appearing in Red Flag contained poorly disguised, 
disapproving references to Moscow's position:
The peace-loving people certainly do not want 
war, but those who really treasure peace will 
never bow to threats of war. Peace cannot be
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got by begging from the imperialists. War can 
be stopped and peace won only through mass 
struggle...14
Similarly, in response to apparent threats against Syria, 
China voiced concern that failure to take adequate measures 
to prevent the fall of the Syrian regime would boost Western 
confidence, thereby encouraging a direct attack on the 
'socialist camp'.15
Both Chou and Mao linked the issues of Taiwan and the 
Middle East, associating them as two fronts in the same 
struggle against Western aggression.16 China, which 
unsuccessfully prodded the U.S.S.R. to respond with force in 
the Middle East case, also expected firm support from Moscow 
in its confrontation with Taiwan, but received little.17 
This is not to suggest that the two sets of crises were 
identical in nature or equal in importance to China. Among 
other things, the Taiwan Straits episode was a crisis 
engineered by China. In addition, unlike the Middle East 
case, Beijing's brinkmanship in deciding to bombard Quemoy 
was an assertion of sovereignty. Thus, the Taiwan Straits 
crisis was of far greater consequence than its Middle East 
counterpart. Still, it is important to recognise the degree 
to which China's Middle East policy was integrally related 
to its global strategic posture and the way in which that 
posture was distinctly at odds with that of Moscow.
-lii), China's Egypt;
Developments at the regional level, directly involving the 
PRC, did perhaps more to produce China's disillusionment and 
spur its temporary retraction from the Middle East than any
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perceived failure of Moscow's to accommodate its militancy. 
Other than the 1958 opening of the New China News Agency 
office in Cairo, the period 1958 to 1963 witnessed a 
reduction of Chinese activity in the region that paralleled, 
if it did not actually arise from, a marked diminution of 
its influence.
During this time Beijing was repeatedly reminded that the 
independent ambitions of the region's pivotal figure,
Nasser, neither ideologically nor strategically coincided 
with its own. Nasser's interest in maintaining a balanced 
position vis-a-vis the superpowers did not accord with 
China's preferences. Egypt's persecution of local communists
- even though China's principal attraction to Nasser had an 
anti-imperialist rather than a strictly socialist foundation
- earned similar disapproving, if inoffensively worded, 
criticism.18
On the occasion of Egypt's alleged role in the Shawwaf 
coup in Iraq, Beijing voiced its displeasure in more 
explicit terms, disturbed by Nasser's 'hegemonic' aims, 
which appeared to have assumed priority over the struggle 
against the West.19 A Red Flag editorial characterised 
Nasser's actions against Qassem as 'arrogant attacks' and 
'frenzied abuses'. Stitching these criticisms together was 
China's concern that the U.S., which typically disapproved 
of Nasser, was pleased and assisted by his efforts. 
Consistent with its increasingly vociferous criticism of 
Moscow's 'capitulationism', China objected to Nasser's 
positive neutrality. However, China seemed reluctant to
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challenge Nasser openly. For example, Beijing couched its 
disapproval of Egypt's association with Yugoslavia by 
focusing criticism on Tito.20
China's reluctance to attack Nasser is attributable not 
only to Nasser's prestige in the Middle East, but also to 
the importance that Beijing attached to Egypt as a 
bridgehead to Africa. It is helpful to recall that the 
establishment of the embassy in Cairo was also China's first 
embassy in Africa. Besides gaining an entree to the Arab 
world, China's link with Egypt had provided an outpost from 
which to monitor events and initiate contacts on the African 
continent. In 1958, just as Sino--Egyptian relations were 
experiencing difficulties, the Afro--Asian Peoples' 
Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) located its new secretariat 
in Cairo. The Chinese mission to the AAPSO was, among other 
things, a channel to the Algerian National Liberation 
Front.21 E. C. Chibwe refers to Cairo as the center for 
Afro--Arab and Afro--Asian discussion on economic 
cooperation, international trade, and economic aid for and 
among developing countries.22 Thus, there was more at stake 
for China in its relations with Egypt than was apparent.
If China had complaints with Nasser's policies, Nasser in 
turn disapproved of China's policies. Nasser either 
genuinely suspected Chinese involvement in the Mosul and 
Kirkuk massacres in Iraq, or else used these incidents to 
highlight his differences with Beijing.23 He seized the 
opportunity to express sympathy with the Tibetan revolt, and 
he warned China against interfering in Iraq.24 Nasser 
deplored China's decision to permit ousted Syrian Communist
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Party General Secretary Khalid Bakdash to deliver a 
blistering personal attack in Beijing in September 1958 in 
reaction to the formation of the UAR.25
As previously argued, despite undercurrents of 
disagreement on an ever-increasing number of issues, the 
Sino--Soviet alliance remained essentially intact until the 
close of the 1950s. Broadly speaking, the overarching 
objective of breaking Western predominance in the Middle 
East continued to be the shared primary purpose of Moscow 
and Beijing. Meanwhile, as Sino--Soviet friction 
intensified, the U.S.S.R. appeared to be no more successful 
than China in bending Nasser to its preferences. Khrushchev 
and Nasser quarrelled over the communists' direction of the 
Iraqi revolution; over Nasser's persecution of local 
communists (which was no less embarrassing to Moscow than to 
Beijing); and over the suggestion that the U.S.S.R. would 
accede to a limitation of arms transfers to the region.26 
Interestingly, the worsening of Sino--Egyptian relations 
paralleled deteriorating Sino--Soviet relations. However, 
there is no evidence that China's friction with one country 
adversely affected its relations with the other.
(iii) Syria falls to the UAR;
The 1958 crisis elevated the importance of Syria to the 
Chinese. So also did Nasser's uncooperativeness. For, if 
defending Syria against the West was Beijing's cardinal 
objective, cultivating relations with Syria in order to 
offset Nasser's influence was an important subsidiary aim.
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As previously argued, however, supporting Syria against the 
West assumed a significance for China that was not 
necessarily shared by Moscow. Although, to the satisfaction 
of the Chinese, Syria 'escaped' a U.S. military 
intervention, this outcome was not attributed by Beijing to 
Moscow's resoluteness. In the meantime, Damascus had been 
subjected to intimidation while the Sino--Soviet alliance 
had been subjected to friction.
Yet, lack of firm Soviet support was by no means the sole 
barrier to closer association between China and Syria. The 
souring of Sino--Egyptian relations, which had heightened 
China's interest in Syria, tended to reduce China's 
prospects for cementing ties with Syria. Recall that Sino-- 
Syrian relations had originally profited from cordiality 
between China and Egypt. Syrian recognition of the PRC, for 
example, has been attributed to Nasser's influence.27 
Throughout the 1950s, although Syria's domestic political 
situation was turbulent, its foreign policy never lay 
entirely outside the orbit of Nasser's influence.
Ironically, just as China transferred its attention to Syria 
(partly to compensate for deteriorating relations with 
Nasser), Nasser succeeded in absorbing Syria into the UAR.
The formation of the UAR had consequences for China that 
cut two ways. Insofar as the union of Egypt and Syria 
represented a more solid front against Western imperialism, 
it was approved by Beijing. On the other hand, in light of 
China's deteriorating relations with Nasser, the formation 
of the UAR was less than a welcome development. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, Beijing refrained from either
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strong criticism or applause.
Throughout the brief lifespan of the UAR, China maintained 
this cautious posture of neither extolling the union's 
virtues nor ridiculing it for its shortcomings. When, on 28 
September 1961, Syria seceded from the UAR, China did not 
display its approval loudly and enthusiastically, despite 
the coolness between Cairo and Beijing. In fact, not until 
11 October did China extend recognition to the new Syrian 
regime; and the PRC's ambassador, Hsu Yi-hsin, was not 
posted to Damascus until May 1962.28
How is one to account for China's response - or lack of 
one - to the reassertion of Syrian independence? In the 
absence of clear evidence, one is led to consider three 
possible explanations. First, Beijing's reaction to Syria's 
defection from the UAR could be interpreted as an exercise 
in caution and restraint: a measured response designed to 
avoid Nasser's further alienation. A second possibility - 
which also views China's hesitancy as purposeful - is that 
China recognised the secession as the latest episode in the 
ongoing but unresolved 'struggle for Syria' waged between 
Egypt and Iraq. China was therefore reluctant to behave in a 
manner that could be construed as 'taking sides.'Finally, 
the delay in both issuing formal recognition and assigning 
an envoy to Damascus could be explained as an indication 
that China simply could not assess the situation.
(iv) Relations w ith Iraq;
Although appearing reluctant to challenge Nasser openly,
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China did not abandon its efforts to head off his influence. 
Whereas the formation of the UAR temporarily removed one 
opportunity, the 1958 Iraqi revolution seemed to provide 
another in its place. The revolution detached Iraq from the 
Baghdad Pact, without shifting the country into Nasser's 
embrace. The early receptiveness to, or at least tolerance 
of, Iraqi communists, was also encouraging to Beijing.
As in the Syrian case, China's position with respect to 
Iraq revealed and heightened friction between the PRC and 
the U.S.S.R. The Iraqi revolution, which had delivered a 
blow to the Baghdad Pact, signified to Moscow a satisfactory 
outcome; to Beijing, however, the affair represented an 
encouraging basis for liberating the entire region. In 
contrast to the subdued response to the formation of the 
UAR, China hailed the birth of the Iraqi republic. A Renmin 
Ribao editorial offers the following rationale for China's 
reaction:
The founding of the Iraqi Republic is 
especially significant for the Asian and 
African peoples because the Faisal monarchy 
of Iraq was the initiator of the Baghdad Pact 
and a cornerstone of U.S. and British 
imperialist aggression in the Middle East.
Now this cornerstone has fallen with a bang, 
and moreover, Iraq has become an anti­
imperialist forefront.29
China's instant recognition of the Iraqi Republic and warm 
congratulations to Qassem are a matter of record. Other 
aspects of Sino--Iraqi relations at the time, however, are 
less clear. Hashim Behbehani notes that, within eighteen 
months of the revolution, eight Iraqi delegations visited 
China while three Chinese missions journeyed to Iraq.
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Primarily on the basis of this evidence, he concludes that 
Sino--Iraqi relations underwent 'rapid development.'30 Yet, 
as Behbehani's own observations reveal, most of these were 
cultural and peace missions. Certainly, such missions 
indicate a degree of cordiality between the two countries. 
And they might have provided their members with the 
opportunity to assert their countries' similarity of 
purpose. However, it is uncertain at best that these 
meetings produced anything more substantial, even if they 
were intended to. Not until 25 May 1960, for example, did 
the two countries sign their first trade and payments 
agreement.31
It might be useful to view Sino--Iraqi relations in this 
period somewhat differently. China was attracted to Iraq for 
reasons besides the revolutionaries' apparent opposition to 
U.S. imperialism. At the time of the revolution, the Iraqi 
communists were well-organised and, in light of the excesses 
of the Old Regime, the views that they espoused were not 
anathema to the masses.32 Initially, Iraqi nationalists and 
communists collaborated. Encouragingly, the Iraqi communists 
were anti-Nasserists who opposed incorporation within the 
UAR.33
Yet, it is difficult to imagine that attraction to Iraq 
prevented China from taking note of other developments in 
Iraq that, while equally obvious, were less promising. The 
'united front' which succeeded in overthrowing the Iraqi 
monarchy was clearly disunited. Although Qassem sought the 
support of anti-Nasserist communists, he himself was not
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ideologically committed to communism.34 Throughout its 
period of growth and activity, the Iraqi Communist Party 
(ICP) operated under a thin veil of anonymity: it was never 
officially recognised as a legal political party. ICP 
officers were not allowed to occupy the highest rungs of 
local administration or to arm the People's Revolutionary 
Force. Even when the ICP reached the apex of its strength - 
dominating trade unions and organising the peasantry - 
Qassem quickly suspended ICP activities and dismissed its 
officials (especially those occupying positions in the 
military and broadcasting). Therefore, the ICP, though with 
a larger following and more diverse activities than 
communist parties elsewhere in the region, was nonetheless 
kept under close surveillance and held in tight check.
The communists themselves were largely responsible for the 
bloody skirmishes at Mosul (March 1959) and Kirkuk (July 
1959) .35 The fragmentation of the post-revolutionary 
situation in Iraq as well as the association of local 
communists with brutal slayings and torturings probably 
counteracted whatever temptations existed for China to throw 
its full support behind either Qassem or the communists in 
I raq.
One piece of evidence confirming that China was more of an 
interested spectator than a powerful actor in Iraq during 
this phase is the July 1959 Central Committee report issued 
by the ICP. In evaluating its efforts, the ICP Central 
Committee report, according to Uriel Dann, shows that
the ICP was independent in its decisions. The 
errors were of its own making and the lessons
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were drawn by its own members. If outside
influence was exerted, the report reveals no
sign of it. The Soviet Union was mentioned 
quite perfunctorily, considering the 
customary party style, and China not at 
all.36
With the exception of the presence in Baghdad of Chinese
cultural and other such delegations, there is little
indication of either considerable involvement in, or 
influence over, Iraq. Given the change and complexity that 
characterised Iraqi domestic politics at the time, this is 
hardly surprising. If one takes the view that its modest 
efforts in Iraq reflected China's understanding of Iraq's 
domestic political situation, two interesting conclusions 
emerge. First, in exercising caution and restraint in its 
approach towards Iraq, China duplicated the policy it had 
adopted towards Syria, perhaps for similar reasons. Second, 
to the extent that its lack of involvement in Iraq was an 
expression of choice, China's policy towards Iraq 
represented a failure of commitment no different from that 
for which it had chided Moscow.
(y) Additional constraints;
China's relative withdrawal from Middle Eastern affairs in 
this period cannot be explained solely in terms of the 
mutual recrimination that characterised Sino--Egyptian 
relations; the vicissitudes of Middle East regional 
politics; or Sino--Soviet discord regarding the proper 
policy approach towards the region. During this period, 
China was not merely preoccupied with domestic economic 
reform, it was handicapped by the failures of, and the near­
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famine conditions brought about by, attempts at reform.
The launching of The Great Leap Forward in 1958 produced a 
set of consequences which extended into the sphere of 
foreign policy. Whereas China developed an interest in 
competing with the U.S.S.R., it was more than ever unable to 
deploy the material resources necessary to do so. The funds 
to finance aid projects on the scale of the Aswan Dam, or 
even less ambitious ones, were even more scarce in the 
context of domestic economic hardship.
China's economic crisis had an effect on its foreign 
relations, but its foreign relations had an effect on the 
severity of China's economic crisis. Moscow's July 1960 
decision to withdraw Soviet technicians from the PRC further 
hobbled the Chinese economy. Perhaps unwittingly, the 
U.S.S.R. contributed to the temporary crippling of China's 
economic foreign policy instruments. Ultimately, then, 
Moscow's action weakened China's competitiveness in the 
Middle East, as elsewhere. China's retreat from the Middle 
East in this period received its primary and initial impetus 
from its deteriorating political relations with Nasser. 
However, its retraction was strongly influenced by domestic 
economic upheaval, made worse by the Soviet departure.
B. Invoking the 'united front'
.(i ) C r e e p i n g ,  j e o l a t i o n ;
From the outset of the decade, interrupted by only a brief 
suspension in their polemic, the Sino--Soviet relationship 
steadily deteriorated. During the 1962 Sino--Indian border
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conflict, the Soviet Union adopted a tacitly pro-Indian 
position. Beijing reacted with outrage.37 Unlike the 
restraint that had formerly characterised its criticism of 
Moscow, China openly assailed the ineptness of the Soviet 
leadership. Following the Cuban missile crisis, for example, 
China decried Khrushchev's crisis management as 
'adventurism' and 'capitulationism' . 38
The events of 1962--63 suggested to China that Khrushchev 
was irredeemably revisionist, and that the Soviet Union had 
'forfeited its place in the ranks of the vanguard of the 
international proletariat.'39 To China, its criticisms and 
exhortations, whether politely or crudely expressed, had 
produced no discernible change in Moscow's policies. In 
denouncing the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) - as an 
affront to its sovereignty and a display of Great Power 
collusion40 - China invoked the strident tone which 
signalled the total dissolution of the Sino--Soviet 
alliance.41
In light of the Sino--Soviet schism, the specter of 
superpower detente was anything but comforting to China. A 
new sense of creeping isolation contributed to a 
reformulation of China's foreign policy. Yet, it would be 
misleading to attribute this development solely to China's 
revised assessment of its relations with the superpowers.
The period 1958--1962 had been marked by various questions 
and confrontations relating to China's sovereignty. The 
period had opened with the Taiwan Straits crisis; had 
included difficult negotiations over borders with Burma and 
Nepal; and had involved a simmering boundary dispute with
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India that culminated in war.
Although nine of China's ten neighbors were socialist 
countries, relations with them remained complex and uneasy 
By the end of 1962 China's economy began to recover, but 
China's tensions with, and concerns about, its neighbors 
failed to subside. Commenting on the backdrop to China's 
adoption of the United Front, Wang Gungwu argues,
The central issue of China's independence 
remained tied to the question of its 
sovereignty over the territories and peoples 
it inherited.42
When Mao adopted the United Front, he rehabilitated a 
framework which he had originally developed decades earlier, 
but made it conform to the exigencies of the early 1960s.
Mao had long considered the vast geographic area separating 
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as the battleground of socialism 
and capitalism. The new version of the 'intermediate zone' 
was more expansive than its predecessor, however. It 
welcomed a broad range of potential allies including small 
and medium-sized capitalist countries. In addition, it 
deliberately excluded the Soviet Union from its ranks. The 
latter - no longer China's erring partner but a dangerous 
imperialist collaborator - was presented as a target rather 
than an integral part of the United Front.
China devoted a great deal of its energy to nurturing 
relations with the 'first intermediate zone', the developing 
world. China paid particular attention to Africa, which was 
depicted as a 'storm center of revolution.' Revealing the 
same propensity for generalisation and hyperbole formerly
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reserved for reporting events in the Middle East, the 
Chinese official press transferred its coverage to Africa. 
The African continent was portrayed as,
... seething ... The new situation created by 
the unfolding of the national independence 
movement in Africa is shaking the imperialist 
colonial system and hastening its collapse.43
Charles Neuhauser quotes the Chinese Army's Bulletin of 
Activities as a reliable indicator of China's interest in 
Africa, and of China's rationale for that interest:
Africa is now both the center of the anti­
colonialist struggle and the center for East 
and West to fight for control of an 
intermediate zone, so that it has become the 
key point of world interests.44
The conviction that imperialism had concentrated its 
offensive strategy in this region, and possibly 
overstretched its capacities, fed China's interest in the 
developing world, but in Africa especially. This approach 
was merely a shift in emphasis
and direction, however, in China's posture towards Afro-- 
Asia. For China had consistently recognised the importance 
of new states, and had sought to enlist them in the struggle 
against a single foe.
The language of the United Front however was markedly more 
strident than the 'Bandung line'. In addition, United Front 
diplomacy was more potentially disruptive than Bandung 
diplomacy. Although China continued to conduct relations at 
the intergovernmental level, it actively encouraged the 
creation of sub-official organisations and retreated from
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its adherence to non-interference in the affairs of new 
states.
China pledged itself to supply a sense of collective 
purpose. It relied primarily on words, in the form of 
cajolery, to portray itself as the base area, rather than 
the front line, of revolution. Although it relied primarily 
on persuasion by words rather than persuasion by deeds,
China revived trade with, and dispensed new aid to, the 
developing world. Besides signifying the partial recovery of 
the Chinese economy, this shed light on the enduring 
attitudes of the Chinese leadership. For, whatever the 
quantitative indices of China's power, China's leaders 
seemed characteristically to reach beyond them. Somewhat 
consistently, ambition determined affordability, rather than 
the other way around. Michael Yahuda notes that:
Mao and his colleagues tended to think in 
global terms even though China's actual 
capabilities were only of regional 
significance.45
The essence of the United Front was tactical flexibility. 
While the Chinese official press talked the language of 
revolution, Chinese foreign policy behavior demonstrated an 
easy mix of ideological orthodoxy and pragmatism. Peter Van 
Ness describes China's foreign policy during this phase as
a militant, non-dogmatic assault on the 
status quo, one which welcomed as allies any 
groups or individuals willing to commit 
themselves to policies involving some degree 
of change in what Peking saw to be the right 
direction.46
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Evolving from critic to ideological rival to claimant as 
the sole true source of socialism, the PRC pursued a dual 
policy of aligning with the governments of developing states 
against 'common' external enemies and encouraging 
revolutionary armed struggle.47 Yet, to point out that 
China's United Front was a more expansive search for allies 
is not to suggest that it was an arbitrary one. China, at 
least as carefully as in the past, evaluated its prospective 
allies individually, assessing their predilections or 
revolutionary potential on a case-by-case basis.
.14ij -The.. Middle East ..On the ,,,Eve g>f the United Front:
Beginning with the Syrian secession from the U.A.R. in 
1961, a series of developments occurred within the Middle 
East which sharpened divisions within the Arab world. The 
first was the outbreak of civil war in North Yemen. In that 
conflict Egyptian troops were dispatched on behalf of the 
revolutionaries and in opposition to the Saudi-supported 
monarchists. Thus, a local conflict originating on the Arab 
periphery became a regional conflict of central importance 
to the future of inter-Arab politics.
Initially, this local conflict presented Nasser with an 
opportunity to recover the initiative in inter-Arab politics 
(following the U.A.R. setback). Eventually, however, the 
five-year intervention came to represent for Nasser a decade 
marked by overcommitment, and (in 1967) humbling defeat.
Second, in 1963 a Ba'thist-led coup took place in Iraq. 
Initial expectations that the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'thists
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might agree to a federal union with Egypt were rather 
quickly disappointed. Neither Syrian nor Iraqi Ba'thists 
were willing to concede to a formula for union that might 
result in Egyptian predominance; nor was Nasser willing to 
accept anything less. Commenting on the importance of the 
Iraqi coup, Patrick Seale states,
The events in Baghdad changed the rules of 
Arab poliMcs. Traq, which Qasim's isolation­
ism had kept out of play, re-entereed the 
mainstream, and the Ba'th party was trans­
formed. From being a divided and enfeebled rump 
of a party it suddenly looked like a major rad­
ical and pan-Arab force on a par with Nasser 
himself.
Thus, during this period, a second axis of inter-Arab 
hostility developed: to the 'revolutionary' vs.
'traditional' Arab rivalry (e.g. Egypt vs. Saudi Arabia) was 
a added a rivalry among 'revolutionary' Arab regimes (ie., 
'Nasserists' vs. Ba'thists, and eventually Iraqi vs. Syrian 
Ba'thists as well) .<19
In the area of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian peninsula, 
other significant changes were under way. In 1961, Kuwait 
attained its independence, marking the initial phase of the 
British withdrawal from the area. As already noted, the 
North Yemeni civil war was transformed into an inter-Arab 
conflict as a result of the involvement of Egypt troops and 
Saudi support for the monarchists. In 1964, a tribal 
rebellion broke out in the Qara mountains in the Dhofar 
territory of Oman. Initially, this rebellion took on a 
'nationalist and pro-Nasser coloration' primarily as the 
result of the spread of Nasser's ideas rather than as a
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consequence of direct Egyptian involvement.50 Within the next 
several years, the movement, which had originally been 
called the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF), would elect a new 
leadership, assume a new name (The Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf), and a elaborate a 
charter linking the Dhofari insurgency to mass struggle in 
the Gulf.51 Thus, as China launched its United Front, inter- 
Arab politics was in a state of ferment and flux.
ii jj) The, .United Front .In ...tbs-Middle-East
During the mid-1960s there were several indications that 
China had begun to attach greater importance to the Middle 
East than in the preceding several years. Shichor provides 
some useful evidence to support this.
First, the Chinese Foreign Ministry was reorganised in a manner 
which reflected the growing importance of Middle East (and 
African affairs). The Department of African and West Asian 
Affairs was divided in two, forming the Department of 
African Affairs; and the Department of North African and West 
Asian Affairs. Thus, a separate department was created with 
special responsibility for Arab affairs. In addition, Vice- 
Foreign Ministers Chi P'eng-fei and Tseng Yung-ch'uan were 
appointed to head this new creation, marking the first time 
that such high-ranking officials were charged with responsibility 
for Sino-Arab relations. Finally, experienced, senior 
diplomats were dispatched to Chinese missions in the Middle 
East, including Ho Kung-k'ai, former director of the 
Department of African and West Asian Affairs (who was sent 
to Egypt as counsellor and charge d'affaires).
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Shichor also montions Llie higher frequency of official 
messages of goodwill and support conveyed by China to Arab 
leaders; and points out the increase in the value and volume 
of Sino--Middle Eastern trade as well as the Middle East's 
share of Chinese economic assistance to developing 
countries.52
It is primarily on the basis of this evidence that Shichor 
describes the Middle East as 'special' to China. It is 
important to emphasise, however, that China's increased 
involvement in the Middle East reflected its greater 
attention to the developing world as a whole. China's 
heightened interest in the Middle East was, to a large 
extent, a function of its general effort to build a United 
Front. Viewed in this way, the Middle East was 'special' 
insofar as it could be incorporated in the struggle to 
oppose the U.S. and compete effectively with the U.S.S.R.
By the early 1960s, China was at odds with Moscow as well 
as with Washington. This meant, in effect, that China had 
three forces to contend with in the Middle East: the United 
States, the paramount 'imperialist' power; the Soviet Union, 
the PRC's socialist rival; and Egypt's Nasser, the region's 
most formidable but least manipulable figure.
Competition with the Soviet Union in the early '60s was an 
important factor in the broader theater of China's Afro-- 
Asian relations. The open rift with the Soviet Union urged 
China's assertion of its status and presence in the widest 
possible terms.53 The Middle East, which in the 1950s had 
served as a theater of Sino--Soviet collaboration, in the
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1960s functioned as an arena of Sino--Soviet rivalry.
On what basis did China hope to further its prospects in 
the Middle East, or for that matter, elsewhere in the 
developing world? In other words, what was the rationale for 
extending the United Front to Afro--Asian countries, 
particularly to the Middle East? Van Ness argues that,
'the basic cement of Peking's desired 
alliance with the underdeveloped world was a 
common colonial experience and a continuing 
opposition to any form of foreign 
intervention or interference.'5
It is important to remember that the essence of the United 
Front was the endorsement of armed struggles with a minimum 
of direct involvement in them. Van Ness maintains that 
geographical proximity to China, along with degree of 
receptivity to Chinese foreign policy goals primarily 
determined those struggles in which China would invest more 
than mere words.55 Using these criteria, it would appear 
that the Middle East was generally not a high priority 
within the framework of the United Front. Still, this does 
not mean that China abandoned interest or refrained from 
involvement in the region.
(iv) China's Relations with EgypjLL
As in earlier years, China's highest hopes as well as its 
greatest difficulties in the Middle East lay in effectively 
managing its relations with Egypt. In this phase, as 
previously, Nasser's influence within the region seemed 
necessary yet impossible for China to harness.
The PRC appeared try to head off, or compete
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with, Nasser for influence by recognising break-away Syria 
as well as Kuwait; by sponsoring 'rival' Afro--Asian 
organisations (e.g. the June 1964 Asian— African Economic 
Seminar, about which Egypt was not informed) . Even while 
trying to undercut Nasser in this manner, China continued to 
seek better relations with him.
China's ambivalence can be understood partly as a sign of 
respect for, and relative impotence in the face of, Nasser's 
stature in the region; and partly as a sign that Beijing did 
not necessarily want to expose Nasser to the West. A direct 
attack on Nasser's policies, as a means of seeking to alter 
them, threatened not only to fail to produce the desired 
effect, but also to be counterproductive. Seeking to provoke 
or discredit Egypt could have alienated many in the Middle 
East who were not otherwise hostile towards China and not 
otherwise Nasser's most ardent followers. Pressuring Nasser 
to adopt positions against his wishes also risked driving 
him further into Moscow's orbit.
It is unlikely that Beijing, though aiming to influence or 
to counteract Nasser's policies, sought to contribute to his 
downfall. However little interest he showed in taking cues 
from Beijing, China surely recognised that Nasser 
represented the strongest resistance to U.S. domination of 
the Middle East. On the one hand, China hoped to capitalise 
eventually on Nasser's misfortunes by quietly nurturing 
relations with his rivals. On the other hand, China tried to 
use Nasser's foreign policy reversals and anxieties as an 
opportunity to repair relations with him.
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Were these signs of policy inconsistency? Was China unable 
to make up its mind about Nasser? One could argue that 
Beijing's apparently shifting posture towards Nasser was the 
very hallmark of the United Front, which relied on a blend 
of 'carrot and stick'.57
Some signs of conciliation between Cairo and Beijing arose 
during Chou's visit in December 1963, which resulted in 
China's agreement to purchase Egyptian cotton. The next 
year, China donated industrial equipment worth $80 million 
to Egypt; Sino--Egyptian trade in 1964 doubled the previous 
year's.58 This statistical evidence can, however, be read in
two ways: either as a sign that China was aiming to improve
relations with Egypt; or, more optimistically, as an 
indication that relations between the two countries were 
already better.
China's decision to extend aid to Egypt represented a 
departure from past practice. In the mid-1950s, aid to 
developing countries had been a subject of Sino--Soviet 
disagreement. At that time, China had taken the position - 
either on ideological grounds or based on the conviction 
that it was dangerous to spread scarce resources too thinly 
- that its ally, the Soviet Union, should limit its aid
transfers to new states. China's decision to assist Egypt in
the early 1960s partly reflected a shift in attitude 
produced by the changed climate of relations between Moscow 
and Beijing. However, competition with the Soviet Union 
required a large deployment of resources. Indeed, China's 
non-interest bearing loan represented its largest single 
commitment up to that time either in the Middle East or on
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the African continent.
Did the size of the aid commitment and the mere occurrence 
of Chou's visit to Egypt following the long chill in Sino-- 
Egyptian relations signal a fresh start or a false start? 
Although hailed in the Chinese press as a 'milestone,' the 
actual circumstances of Chou's 1963 visit and the events 
which followed from it require further review. First, Nasser 
was out of the country, unable therefore (or perhaps 
unwilling) to greet Chou upon his arrival. Second, at the 
official reception for Chou —  which Nasser did in fact 
attend -- Nasser's welcoming remarks barely concealed 
criticism of China and at the same time acknowledged the 
help rendered to Egypt by the Soviet Union.59 Third, the 
collapse of Bandung II made it unnecessary for China to 
continue its efforts to block Soviet participation. Perhaps 
not coincidentally, Chinese shipments of industrial goods to 
Egypt scheduled for the period 1965--68 were never 
delivered. Sino--Egyptian rapprochement in fact never 
attained the depth suggested by Chinese press reports; 
moreover, China's enthusiasm for revitalising its relations 
with Nasser seemed to fluctuate according to its prospects 
for strengthening China's campaign against the United 
States and advancing its competition with the Soviet Union.
.(iy). .Ching.' g Relation? with the Pal£.s£inians;
Another important aspect of China's application of the 
United Front to the Middle East was its approach to the 
Palestinian movement, which was itself undergoing a gradual
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transformation. Understanding tow the Palestinian movement 
evolved in this period is therefore crucial to explaining 
China's interest in and association with it. Traditionally, 
the Palestinian cause had been subsumed within the cause of 
Arab nationalism and subject to the authority of Arab 
governments. While their exponents languished under the 
tight restrictions of Arab regimes, the ideas of Palestinian 
self-determination and independent struggle had, in any 
case, failed to arouse broad appeal among Palestinians.60
In the early 1960s, however, the notion of the Palestinian 
cause as a chiefly Palestinian matter began to draw 
attention and win adherents among Palestinians. The newly 
formed Fatah embraced such a view as one of its core 
principles, spurring this development. Meanwhile, Arab 
leaders - partly as an outgrowth of their rivalries with one 
another - took initiatives that, in effect, conceded the 
idea's importance and unwittingly contributed to its 
popularity. The thirty-first session of the Arab League, for 
example, resolved to reconstitute the Palestinian 'entity.' 
Independently of the League, Qassem boldly recommended the 
formation of a Palestinian government in the West Bank and 
Gaza; he proclaimed a Palestinian Republic as well as the 
establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Army. Later, 
Nasser countered with a little drama of his own, calling the 
first Arab summit conference to unveil his proposal for the 
creation of the PLO.
The birth of the PLO at the Cairo Summit in 1964 was 
therefore a bid by Arab governments, by Nasser in 
particular, to reassert, not relinquish, control over the
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Palestinian struggle. It signified their attempt to staunch 
by appearing to assuage, the growth of demands which their 
own actions (and inaction) had been partially responsible 
for stirring. If the PLO in its infancy was little more than 
a new version of an old practice, then Fatah - judged by its 
origins and aims rather than its capabilities at the time - 
was a departure from the past. Fatah, itself an embryonic 
organisation, was launched in secrecy from the Gulf, but not 
by Arab governments. On the contrary, Fatah sought a greater 
degree of Palestinian autonomy over the Palestinian 
struggle. Consequently, in seeking to incorporate the 
Palestinian struggle into its United Front, China 
encountered, if not a single movement with a dual identity, 
then certainly one whose identity was in a state of flux.
Recall that China essentially followed two paths in 
dealing with Nasser at this time: aiming to improve 
relations with him while simultaneously encouraging trends 
of which he did not necessarily approve. It is therefore 
unsurprising that China cultivated relations both with the 
PLO, which was intimately affiliated with Egypt; and with 
Fatah, which was not. During February 1964, Ahmed Shuqairy, 
who was making preparations for the establishment of the 
PLO, was in touch with the Chinese ambassador in Cairo. The 
following month China hosted the visit of Fatah's two 
founders, Yasser Arafat and Khalil al-Wazir. One year later, 
Shuqairy, then chairman of the fledgling PLO, duplicated the 
Fatah leaders' visit to China, obtaining approval for the 
opening of a PLO mission in Beijing.
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Several aspects of these visits are noteworthy, even if 
the exact contents of discussions held during them are 
unavailable. First, in terms of protocol, China exercised 
care in receiving its Palestinian guests in a manner least 
likely to offend Arab officialdom. Whereas Shuqairy was 
granted meetings with China's top leaders, including Mao and 
Chou En-lai, Arafat and al-Wazir were hosted by Liao Ch'eng 
Chih, chairman of China's Afro--Asian Solidarity Committee. 
In addition, the Fatah team was invited to Beijing as part 
of an official Arab government (Algerian) delegation.
Second, China pledged support to both sets of Palestinian 
representatives, with the strong suggestion that such 
support would include material assistance to either group. 
Yet, there is no evidence that the Chinese immediately acted 
on their promises.
In the case of the PLO, while the organisation had been 
created in 1964, it was not activated until after the June 
1967 war. Similarly, Fatah, although committed in principle 
to rely primarily on armed struggle, was still in the 
process of coalescing as an organisation. In spite of the 
very modest scale of their guerrilla 'campaign,' Fatah's 
leaders remained concerned about Arab governments' reactions 
to their independent efforts; not until June 1965 did Fatah 
even openly associate its name with the few raids which it 
succeeded in launching against Israel. The most important 
Fatah training facilities were provided by Syria, but this 
cooperation was not something that either Fatah or Damascus 
chose to advertise, or to open to additional partners. 
Algeria was also openly sympathetic towards Fatah, providing
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an office in its capital and an entree to China. Yet, 
President Ben Bella, who never ceased to be an ally of 
Nasser, feared that Palestinian raids might result in severe 
retaliatory strikes against Egypt. He therefore refused to 
allow arms to be shipped to the commandos via Algeria.
In view of these circumstances, China's initial approach 
to the Palestinian movement consisted of systematic contacts 
with both the PLO and Fatah. Support was registered, 
however, mostly in the form of promises and verbal 
encouragement, reflecting China's awareness of the ambiguous 
status and limited capabilities of the two organisations as 
well as their potentialities.
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Chapter II 
An Evaluation
What were China's objectives?
During the period reviewed here China launched an attempt 
to construct a socialist economic model and to apply a 
foreign policy independent of the Soviet Union. This phase 
is unique not only in terms of changes in the nature of 
Chinese objectives in the Middle East, but also in terms of 
the fluctuating earnestness or energy with which they were 
pursued. In the span of only seven years, China's interest 
in the Middle East appeared to have completed one full 
cycle: proceeding from mild indifference to energetic 
commitment, and finally to frustration and disappointment.
As the gap between Moscow and Beijing widened, the Middle 
East surfaced as an important theater of Sino--Soviet 
compettion. Gradually, the priority of reducing Western 
predominance in the region merged with the importance of 
using the region to undermine Soviet accommodation with the 
West. Accordingly, China pursued a new set of objectives: a 
form of rivalry with the Soviet Union which would be 
unlikely to be catastrophic for China; and the 
neutralisation, if not the displacement, of the U.S.S.R. 
from the region. Yet, during this period the Chinese press 
devoted considerably more attention to developments in 
Africa than to the situation in the Middle East. This is one 
indication that, at the time, the Middle East was rated by 
China as a region perhaps equal in importance to Africa, but 
one less promising in its prospects.
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What were China's tactics?
Several factors converged which urged China to modify its 
tactics in the Middle East: (1) the deterioration of the
Sino-Soviet alliance, which removed the cover and the 
material underpinning of China's diplomacy in the region;
(2) preoccupation with, and hardship imposed by, the Great 
Leap Forward and the accompanying Soviet withdrawal of aid;
(3) souring relations with the cornerstone of China's 
bilateral Middle East ties, Egypt; and (4) a more 
interventionist American approach to the Middle East as well 
as, more threateningly, to Southeast Asia. This set of 
developments guided China's determination of which policy 
instruments to select, the circumstances under which to 
apply them and the objects at which they were to be 
directed.
First, because relations with Nasser were on a downward 
spiral, resulting in the paralysis of its most important 
bilateral relationship, China shifted its attention to 
nearby Iraq, which initially promised to be, if not more 
malleable, then at least more revolutionary. Yet, China did 
not commit substantial resources to develop this 
relationship, reflecting both its attention to the 
vicissitudes of Iraqi domestic politics and its own economic 
constraints.
Second, China sought to diversify its political portfolio 
by engaging in a remarkably active series of diplomatic 
exchanges and official visits, culminating in Chou En-lai's
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tour of the region.
Third, in an apparent bid to trump the Soviet Union, China 
embraced the embryonic PLO. China also met with and 
expressed support for the leadership of Fatah which, not 
being closely affiliated with Egypt, fulfilled Beijing's aim 
of competing with Nasser for influence as well as trying to 
improve relations with him.
Finally, in spite of the general austerity imposed by the 
failures of The Great Leap and compounded by the Soviet 
withdrawal, China arranged an economic aid package 
unprecedented in its scope.
In the late 1950s after an initial lapse, though not a 
complete cessation, of its activities in the region, China 
unleashed a Middle East offensive characterised by a mixture 
of policy instruments and a variety of targets both at and 
below the state level. More militantly anti-Soviet in its 
rhetoric, China evolved a set of tactics aimed at harnessing 
local elements in a global 'united front' against both the 
United States and the Soviet Union.
Were China's efforts successful?
Essentially, China combined a negative message with a 
negligible physical presence and obtained primarily negative 
results. However appealing in principle, China's project of 
building a coalition against Western and Soviet influence 
was impoverished by its running counter to the logic and 
reality of Arab politics. First, it challenged Nasser's 
personal, national and pan-Arab aspirations by seeking in 
effect to subordinate them to two transcendant causes: the
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East— West conflict and the Sino--Soviet dispute. In 
addition it obliged Nasser to forfeit the framework of 
positive neutrality by which he hoped to insulate Egypt in 
his pursuit of his foreign policy aims. Second, it promised 
a theoretical collective security under China's leadership. 
Such an arrangement, however, was completely divorced from 
China's capability to provide it. Furthermore, it was 
predicated on a regional (if not global) community of 
interests more contemplated than real.
China astutely associated itself with the Palestinian 
movement while the movement was in its infancy, and as a 
result, probably succeeded in earning a measure of Arab 
goodwill but little else. Overall then, China's Middle East 
offensive - constituting a search for allies against the 
United States and the Soviet Union - provided more lessons 
than concrete gains. During this period China distinguished 
itself more as an irritant than as an intimate of the Arabs; 
at the same time it discovered the difficulty of dislodging 
the Soviet Union from, and opposing the United States in, 
the Middle East.
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Chapter III 
Socialist fortress 
1966--1968
A. United Front, inhospitable climate:
The end of 1965 witnessed the merging of domestic and 
international developments hostile to the realisation of 
China's main foreign policy objectives and greatly 
responsible for the subsequent curtailment of its 
international activities. The overthrow of Nkrumah, the 
abortive PKI coup attempt in Indonesia, the UAR--Indian 
opposition to PRC seating at Bandung II, together with the 
postponement and eventual cancellation of that conference at 
Algiers undermined the foundation of China's United Front 
strategy, thus demolishing the theoretical structure of 
China's Afro--Asian foreign policy.
The decline of China's fortunes in the Afro--Asian context 
was matched by an additional set of international 
complications. The most important of these was the 
escalation of United States' involvement in Vietnam. The 
Chinese official press invented a new terminology to account 
for the revision of American tactics in Southeast Asia, 
designating the United States as a 'mad dog' rather than a 
'paper tiger'. The attachment of new labels was accompanied 
by a review of U.S. tactics and reconsideration of how China 
should address them.
The intensification of American involvement in Vietnam was
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presented - though not cavalierly dismissed - as a symptom 
of decline: a reckless act arising from despair. The 
augmented U.S. military presence in Vietnam was portrayed as 
an overextension of American overseas commitments. Publicly, 
Beijing played down the danger of calamity, focusing on the 
long-term inevitability of American defeat rather than on 
the short-term threats to Chinese interests.1
Compounding China's growing sense of isolation was an 
improvement in Japanese--South Korean relations. The signing 
of the 1966 Japan--ROK Treaty, which coincided with the 
American escalation in Vietnam, drew an outpouring of 
concern and condemnation in the Chinese press.2 These 
reactions in China's official publications might not furnish 
a reliable guide to the perceptions of China's leaders, 
particularly during the Cultural Revolution, when invective 
and hyperbole appeared to have become the standards of 
journalistic excellence. Furthermore, to the extent that 
they indeed reflect the real concerns of the Chinese 
leadership, these publications do not authoritatively 
indicate that such sentiments were uniformly held by the 
leadership. Yet, recognising that China remains ever- 
sensitive to the possible revival of Japanese militarism, it 
is hard to imagine that the concerns voiced by the press 
were just empty rhetoric.
At the same time that these real or imagined assaults at 
the rim of China's strategic heartland were occurring, 
changes in the Soviet Union were under way. Leonid 
Brezhnev's accession to power had provided no relief in the
ongoing Sino--Soviet dispute. Brezhnev was not welcomed to 
office by the Chinese as a happy alternative to Khrushchev, 
but was instead excoriated for having reverted to 
'Khrushchevism without Khrushchev.' Relations with the 
Soviet Union continued on a course marked primarily by 
acrimony rather than accommodation.
On the whole, especially at the outset of the Cultural 
Revolution, China's foreign relations were characterised by 
bitter disappointment and uncertainty. Yet, poor relations 
with both the United States and the Soviet Union, coupled 
with the recent failure to build a United Front against them 
did not extinguish China's militancy. It merely impelled 
China to scale down its objectives and adjust its tactics.
B. The Cultural Revolution and foreign policy:
Domestically, the onset of the Cultural Revolution, whose 
avowed primary purpose was the prevention of the restoration 
of capitalism, had an important (if only implicit) secondary 
aim: the protection of China against corrosive foreign 
influences.3 Yahuda argues persuasively that there was 
nothing especially xenophobic in the foreign policy 
implications of this formula. During this period, China's 
isolation was in fact relative, not absolute.4 Still, the 
series of estrangements that characterised the years 1966-- 
1968 have a strong basis in the Cultural Revolution.5 
Diplomacy was not deliberately foresworn as a matter of 
policy; however, as a result of the tumultuous conditions of 
the Cultural Revolution, diplomacy was difficult, if not 
impossible to conduct.
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In practical terms, the events of 1965 already mentioned 
eliminated the justification for China's foreign policy 
offensive of the previous two years. The Cultural Revolution 
(which itself was not caused, yet was fortified, by these 
foreign policy disappointments) probably reinforced the 
argument in favor of withdrawal. The outgrowth of these two 
sets of phenomena - the international and the domestic - was 
a revised Chinese analysis of the world which, by adjusting 
the framework within which events are interpreted and roles 
are identified, contributed to the alteration of China's 
foreign policy direction and content.
Perceiving itself in a new context, China portrayed itself 
and was seen as a 'socialist fortress', awaiting the outcome 
of national liberation struggles that it could support 
forcefully in moral and rhetorical terms, but on whose 
behalf it could not intervene.6 Renmin Ribao on 25 August 
1966 suggests the nature and extent of support for national 
liberation movements contemplated by China during the 
Cultural Revolution:
The task of the Marxist--Leninists and all 
revolutionaries is to arm the minds of 
millions upon millions of people with this 
great strategic principle that imperialism 
and all reactionaries are paper tigers and 
reinforce the revolutionary confidence and 
determination of the people to enable them to 
launch revolutionary attacks on still a 
bigger scale against U.S. imperialism and its 
lackeys.7 [Emphasis added]
Under the influence of Lin Piao's 'Long Live the Victory 
of People's War', the Chinese Communist revolutionary
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experience was universalised. Accordingly, China virtually 
ceased its appeals to established Afro--Asian regimes, thus 
temporarily abandoning its bi-level approach. By viewing 
states as the analogue of classes, the PRC during this phase 
envisaged itself as an ideological model, providing mainly 
inspiration and guidance.8 Each national liberation movement 
was expected to make its own revolution.
C. The Impact of the '67 War:
The years 1966-68 were a period of monumental change in the 
Middle East. A full appreciation of China's involvement in the region 
during that time therefore requires attention to key developments in 
the Middle East and their ramifications. Undoubtedly the period's 
pivotal event was the 1967 Arab--Israeli war, which was the 
culmination of several significant trends and the catalyst for 
others.
Prior to the June war, inter-Arab relations had been 
discordant, indeed hostile. As indicated earlier, the 
incompatibilities among 'revolutionary' Arab regimes had 
been illustrated and deepened by the collapse of the U.A.R.
Meanwhile, 'revolutionary' Egypt and 'traditional' Saudi 
Arabia had taken opposite sides and become directly involved 
in the North Yemeni civil war. Thus, there were two axes of 
inter-Arab rivalry by the time of the '67 war.
Suddenly and dramatically, the '67 war altered the political
climate and to an extent revised the configuration of power in the
Arab world. First, the Arab defeat, which was interpreted as a
common Arab misfortune, led to an Arab reconciliation, albeit
limited and temporary. Second, Arab oil producers -- Saudi Arabia in 
particular -- assumed financial responsibility for losses incurred
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during the war and for the budding Palestinian movement, thereby 
improving their own security, leverage and stature vis-a-vis other 
Arab states (especially Egypt).
The war however imposed tremendous hardships on the Arab 
confrontation states, represented not only in loss of territory to 
Israel, but also in the absorption of tens of thousands of refugees. 
The influx of refugees was disruptive economically in the short-term 
and politically in the longer term. This was especially true in the 
case of Jordan. Thus, the defeat thrust obligations upon Arab 
regimes which further taxed their capacities and in turn undermined 
their popularity, if not their legitimacy.
To cope with the burdens of defeat -- which included a 
crushing blow to his own and Egypt's prestige -- Nasser decided to 
rearm while simultaneously seeking to maintain domestic consumption 
levels; in addition, he launched a 'war of attrition' against 
Israel. These policy decisions led Nasser to accept a degree of 
dependence on the Soviet Union that was otherwise repugnant, and 
therefore, unacceptable to him.
As a result of Nasser's decision to turn to the Soviets for 
greater assistance, the U.S.S.R. was presented with an occasion to 
augment its presence in the region. This was all the more ironic in 
that the Soviet Union could have been held accountable for the 
crippling Arab defeat. The swift, massive resupply of weapons in the 
immediate aftermath of the war, coupled with a willingness to accede 
to Nasser's request not only salvaged Soviet prestige but also 
provided Moscow with a degree of leverage it had not previously had.
United States involvement in the Middle East also changed as a 
result of the war. Until 1970 the U.S. tended to defer to 
U.N. representatives responsibility for pursuing a peaceful
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settlement to the Arab-Israel dispute. Washington adopted a more act 
and vigorous role in support of Israel, countering Soviet assistance 
to Egypt with a substantial commitment of its own. In this way, the 
'67 war ushered in a period of 'no war, no peace' marked by the 
further militarisation of the Arab-Israel conflict and the 
superpowers' critical role in that process.
Tt would of course be incomplete to discuss the war and its 
aftermath solely in terms of inter-Arab detente, increased burdens 
on Arab regimes, and the reconstruction and bolstering of armed 
forces (including the superpowers' prominent role in that 
development). The '67 defeat of the Arabs was a psychological defeat 
which spun its own set of repercussions. To a young generation of 
intellectuals, the war was profoundly disillusioning. Compounding 
this disenchantment was the rapprochement between 
'progressive' and 'conservative' regimes. Nasserism had 
yielded a humiliating military defeat; worse, it had ceased
to be 'revolutionary'. Similar disappointment set in with
regard to Ba'thism, which was accused of "surrendering to 
the intrigues and brutality of the military".9
The post-'67 Arab intellectual atmosphere was characterised by
ideological defection, not just disaffection. Youths gravitated from
Nasserism and Ba'thism to 'alien' ideologies such as Maoism. Ajami
captures this transformation in observing that,
In the light of the June defeat, a younger gener­
ation was to dig deeper into the political tradition 
and social structure. It was to see in the ideas and 
deeds of the heros of the 1950s and 1960s the dead 
hand oi the past. A Hood of new writings -- some 
indigenous, some the standard revolutionary tracts of 
Debray, Fanon, Mao, Guevara -- opened up new horizons. 
They gave a revolutionary tone to political discourse; 
they underscored the gao between young and the domin­
ant order . 10
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The leading channel for Arab revolution following the ' 67 war 
was the Palestinian movement. The shock and disappointment of the 
war extended to the Palestinian population, strengthening the views 
and positions of the militants within it who emphasised the 
'Palestinian character' of the Palestinian cause; and who advocated 
guerrilla armed struggle to liberate Palestine. Pan-arabists, like 
the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), which had previously opposed 
Palestinian separatism, were compelled to field commando units or 
risk losing credibility.11 The war accelerated the process 
whereby Palestinian nationalism, which had formerly been 
encapsulated within Arab nationalism, assumed an identity of 
its own. Second, the war discredited the PLO leadership, 
which was widely viewed as Nasser's handiwork and therefore 
implicated in his military defeat. In this way the crisis in 
confidence in Arab regimes was at the same time a crisis in 
confidence in the PLO leadership. This in turn led to a 
third development; namely, the replacement of the PLO 
leadership by Palestinian militants.
The so-called 'Palestinian militants' were not a homogeneous or 
cohesive group; nor were Arab regimes indifferent to, or willing to 
acquiesce in, the detachment of the Palestinian movement from their 
control. Whereas all of the militant factions which emerged in the 
aftermath of the ' 67 war were committed to 'liberate 
Palestine' and to embark on a 'national war' to do so, there 
were in fact numerous ideological, political and personal 
differences among them.
Fatah, for example, at least theoretically pledged non­
interference in the affairs of Arab states. In contrast, the Popular
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Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) , under the direction of 
George Habash, was strongly influenced by Marxist--Leninist ideology 
and therefore committed to Arab nationalist revolution. Moreover, 
the PFLP represented the view that the plight of the Palestinians 
was linked to social and political conditions throughout the Arab 
world. Hence, Fatah's promise of non-involvement was anathema to the 
PFLP. Meanwhile, the Iraqi and Syrian wings of the Ba'th Party 
sponsored the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) and Sa'iqa, respectively, 
both to remain involved in, and to retain an element of control 
over, the movement's activities.
1967 was also an important year for the South Arabian peninsula. 
North and South Yemen, by virtue of lying on the periphery of the 
Arab world, were physically untouched by the Arab--Israeli war and 
relatively insulated from its most severe repercussions. Perhaps the 
most significant, if only indirect, effect of the June war was the 
withdrawal of Egyptian forces from North Yemen. The Egyptian 
disengagement and the concomitant curtailment of Nasser's influence 
paved the way for the end of the civil war. It also relieved 
strategic pressure on Saudi Arabia, helping to ensure a strong 
Saudi influence over North Yemeni domestic political affairs.
Five months after the June war (30 November 1967), the last 
British troops evacuated Aden, bringing an end to the 
British military presence in the area. Although the National 
Liberation Front which asssumed power after the British 
departure, had collaborated with Nasser in the North Yemeni 
civil war, even before the '67 war, they had broken with 
him.12 Thus, the political power struggle which ensued in
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chapter will describe in some detail, that struggle would 
result initially in improvement in the position of Marxist 
adherents, and culminate in their overthrow of the 
established leadership of the NLF.13
These changes within the Middle East had numerous yet somewhat 
contradictory implications for China's involvement in the region. On 
the one hand, for example, the disenchantment which turned some 
Arabs to 'alien' ideologies, including Maooism, was a welcome 
development. So was the growth of an increasingly militant 
Palestinian movement which embraced guerrilla armed struggle; that 
some factions were committed to revolution was presumably even more 
heartening. Such trends tended to reinforce the prevalent view in 
China that the world's 'revolutionary people' were indeed 
revolut ionary.
On the other hand, these developments in the 
Middle East provided opportunities for an augmented superpower 
presence and influence. Consequently, they were not compatible with 
China's interest in seeing quite the reverse occur. The discussion 
which follows will examine China's involvement in the region, as it 
responded to these changes.
D. Narrowing the United Front in the Middle East:
In the Middle East at this time as elsewhere, neither the 
formulation of China's foreign policy nor the character of 
China's efforts was determined by the Cultural Revolution. 
Nevertheless, they were inseparable from this domestic 
phenomenon. Likewise, the results of China's previous 
efforts in the region were neither primarily responsible
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for, nor inconsequential to, the character of the Cultural 
Revolution; the two were related.
It is important to recall that China's two-year 
'offensive' in the Middle East had not yielded substantial 
benefits. On the contrary, China had failed to enlist either 
Egypt or Syria in its attempt at inclusion in Bandung II. 
Nasser's trip to Moscow in September 1965 and the Soviet-- 
Egyptian communique issued upon his departure, besides 
indicating the difficulty of dislodging the U.S.S.R. from 
the Middle East, reminded Beijing of the independent will of 
Arab statesmen. China's diplomatic efforts and economic 
gestures alike were rebuffed. Neither Egypt nor Syria, for 
example, made use of the loans offered by China (sums of $80 
million and $16.3 million respectively).14 Trade between the 
PRC and the region declined precipitously in 1967, totalling 
only half the previous year's value.15 The withdrawal of all 
but one of China's diplomats from the Middle East (i.e. all 
but China's representative in Cairo), seen in this context, 
reflects a decision strongly urged by circumstance.
Understandably, China's efforts to press Afro--Asian 
regimes against both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., particularly 
given the PRC's inability to replace either of them 
militarily or economically, was too extreme to be 
acceptable.16 Thus the basis of the United Front narrowed 
appreciably. Regimes with which China continued to deal were 
those that appeared to exhibit the highest degree of 
'revolutionary potential' such as South Yemen, whose seeming 
hospitability as a guerrilla training base and arms transfer
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station was attractive to the PRC. China replied swiftly to 
this opportunity, offering $12 million in aid to South Yemen 
almost immediately after the British withdrawal.17
Whereas China reduced its diplomatic presence in, and 
material commitment to the Middle East during this period, 
China did not sever all contacts with, nor abandon all 
objectives with respect to, the region. Beijing's decision 
to keep one of its distinguished diplomats, Huang Hua, in 
Cairo throughout the Cultural Revolution, is one indication 
of Beijing's continuing interest in the Middle East, and 
especially in Egypt.
,(il. Chiaa:s RelaJLia ns. with the PLQ;
In the Middle East during this period events unfolded 
rapidly, indeed dramatically, highlighted by the June '67 
war. Among other things, the war fatefully altered the 
course and character of the Palestinian movement. As 
previously illustrated, Chinese foreign policy had itself 
begun to change, in some ways profoundly. In what manner, if 
at all, did these two sets of changes affect the Sino-- 
Palestinian relationship?
Within the Arab world, the June '67 war was a humiliation, 
not just a military defeat. An atmosphere of gloom, even 
despair, permeated Arab society. The war undermined popular 
confidence in Arab governments, which were held accountable 
for the debacle. At least initially, this yielded a more 
tentative, and even less coherent policy on the part of Arab 
governments towards the Palestinian question. Meanwhile, 
among Palestinians, the war produced an upsurge of support
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for guerrilla combat and for a leading, if not dominant, 
role for Palestinians in the struggle.
The foreign policy of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (at 
least in its radical phase: 1966--1968) seemed in some ways 
tailor-made to accommodate these developments. By the time 
of the '67 war, China's policy of cultivating national-- 
bourgeois governments had already fallen from favor, and in 
its place Beijing had begun to concentrate support for 
national liberation and revolutionary movements.
The '67 war provided China with an occasion to unmask the 
Soviet Union's 'betrayal' of the Arabs as well as to 
condemn the Israeli attack as the handiwork of an 
'imperialist lackey'.18 The Chinese press admitted - though 
in understated terms - that the war constituted a 'temporary 
setback'; and that the Arabs' struggle against imperialist 
aggression would be a 'protracted one' ,19 In light of the 
U.N.'s 'ignominious record,' China cautioned the Arabs to 
avoid submitting the Palestinian question to the 
international organisation; and encouraged them instead to 
persevere in their armed struggle.
Meanwhile, the special attention that China accorded the 
Palestinian movement in the immediate aftermath of the '67 
war was initially reflected in the intensification of its 
verbal attacks on Israel. Whatever form it took, Chinese 
support for the Palestinians had no apparent doctrinal 
basis. Still, ideological considerations were not 
necessarily irrelevant. The militant line which China 
espoused during the Cultural Revolution required some 
concrete commitment to give it credibility. Thus, even in
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the absence of an ideological compatibility, there was some 
justification for Beijing to portray the link between China 
and the Palestinian movement as if such a compatibility 
existed.
Yet, China's support of the Palestinian movement probably 
served more than just this propagandistic purpose. Recall 
that the aims which underlay the United Front -- competing 
with the Soviet Union and undermining U.S. influence -- were 
not abandoned, even if the framework for advancing them was 
retired. The outbreak of war in the Middle East, and the 
accompanying intensification of Soviet--American rivalry in 
the region, undoubtedly drew China's attention. In this 
sense, China might be said to have viewed the Palestinian 
movement as a vehicle for undermining U.S. interests and 
competing with Moscow for prestige among the Arabs.
The post-'67 occupation of Arab land by Israel could 
conceivably have encouraged China that the Palestinian 
struggle could be successfully waged (though not on classic 
'people's war' grounds). Fatah's decision in late 1967 to 
launch an armed popular uprising in the occupied territories 
might have lent further optimism, but then only briefly.
For, Fatah had not had ample time to establish the necessary 
organisational base to conduct such a campaign. Hurried 
attempts to form guerrilla networks inside the occupied 
territories encountered stiff Israeli opposition and harsh 
reprisals.
Although launched prematurely and therefore 
unsuccessfully, these 'heroic failures' seemed to lead Fatah
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and Beijing to the same conclusion: that the success, if not 
the survival, of the guerilla movement, depended on reaching 
some accommodation with Arab governments. This line of 
thinking helps to explain Fatah's fateful decision to enter 
the PLO, which it had formerly held in disdain. Fatah's 
entry into the PLO, as a means of enriching the prospects of 
the guerrilla movement, appears to have had more than just 
Beijing's blessing. In an interview with Khaled al-Hassan, 
Helena Cobban learned that 'some of the crucial mid-1968 
meetings at which Fatah's take over of the PLO apparatus was 
planned were held in the home of the Chinese ambassador to 
Cairo. ' 20
At the Fourth PNC session (July 1968), during which Fatah 
bid successfully to take over the PLO, China's Huang Hua led 
the only non-Arab delegation in attendance. Similarly, at 
the conclusion of the session, China was the only non-Arab 
government to receive credit for its support. In the 
meantime, the Palestinian National Charter was crucially 
amended. Article 9, for example, was rewritten so as firmly 
to establish the primacy of guerilla activity. The new text 
read:
...armed struggle is the only way to liberate 
Palestine. Thus, it is the overall strategy, 
not merely a tactical phase.
Fatah's thesis - that the 'Palestinian' aspect of the 
struggle receive emphasis - was incorporated in the new 
version of Article 28 of the Charter to read:
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The Palestinian Arab people insists upon the 
originality and independence of its national 
revolution and rejects every manner of 
interference, guardianship and subordination.
Studying these crucial changes in the Palestinian Charter 
tempts us to extremes: to leap to the conclusion that China
drafted Fatah's platform and orchestrated its 'capture' of 
the PLO; or to dismiss China's role as that of an interested 
but inconsequential spectator, whose presence was 
appreciated but whose advice was disregarded. A more 
balanced view suggests that China was anything but 
indifferent to these changes, and played a limited, though 
ambiguous, role in their adoption.
The suggestion that the courses of Chinese foreign policy 
and the Palestinian movement were travelling roughly at the 
same pace in the same general direction is potentially 
misleading. Changes in the Palestinian movement might have 
been swift, but they were also complicated. When Fatah's 
efforts to launch an uprising inside the occupied 
territories were aborted in favor of building operational 
bases in Jordan and southern Lebanon, the ranks of the 
Palestinian guerrillas swelled, but so too did the number of 
individual commando units. Consequently, the Palestinian 
guerrilla movement experienced two simultaneous trends: 
proliferation in numbers as well as factions.
Furthermore, by agreeing to carry the various commando 
groups into the PLO with it, Fatah sought both to reconcile 
these trends and then to capitalise on them. This decision 
ensured Fatah of a predominant voice within the PLO, which
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was itself thereby transformed into a forum of intra- 
Palestinian discord, not just rich debate. Henceforward,
Fatah was party to a struggle consisting of two elements: 
the battle for the PLO and the battle by. the PLO.
In supporting the PLO, therefore, China had to contend 
with these developments, and more. If the intra-Palestinian 
dimension of the movement's evolution warranted China's 
attention, so too did the reactions of other governments to 
these events. Nasser, for example, behind the scenes, 
offered to assist Fatah with arms and training and invited 
Arafat to join him in a July 1968 trip to the Soviet Union.
In turn, the nascent Egypt--Fatah link aroused jealousies 
and concerns in Damascus, prompting Syria to fund, train and 
equip Sa'iqa. Thus China, in emerging as the main champion 
of the PLO outside the Middle East, had to confront the 
rapid changes within the PLO as well as the intricacies of 
inter-Arab politics. Said differently, by virtue of becoming 
the PLO's benefactor, China had to contend with the numerous 
and complex foreign policy implications of assuming such a 
role.
E. Communism and Maoism in the Middle East
On the whole communism and communist organisations 
developed a relatively narrow base of support in the Middle East. 
Unlike in Indochina, for example, there were only a few isolated 
cases in which communists either shared or themselves held politica 
power in government. As has already been demonstrated, communists 
were active, indeed instrumental, in bringing down the Iraqi 
monarchy in 1958. As will be shown, in the aftermath of the '67 war
the disillusionment with Arab revolutionary ideologies and leaders 
led many Arab youths to other 'alien' ideologies, including Maoism. 
Finally, it will also be demonstrated that in the late 1960s, 
Marxism had a strong following in South Yemen, where the area's onl 
Marxist regime was founded in 1969.
Was the relatively limited appeal of communism and the 
relatively lackluster record of communist parties in the region 
attributable to China's (or for that matter, the U.S.S.R.'s) 
expediency in placing 'state interests' ahead of 
'ideological' commitments?
As previously argued, China's initial attraction to Nasser was 
his growing prestige within and outside the Middle East. That Nasse 
was not a communist was less important than that he represented, an 
in many respects was responsible for, stirring anti-colonial 
nationalism. China's interest in Nasser therefore derived from 
China's aim of supporting Afro-Asian nationalism in the hope of 
thereby undermining Western influence. The subordination of an 
ideological commitment to communism in this regard should not be 
taken to mean that China had fully abandoned that commitment. 
Chinese officials continued to have dealings with, and to offer at 
least verbal support to local communists.
That the nature of the doctrine of communism is fundamentally 
at odds with the nature of the region is as powerful an explanation 
for communism's (or Maoism's) relative unpopularity in the Middle 
East as that China (and the U.S.S.R.) failed to provide adequate 
support for communist movements. Communism, as an atheistic 
doctrine, with a pillar of Middle East culture; namely, Islam. Thus 
Islam can be said to have served as a bulwark against communism or 
any of its variants.
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Of course, an individual might -- and many do -- adhere 
selectively to an ideology: accepting some tenets while renouncing 
others. Moreover, not all Muslims, any more than all Christians, are 
such fervent believers that they cannot be 'converted' to communism 
And not all Middle Eastern peoples are Muslim, in any case. So, the 
'Islamic bulwark' thesis too is, at best, only a partial explanatioi
Whatever its appeal among Middle Easterners, neither Maoism nor 
any variant of Marxism operated in an ideological vacuum. During the 
1950s and 1960s just the opposite was true. Nasserism as well as 
Ba'thism were two indigenous 'revolutionary' ideologies, with stronc 
organisational bases, and anchored in the military. Consequently, 
they typically, if not continuously, competed with communism and 
communists from a position of advantage. In promulgating 
revolutionary socialism, both Nasserists and Ba'thists succeeded to 
a large extent in co-opting would-be revolutionists and winning the 
approbation of discontented masses.
It must also be added that Arab regimes -- however 
revolutionary in outlook -- jealously guarded their political power 
once they attained it. However much they may have had in common wit! 
communists, Nasserists and Ba'thists once in power considered 
communists to be dangerous oppositionists and treated them 
accordingly. Nasser harassed and arrested them. Likewise, the Shah 
of Iran (and later, his successor, Ayatollah Khomeini) conducted 
periodic campaigns to destroy the Tudeh, or local communist, Party. 
As Patrick Seale points out, when the Ba'th seized power in Baghdad 
in February 1963, "its first act was to slaughter communists".21 Whe; 
Hafez al-Asad went about consolidating power in Syria, he formed the 
National Progressive Front, in which parties other than the Ba'th
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might 'participate'. Yet, the communist party and other non-Ba'this 
members of the Front were in fact prohibited from canvassing for 
supporters in the military or among students.22
106
Chapter III 
An evaluation
What were China's objectives?
In this highly radicalised stage of the Cultural 
Revolution, China's objectives in the Middle East shifted in 
emphasis but not in focus. If anything, the intensity of 
China's hostility towards both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
increased and with it, the desire to win adherents to the 
struggle against a two adversaries. Fueled by the militancy 
associated with its domestic situation, tempered by the 
realism imparted by the collapse of the United Front in 
1965, and anxious about, though encouraged by, the 
resistance of North Vietnam to American aggression, China 
registered the biggest changes in its Middle East policy in 
the style of its tactics rather than in the substance of its 
aims. The outbreak and outcome of the '67 Middle East war 
supplied China with a fresh incentive to upgrade its support 
for revolutionary change in the region both as an end in 
itself and as a means of subverting U.S. and Soviet 
influence.
What were China's tactics?
During this phase, China reduced its intergovernmental 
activities and correspondingly devoted more attention to 
national liberation movements. The 'socialist fortress' of 
the Cultural Revolution was garrisoned by an updated set of 
revolutionary principles and tactics that effectively 
narrowed t ho basin of the United Front to the cultivation of
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two groups: the PLO and, to a lesser extent, the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf 
(henceforth referred to as the PFLOAG and discussed fully in 
the next chapter). In withdrawing all but one of its 
ambassadors from the region, China in effect removed one leg 
of the United Front approach, which had aimed at cultivating 
relations with nationalist governments as well as national 
liberation movements.
China concentrated its efforts on channelling support to 
the PLO and the PFLOAG in the form of indoctrination, 
guerilla training, the limited supply of light arms and 
ammunition, and strident verbal encouragement. China's 
support for the PLO - begun partly to strengthen relations 
with Arab regimes which had sponsored its creation - served 
in effect as an alternative to relations with those 
governments.
Were China's efforts successful?
Support for revolutionary and national liberation 
movements in the Middle East yielded positive results for 
China, though limited and temporary. First, China benefited 
in the ideological war with the Soviet Union by attaching 
itself to these causes while the U.S.S.R. concentrated its 
energies on strengthening local regimes to advance its 
overriding interest in competing with the U.S. Second, by 
investing in the PLO and the PFLOAG, China succeeded in 
building credit among them that could pay future dividends 
in the event of their victory. Third, links with the PLO and
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the PFLOAG enabled China to retain a toehold in the Middle 
East, however tenuous, while the superpowers and their local 
clients worked at cross-purposes.
The acknowledgment of these achievements, however, leaves 
unanswered the question of the depth and durability of 
China's influence among its revolutionary clients; the 
promise or doubtfulness of their revolutionary potential; 
and the degree of interest and potency of the superpowers as 
well as local regimes to counter or neutralise China's 
efforts.
First, while China clearly won the appreciation of, it did 
not necessarily win lasting influence within, the PLO. 
Second, what influence China was indeed able to exert over 
the PLO was directly related not only to the level of 
material support it was willing and able to provide, but 
also to the availability of assistance from other sources. 
Third, China's impact on the region through its influence 
over these groups depended on the effectiveness of the PLO 
itself. To the extent that the PLO's disunity and tactics 
subverted its own campaign, it poorly served the Chinese 
interests entwined with them.
What is particularly interesting about China's evolving 
relationship with the Palestinian movement is this: 
Disappointing relations with Arab governments in'the past 
explains in part why China gravitated to Fatah in the first 
place. Fatah was, in a sense, 'the other channel' into 
Middle East politics. Beijing approved of, and encouraged, 
Fatah's efforts to acquire a degree of independence from 
Arab governments. Presumably, this sprang from the
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conviction that a semi- or fully-autonomous Palestinian 
movement would be more amenable than Arab regimes to 
frustrating superpower designs in the region.
Yet, Fatah almost immediately confronted a dilemma: its 
desire for independence from Arab regimes and its reliance 
on Arab regimes were from the start never fully 
reconcilable. Ultimately, China, in supporting Fatah, shared 
that dilemma. This did not, however, work permanently to 
China's disadvantage. True, the Palestinian movement was not 
drawn away from Arab regimes and freed to act in ways that 
suited China's preferences. Nevertheless, China's commitment 
to the Palestinian cause in future helped to redeem 
Beijing's image in Arab eyes, and actually contribute to the 
rehabilitation of its relations with Arab governments.
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Chapter IV 
Prelude to pragmatism 
1969— 1971
A. The rise of 'Social Imperialism':
Beginning in 1969, China gradually surfaced from three 
years of domestic political radicalism which had reinforced 
its tendency towards a militant foreign policy. The years 
1966--68 had featured the severe curtailment of China's 
intergovernmental activities in favor of a morally and 
rhetorically strong, yet materially limited, commitment to 
national liberation movements. In a June 1968 speech, Chou 
En-lai hinted at the emerging themes of Chinese foreign 
policy in this phase:
We will continue to make great efforts to 
develop our relations with friendly countries 
on the basis of the five principles of 
peaceful coexistence. We will unite more 
closely with the people of all countries and 
carry through to the end the struggle against 
U.S. imperialism and its lackeys and the 
struggle against modern revisionism.1
Besides the foreign policy spillover of domestic political 
de-radicalisation, superpower behavior and its ramifications 
for Chinese security provided the main impetus for the full- 
scale resumption of China's international activities. The 
1968 'Tet offensive', together with the subsequent 
enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine, was interpreted, or 
perhaps merely rationalised, by Beijing as a vindication of 
'people's war' and of the Chinese analysis of the erosion of
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capitalist--imperialist power.2
Conceptually, China linked events on the Asian battlefield 
with the domestic situation in the United States and Western 
Europe. The Chinese press energetically reported the West's 
domestic political and economic difficulties, portraying 
them as symptoms of general decline. Racial unrest, 
compounded by mass student demonstrations convulsed the 
United States, finding their analog in Europe, including the 
bloody confrontations that nearly broke the back of the 
French Fifth Republic. To Beijing, these developments 
revealed a social fragmentation that complemented the 
deepening economic crises afflicting the West.3
To the extent that these developments were genuinely 
heartening to the Chinese leadership, they were largely 
overshadowed by portentous changes in Soviet conduct and 
capabilities. The invasion of Czechoslovakia, in combination 
with the promulgation of the Brezhnev Doctrine sent a clear 
and ominous signal to Beijing. A 23 August 1968 People's 
Daily 'Commentator' article contained a highly significant 
new indictment of Soviet conduct. By branding the U.S.S.R.
'a gang of social— imperialists,' the People's Republic of 
China entered a new stage of hostility in its relations with 
the Soviet Union.4 More menacingly, the buildup of Soviet 
Far Eastern forces, occurring when the Cultural Revolution 
had shifted the PLA's responsibilities to the twin chores of 
maintaining domestic order and managing civilian 
administrative affairs, underscored China's relative 
weakness.5
Still, the world situation did not seem entirely
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unfavorable to China. In 1969, Sino--Soviet border clashes 
erupted on the Ussuri River. Ultimately, these incidents did 
not prove to be catastrophic for China. Furthermore, at the 
time of their occurrence, these hostilities did not appear 
to provoke hysteria in China. Nonetheless, the clashes 
underscored the dangers of disunity and unpreparedness, and 
highlighted the risks of self-imposed isolation and relative 
passivity in foreign affairs. The border conflict, which 
occurred on the eve of the convening of the Ninth CCP 
Congress, appears to have provoked reasoned soul-searching 
rather than panic. Emerging from the Congress was an 
appreciation of the need for China to reconsider and 
redefine its foreign relations. The following excerpt from 
an August 1971 issue of Beiiing Review captures well the 
conclusions drawn from this reassessment:
The view that all enemies are the same, that 
they are one monolithic bloc, is not in 
accord with objective reality. Moreover, with 
the development of the situation and the 
people's revolutionary forces daily 
expanding, the enemies' contradictions will 
become more and more acute. The proletariat 
and its party must learn to concretely 
analyse the situation in class struggle in 
the international and domestic spheres at 
different historical periods and be good at 
seizing the opportunity to 'turn to good 
account all such fights, rifts, and 
contradictions within the enemy camp and turn 
them against our present main enemy.'6
China's reevaluation of the world situation depicted the 
'enemy' as increasingly differentiated rather than 
monolithic. In turn, this prompted a more expansive
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application of the United Front, which emphasised: (1)
China's strict insistence on the 'Five Principles of 
Coexistence', signalling Beijing's desire to improve its 
image in order to win friends; and (2) China's concentration 
on strengthening intergovernmental relations in order to 
assert its status as a world power, within the interstices 
of superpower competition.
While 1969 is a convenient date to locate the start of 
China's transition to a pragmatic foreign policy, it falsely 
suggests that the transformation was instantaneous, 
comprehensive and successful. On the contrary, neither the 
Cultural Revolution nor the mi litant foreign policy 
associated with it was terminated abruptly; rather, domestic 
political deradicalisation and the moderation of Chinese 
foreign policy occurred gradually. China's overall aim to 
improve its standing and correct its image in the Middle 
East and elsewhere7 by shifting emphasis to the cultivation 
of intergovernmental relations proceeded in discernible 
stages.
The deep-seated fear of American aggression subsided but 
did not vanish either with the ' Tet offensive' or America's 
early overtures towards China, indicating its willingness to 
consider an improvement in their relations. Rather, 
lingering preoccupation with the American 'threat' continued 
to fix China's attention on its immediate East Asian 
neighborhood.8 Likewise, Moscow's increasingly worrisome 
strategic danger to China lay in the deployment and use of 
its enhanced military presence directly against Chinese 
territory.
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Furthermore, at the intersection of American decline and 
Soviet ascendancy, Beijing noted growing evidence of 
superpower complicity.9 Studying events past and present 
(dating from at least the 1967 Johnson--Kosygin Glassboro 
talks), Beijing inferred a collaborative Soviet--American 
effort to encircle, or at least to isolate, China.10 
Derisively referring to the U.S.S.R. as 'another ferocious 
international gendarme,' Beijing depicted Moscow's ambitions 
as 'predatory and unscrupulous'; it portrayed the Soviet 
Union as eager to collude with U.S. imperialism which, both 
despite and because of its own decline, was willing to turn 
deals with Moscow, ultimately to China's detriment.11
B. Middle East - A Difficult Transition:
Insofar as the Middle East is concerned, the period 1969- 
1971, though relatively brief, was anything but uneventful. 
Some, but not all, of the significant developments occurring 
in this period are directly traceable to the '67 Arab 
defeat. The most notable events - and those 
with possible implications for China's involvement in the 
region - were: (1) the revolutions in the Sudan (May 1969)
and Libya (September 1969); (2) the increasingly costly 'war
of attrition' and the eventual (7 August 1970) cease-fire;
(3) the changing scale and character of superpower 
involvement in the region; (4) the Jordanian-Palestinian 
confrontation; (5) the Egyptian 'succession crisis'; and (6) 
the radicalisation of the regime in South Yemen.
In a sense, the revolutions in the Sudan and Libya were 
part of the after-shocks of the '67 defeat. In both cases,
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pro-Western regimes caved in and were replaced by pro-Nasser 
military officers. M. Heikal, recalling conversations with the 
new revolutionary leaders (Numeiry of the Sudan and Ghadaffi 
of Libya), was struck by the extent to which these officers' 
past actions and future ambitions were affected by the war 
and by Nasser himself.12
Whereas the eagerness of Numeiry and Ghadaffi might have 
encouraged Nasser, other developments clearly did not. At 
the December 1969 Rabat Conference Arab leaders rejected 
Nasser's plea that they commit themselves fully to recover 
Arab territory by force from Israel. In addition, Nasser's 
'war of attrition', as the result of Israeli deep 
penetration bombing raids, imposed a heavy burden on Egypt 
financially as well as psychologically.
Nasser's inability to reconcile these hardships and his 
ambition to recover lost territory and honor led him first 
to seek a greater military commitment from the Soviet Union; 
and later, to accept the United States' Rogers Plan, which 
brought about an Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire. In this 
manner, Egypt became the focal point of increasing Soviet 
involvement in the Middle East; and that involvement 
consisted primarily of arms transfers and supply of military 
advisers. The U.S. became part of this dynamic. Initially, 
Washington - by virtue of its relationship with Israel - was 
deemed capable of bringing about a diplomatic solution. Once 
Rogers' powers of persuasion were found wanting, however (by 
this time Sadat had assumed the Egyptian presidency), the 
U.S. plan was dismissed, reinforcing the argument in favor 
of reliance on Soviet arms.
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Nasser's predicament: overlapped with yet another important 
development; namely, the confrontation between the Jordanian 
government and Palestinian commandos residing within Jordan.
By 1970, the free reign that Palestinian guerrillas had
enjoyed in Jordan, was perceived by King Hussein as a
threat to his authority. Palestinians also launched intermittent
raids against Israel, provoking retaliatory strikes
\
against Jordan. This constituted a second, related issue of 
contention. Finally, in September 1970 a Palestinian- 
Jordanian civil war erupted which ultimately resulted in the 
guerrillas' expulsion from Jordan into Lebanon.
Fittingly, Nasser spent the last days of his life 
interceding in the Palestinian-Jordanian conflict. His 
sudden death spawned still another major development; 
namely, a 'succession crisis' within Egypt.13 Anwar Sadat 
and the principal rival whom it took several months to 
subdue (Ali Sabri) differed not only over who should lead 
Egypt but also over how. One important matter on which their 
views diverged was Egypt's relations with the superpowers: 
whereas Ali Sabri sought a close alliance with the Soviet 
Union, Sadat favored opening to the West.
Yet, Sadat had more to contend with than his rivals within 
Egypt. In inheriting his predecessor's office, Sadat also 
inherited his problems: in particular, Israeli control of the 
Sinai and the continued, costly closure of the Suez Canal.
How to go about the restoration of Egyptian sovereignty 
(which included determining how best to deal with the 
superpowers) became Sadat's central foreign policy challenge 
- one with which Egypt's economic well-being and Sadat's own
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legitimacy were entwined.
From the time that the British Government White Paper (31 
December 1968) had pledged independence to the South Arabian 
Federation, the key problem had been how rather than when to 
implement the decision. The prospect of independence (ie. 
gaining power) had appeared to intensify factionalism within 
the nationalist movement. Thus, the coalition which assumed 
office in 1966 had been riven by division from the start. As 
mentioned in the last chapter, the NLF had managed to 
outmaneuver other factions (e.g., FLOSY) and capture power.
In June 1969, however, the extreme left wing of the party 
compelled Qahtaan al-Shaabi to resign the presidency in 
favor of a five-man council. That this council was composed 
of several Marxists strongly influenced the domestic and 
foreign policies which the new government adopted. 
Proclaiming itself the 'spearhead' of Arab revolution in the 
area, the government pledged to assume 'historical 
responsibilities... for the elimination of the international 
imperialist and reactionary forces'.14 These commitments, 
on the one hand, led to cooperation with PFLOAG and the more 
extreme elements within the PLO; yet, on the other hand to 
clashes with Saudi Arabia.
China meanwhile struggled to resolve contradictions of 
its own arising from its domestic political situation and 
from its changing relations with the superpowers. In 
devising and implementing a foreign policy in the Middle 
East, China's leaders also had to contend with these 
numerous and unresolved changes occurring in the region.
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C. Tentative reimmersion in the Middle East:
In the span of the first eighteen months of its initial 
emergence from the Cultural Revolution, China restored 
official ties with four Middle East governments: Syria (June 
1969), Yemen (July 1969), Egypt (June 1970) and Iraq
(December 1970). The successful re-establishment of official
ties with these four countries, however, tempts us to
overvalue the extent of China's foreign policy
transformation, to overestimate the Middle East's strategic 
importance to China, and to exaggerate the strength of 
China's official relations with these regimes immediately 
upon their revitalisation.
Preoccupation with the growing Soviet threat, and in 
particular with its direct implications for China's 
security, marginalised the Middle East in Beijing's 
strategic thinking. China continued to subordinate the 
Middle East to its highest priority, the defense of its own 
borders. Nevertheless, as this analysis will demonstrate, 
Beijing remained committed to undercutting the superpowers 
in the region. Chiefly for that reason, China's dual tactic 
of continued support for national liberation movements and 
diplomatic reengagement included, though it did not focus 
on, involvement in the Middle East.
As previously demonstrated, China's relations with Arab 
regimes prior to the Cultural Revolution had been sporadic 
and superficial. Thus, China's 'restoration' of official 
ties beginning in 1969 signified little, in and of itself, 
other than the re-establishment of formal bases for the 
possible future strengthening of relations. Despite the
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resumption of official ties, China's relations with Arab 
regimes which had been considerably less than intimate in 
the period preceding the Cultural Revolution, remained so 
until at least mid-1971.
(i). Relations with.Egypt ;.
Sino--Egyptian relations - tentative and often somewhat 
strained - typified China's intergovernmental ties with Arab
regimes in the immediate aftermath of the Cultural
Revolution. Before 1966 the tone, if not the content, of 
Sino--Egyptian ties had been governed by the personal 
relationship between Nasser and Chou En-lai. As already 
illustrated, the leaders' mutual respect and admiration had 
been instrumental in preventing a permanent rupture in the 
two countries' relations. Still, official ties had failed to 
develop much beyond mere cordiality while divergences in 
strategy and tactics had led to temporary estrangement.
Appropriately, Chou's 2 February 1970 letter to Nasser 
signalled China's readiness to resume full diplomatic 
relations. The letter featured the first firm Chinese
support of the Arabs since the end of the '67 war. Yet, it
was more notable for what it suggested than what it 
explicitly stated. Chou's overture to Nasser contained 
familiar but still unwelcome advice. In less patronising 
language than on previous occasions, Chou recommended that 
Nasser take care to recognise his 'true' friends.15 That two 
weeks elapsed before Nasser replied conveyed a message of 
its own. The contents of the Egyptian president's response
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laced expressions of 'gratitude,' 'eagerness,' and 
'admiration' with the polite rejoinder that Egypt was not 
only capable of discerning '’’true"' friendship but also 
intent on maintaining it.16 This was Nasser's way of saying 
that Egypt had no immediate intention of severing relations 
with the Soviet Union and required no advice regarding if 
and when to do so. Somewhat predictably, an additional four 
months passed before Cairo responded to Beijing's invitation 
to renew full diplomatic relations.
The two countries' characteristically unstable relations 
did not cease in 1969 to be punctuated by fundamental 
disagreements leading to public displays of irritation on 
both sides. The PRC continued to register its displeasure at 
the ongoing Soviet--Egyptian relationship, while Nasser 
reacted to China's objections defensively, sometimes 
resentfully.17 At virtually the same time that it was 
preparing to post new diplomats to the Middle East, the PRC 
- under the pressure of Cairo's allegations of Chinese 
complicity in subversive activities - recalled Huang Hua, 
its ambassador to Cairo, and failed to fill the vacant post 
for almost one year.18
Further friction between Beijing and Cairo developed as a 
result of Nasser's acceptance of the June 1970 Rogers Plan. 
Beijing's irritation with Nasser on this subject reflected 
China's acute sensitivity to regional developments which it 
defined chiefly in the context of superpower relations:
U.S. imperialism and its partner are making 
every effort to plot a 'Munich' in the Middle 
East. The aim behind the plot of these 
'superpowers' is to realize their fond dream
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of dividing the spheres of influence in the 
Middle East between themselves at the expense 
of the interests of the Palestinian 
people...After prolonged closed-door 
bargaining with its partner, U.S. imperialism 
dished up a so-called 'political initiative' 
through U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on 
June 19 for the solution of the Middle East 
question...19
The same article recorded the indignation of the PLO, the 
Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, and the Commander of 
the Syrian People's Army in their common opposition to the 
Rogers Plan. A later issue of Peking Review reprinted in its 
entirety PLO Chairman Arafat's official response to the 
Rogers initiative.20 Meanwhile, high-ranking Chinese 
leaders, including Chou En-lai and Vice-Foreign Minister Chi 
Peng-Fei, received Arafat's special envoy, Housni Younes, in 
Beijing to discuss these developments.21 Although details of 
these discussions were never disclosed, it is nonetheless 
useful to keep in mind the timing of the visit; and to 
recall that neither China nor the PLO favored the Rogers 
approach.
Furthermore, the manner in which China chose to express 
its dissatisfaction with Nasser is illuminating. Whereas it 
could have criticised Nasser personally for conceding 
support for the Rogers Plan, Beijing opted instead to 
identify quietly with those Arabs who themselves had begun 
to mobilise opposition to it. China continued to prefer 
circumventing Nasser to challenging him directly as a way of 
expressing disapproval for his policies.22 Notwithstanding 
such care, one thing remained clear: The mutual annoyance 
that plagued Sino— Egyptian relations - even as China
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pursued and ultimately achieved 'normalisation' with Arab 
regimes - was reminiscent of the countries' unstable 
courtship in the years prior to the Cultural Revolution.
lijj  Relation s tti£h,_Syr.ia;.
Syria, Egypt's ally against Israel, particularly after 
1967 was no longer content to follow in the shadow of 
Nasser's foreign policy. Though appearing to chart a foreign 
policy course increasingly independent of Egypt's, to what 
degree did Syria's path diverge from Egypt's? and especially 
pertinent to this study, Was the path adopted by Syria 
likely to win China's approval?
Paradoxically, the same two factors which attracted China 
to Syria were mainly responsible for obstructing China's 
efforts to forge closer links with Syria: namely, Syria's 
relationship with the Palestinian guerrilla movement and 
Syria's relationship with the Soviet Union.
Syria's espousal of the Palestinians presumably found more 
favor in Beijing than Egypt's less militant line. Yet, a 
firm and active commitment by Damascus to assist the 
Palestinian guerrilla movement did not in itself imply a 
coincidence of views between Beijing and Damascus as to what 
this should entail. In fact, Damascus' material support to 
the Palestinian commandos failed to match the pitch of its 
rhetoric.
The Syrian regime was conscious of the dangers, as of the 
opportunities, of supporting the Palestinians. On the one 
hand, aid to the Palestinians satisfied an ideological and
125
fraternal obligation; paid dividends in the inter-Arab 
contest for leadership and prestige; and enabled Syria to 
maintain indirect, low-intensity hostility against Israel.
On the other hand, enhancing the capabilities of the 
Palestinians meant arming a potential rival claimant of 
authority within Syria. Assisting the Palestinians to 
operate against Israel also risked provoking an unacceptable 
level of retaliation against Syria.
Gradually, Syrian support for the Palestinians came to be 
equated with Syrian control over the Palestinians. What 
originated as a clash over tactics, eventually evolved into 
a contest for authority: Syria's struggle mi behalf of the 
Palestinians ultimately merged with Syria's struggle with 
the Palestinians. Thus, for all the theoretical promise of a 
Syrian-Palestinian axis with which Beijing could associate, 
there were these fundamental problems which cried out for 
China's attention.
Curbing Palestinian activities within Syria assumed a 
special importance during this period, for the struggle 
which had brought the Ba'ath Party to power in Syria was 
followed by a struggle within the Ba'ath, which culminated 
in minority Alawite rule. However much the ascendancy of a 
minority regime with secular Ba'athist credentials 
reinforced Syria's commitment to the Palestinian cause, 
events in Jordan in 1970 reinforced the new government's 
determination to hold the Palestinians in close check.
That the Palestinians were not permitted to reign in Syria 
but were instead reined in by Syria was of no small 
importance to the Soviet Union. As Syria's patron, Moscow
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shared Damascus' concern about the dangers of arming the 
Palestinians. In addition, the Soviet Union increasingly 
bore the costs, and to some degree, the risks - both 
financial and otherwise - of maintaining Syria's defense. To 
the extent that Damascus required additional prodding to 
circumscribe the activities of the Palestinians, it is 
highly probable that Moscow was willing to provide it.
Yet, it would be misleading to suggest that Soviet--Syrian 
relations were uniformly cordial throughout this period.
This is not the case. In mid-1969 the U.S.S.R. suspended 
arms deliveries to Syria, partly as the result of 
disagreement over U.N. Resolution 242 .23 This development 
lent brief encouragement to Beijing which, notwithstanding 
the possibility of complicating its relations with the PLO, 
welcomed any opportunity to deprive Moscow of a local 
client.
The initiative appears to have come from Damascus, which 
dispatched a military delegation to Beijing. Was the visit 
intended chiefly as a signal to Moscow? Was Syria genuinely 
and primarily interested in exploring what China had to 
offer? Evidence is unavailable as to the precise nature and 
outcome of the delegation's meetings with Chinese officials. 
Still, it seems unlikely that Syria seriously entertained 
the idea of making China a substitute for the Soviet Union. 
It is equally improbable that Beijing sought any more than 
to loosen Syria from exclusive reliance on the Soviet Union.
Several reports of the Syrian visit to China suggested 
that China had pledged material assistance to Damascus. Some
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of these reports claimed that Beijing had promised to donate 
as much as $15 million in arms to Syria.24 Shichor, however, 
who contends that these reports originated in the Lebanese 
media, dismisses them as 'grossly inaccurate'.25
There appears to be as little reliable evidence to confirm 
the pledge as to deny that it was made. Nonetheless, it is 
possible to place the Sino--Syrian discussions in 
perspective, whatever their exact results. The deterioration 
of Syrian--Soviet relations proved to be as brief in its 
duration as it was rapid in its early tempo. Within months, 
Damascus and Moscow had mended fences, culminating in the 
visit of then-President Atasi and Defense Minister Assad to 
the Soviet Union. The Syrian--Soviet reconciliation suggests 
two things: first, the difficulty of dislodging Moscow, if 
that was indeed Beijing's original aim; and second, the 
possibility that the Sino--Syr.i.an discussions in Beijing 
spurred Moscow to seek a rapprochement with Damascus (which 
could have been Syria's original intention, but was 
certainly not China's).
Notwithstanding the Syrian--.Soviet reconciliation, the 
Chinese persevered in courting Damascus. In May 1972 the PRC 
extended an interest-free loan of $45 million to Syria, to 
be applied to various development projects including the 
construction of a yarn factory, a sports stadium and the 
enlargement of a Chinese-built textile factory.26
Was such an offer sheer foolishness? Throughout Salah 
Jadid's tenure as Syria's president, Soviet--Syrian 
relations, even when they were not strained, were not close. 
Moscow was never enthusiastic about Jadid or his policies,
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which were openly doneribod an 'adventurist' and 
'extremist.' Lingering misgivings about the ramifications of 
too great an investment in Syria carried into the early 
years of Hafez al-Assad's presidency. It was not until 
February 1971 that the Soviet Union signed its first 
substantial arms deal with the Syrian Ba'athists. The value 
of the transaction, estimated at $700 million, dwarfed 
anything that China could afford either in military or in 
economic assistance. Notwithstanding the scale of this, or 
later investments in Syria, Moscow has never been able to 
purchase compliance from Damascus. It is not clear that 
Beijing understood the nuances of the Soviet--Syrian 
relationship; if it did, then China's continued attention to 
Damascus was rather astute.
(iii) Relations., with, Iraqi
The starting point for a Sino— Iraqi rapprochement was 
Moscow's threat to cut its aid to Baghdad. Thus, the 
circumstances of China's overtures to Iraq were similar in 
this respect to China's efforts to nurture relations with 
Syria. Beijing and Baghdad exploited this development to 
their mutual benefit, quickly concluding an economic and 
technical cooperation agreement, which covered trade as well 
as development issues. The terms of the June '71 accord 
called for Iraq to import sulphur while exporting chemical 
fertiliser to China. At the same time, China offered Iraq 
$40 million in the form of an interest-free loan, repayable 
over ten years, with the start of repayment deferred until
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1984 .27
As previously demonstrated, Syria's relationships with the 
Palestinians and with the Soviet Union probably discouraged 
China from investing much in the way of resources or hope in 
winning influence in Damascus. The association between Iraq 
and China was a partnership with perhaps greater promise, 
but different and more wide-ranging complications. Iraq's 
troublesome relations with its neighbors were somewhat 
vexing to China: Beijing was on the verge of establishing 
ties with the Shah's Iran and only three months prior to its 
agreement with Baghdad had earned recognition from Kuwait.
In addition, once Egypt announced its intention to break 
with Moscow, China's efforts to strengthen ties with Iraq 
had different implications. In this new light, Beijing had 
to reconsider whose revolution was worth following.
(iv)-Relations with South Yemen:
South Yemen's importance to China rose in direct relation 
to Beijing's mounting concern with, and hostility towards, 
the Soviet Union. The augmentation of the Soviet naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean was a development which China 
closely monitored. Although at this point, Beijing did not 
infer from Soviet naval deployments a strong effort to 
anchor operations in the South Arabian penninsula, China was 
well aware of Aden's strategic importance.28
Between 1969 and 1972, Beijing's approach to South Yemen 
related to the twin elements of its foreign policy: 
expansion of intergovernmental relations and continued 
support for national liberation struggles. Aden was
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favorably situated to facilitate Chinese efforts on behalf 
of such movements, particularly in the case of the Dhofari 
insurgency. In addition, China had decided to expand its 
commitment of resources to the countries of East Africa. In 
1970, for example, Beijing undertook to build the TanZam 
railroad, which included extending a loan of $401 million, 
the largest aid project sponsored by a communist country up 
to that time.29 Accordingly, Aden figured both as a shield 
for China's burgeoning East African investments and as a 
bridgehead of communications to that part of the African 
continent.
In 1969, at about the time of the Syrian-Soviet 
reconciliation, a new regime came to power in South Yemen 
that appeared receptive to Chinese overtures, even if it 
sent no clear signal that it intended to tilt towards 
Beijing. Power was formally vested in a five-man 
Presidential Council, the NLF High Command. In practice, two 
figures dominated the group: National Front General 
Secretary Abd al-Fattah Ismail and President Salim Rubay 
Ali.30 The former had returned from a Spring 1970 visit to 
Moscow with no significant new aid commitments. In contrast, 
Rubay Ali's subsequent meetings with Mao and Chou En-lai in 
Beijing elicited a Chinese aid offer of $43 million, along 
with the promise to free another $12 million originally 
pledged in 1967.31
Yet, China's competitive edge over the Soviet Union in its 
aid commitments to South Yemen guaranteed neither an 
enduring Chinese influence over the regime, nor the
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permanent displacement of Moscow. Instead, South Yemeni 
domestic politics, interacting with inter-Arab politics, 
while discouraging more than tentative probing by the Soviet 
Union, ensured no more than a tenuous foothold in the PDRY 
for China.
The ascendancy of the ruling NLF in 1969 did not signal- 
the eradication of personal differences and ideological 
cleavages inside South Yemen; nor did the NLF once in power 
succeed in resolving them. Rubay Ali's journey to Beijing so 
soon after Ismael returned empty-handed from Moscow could 
just as easily - and perhaps more accurately - be 
interpreted as a function of the two 'colleagues'' rivalry 
with each other, as a sign of where each man's loyalties 
truly lay, with China or with the U.S.S.R.
Meanwhile, the border with the YAR was anything but 
tranquil. In addition, both Oman and Saudi Arabia were far 
from indifferent to the emergence of a Marxist regime on 
their doorsteps. The United States too, by not interfering 
in the Saudi transfer of American-manufactured weapons to 
South Yemeni dissidents, implicitly registered its hostility 
to the PSRY (as it was then called). Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, the U.S.S.R. refrained from making a material 
commitment to the regime. China, which initially profited 
from this climate of uncertainty, eventually had to contend 
with it.
D . Continued support for revolution 
(i) The continued influence Of, Ljq Pi flQ
Neither domestic political deradicalisation nor the
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associated moderation of Chinese foreign policy was complete 
when, in 1969 Lin Piao delivered his Political Report to the 
Ninth Party Congress of the CCP. This address, in addition 
to revealing the considerable influence of its author in 
post-Cultural Revolutionary Chinese politics, also reflected 
by its content the still-prevalent Chinese view that the 
world's 'revolutionary people' were the sole potentially 
effective obstacles to Soviet--American global domination.32 
In contrast, nowhere in Lin Piao's Political Report was 
there evidence of a major change of heart in favor of 
national--bourgeois regimes.33 A definite answer to the 
question of whether Lin Piao's personal views formed the 
basis of China's foreign policy at this time or merely 
reflected it is not ascertainable; and not directly 
pertinent to this study in any case. What is. clear as well 
as relevant to this analysis, however, is that the views he 
espoused - in particular, his emphasis on continuation of 
support for national liberation movements - shaped the 
character of China's renewed intergovernmental relations.34
The Ninth Party Congress' endorsement of 'people's armed 
struggle' reinvigorated China's revolutionary outlook. In 
practical terms it signalled a rededication to assist 
national liberation movements; correspondingly, it implied 
China's reservations about its newly-initiated project of 
resuming ties with national--bourgeois regimes. That the 
views emerging from the Congress failed to carry Mao's 
explicit support (though they presumably received at least
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his tacit approval) hinted that primary emphasis in Chinese 
foreign policy on assistance to national liberation 
movements may have been contested. In retrospect, the debate 
which is believed to have taken place warned of the 
possibility that stress on support for national liberation 
movements would not last.35
In actual fact the transition in Chinese foreign policy 
from its emphasis on liberation movements to a concentration 
on intergovernmental activities was a matter of only about 
two years. In the intervening time, however, two important 
liberation movements in the Middle East - the PFLOAG and the 
PLO - drew China's attention. The simultaneous scheduling of 
visits to Beijing by Fatah and PFLOAG delegations in March 
1970 reflected the way in which China related the two 
movements, even if it might have evaluated their prospects 
separately.36
(ii) ...Relations .wi.th._the PFLQAG;
Two weeks after the June '67 war, the first Dhofar 
Liberation Front (DLF) delegation travelled to Beijing. 
Meetings with Chinese Defense Ministry officials at that 
time resulted in the promise of 'nominal aid' (i.e. light 
arms). The first such aid shipments were routed through 
Tanzania.37 Yet, while offering rhetorical encouragement to 
the PFLOAG (the DLF's successor) and its maximalist aims of 
advancing revolutionary change throughout the Arabian 
penninsula, China saw its prospects for strengthening ties 
with the movement perceptibly improve only in mid-July 1969. 
It was then that China opened its embassy in Aden, which
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soon thereafter became what one commentator described as a 
'clearinghouse for Chinese weapons and supplies'.38 There 
was cordiality between the PFLOAG and the Aden regime, both 
of whom Beijing assiduously courted. Besides offering a base 
from which to build and extend its influence, Aden provided 
the only opportunity in the Middle East for China's 
intergovernmental and revolutionary activities to coexist 
relatively harmoniously.
Further intensification of Chinese interest in and 
involvement with the PFLOAG was visible in Spring 1970, when 
a PFLOAG delegation travelled to Beijing for meetings with 
high-ranking PRC leaders, including Chou.39 These talks 
reportedly produced a Chinese pledge to furnish Lhe PFLOAG 
with heavy as well as light arms,40 though there is no 
evidence available as to the quantity or type of weapons 
promised; nor is there proof that such weapons were in fact 
delivered. It is unlikely that, were massive quantities of 
weapons transferred, they would have gone completely 
unnoticed. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that 
China's material support was never more than modest. The 
question remains: why?
One explanation for China's apparent restraint in 
channelling arms to the PFLOAG is an ideological one: The 
Chinese revolutionary precept of self-reliance defined 
fraternal support as a supplement to self-help, not a 
substitute for it. Of course, the precept was sufficiently 
ambiguous to serve as a mask for China's own inadequate 
resources as well as for China's insufficient confidence in
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a movement's potential. In the case of the PFLOAG, neither 
its military prospects nor its political agenda inspired 
confidence, probably affecting the scale of Beijing's 
material investment. A further constraint on China's supply 
- or at least, public acknowledgment - of aid to the PFLOAG 
was its desire to strengthen relations with Gulf regimes 
while simultaneously maintaining support of national 
liberation groups. Thus, in rhetorical as well as perhaps in 
material terms, the PRC restricted its support of the PFLOAG 
to 'low-level commentary' and was 'officially cautious' in 
admitting its assistance.41
China served as the PFLOAG's chief benefactor despite 
these apprehensions. Stephen Page argues that, until 1971, 
China was the PFLOAG's principal patron; almost all of its 
weapons were furnished by the Chinese, including some 
artillery and anti-aircraft guns.42 This is partly 
attributable to the U.S.S.R.'s reluctance to befriend the 
movement. How appealing was Soviet ideology in the guerrilla 
war context of the South Arabian penninsula? How valuable 
was the U.S.S.R.'s sophisticated weaponry in the rural 
guerilla setting? How stable was the PFLOAG, or its local 
benefactor, the regime of South Yemen? Finally, given these 
uncertainties, what risk to Moscow's future relations with 
the region's other regimes would a material commitment to 
the PFLOAG entail? It is possible that Beijing was unaware 
of these complications or unrealistic in its assessment; or 
else adopted a tactical position by means of which these 
questions could be sidestepped, at least temporarily.
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(ill.) -Relations-ttith—the. .ELO l
Chinese interest in the Palestinians' struggle was more 
intense yet also more problematic than its attachment to the 
PFLOAG. The activation of the PLO following the '67 war had 
virtually coincided with the 'radicalisation' of Chinese 
foreign policy at the onset of the Cultural Revolution. 
Although the Palestinian guerillas' adoption of armed 
struggle was, in principle, satisfactory to China, in 
practice it was awkward for China to support wholeheartedly. 
For one thing, the PLO was not a 'national liberation' 
movement in the pure doctrinal sense. For another, following 
their '67 defeat, Arab regimes found PLO militancy 
convenient to accommodate only in so far as they themselves 
could control it. The more that China sought to engage Arab 
regimes, the more careful it had to be in prodding the PLO. 
Thus, while it is not astonishing that Beijing embraced the 
Palestinians, it is equally unsurprising that its support 
provided a potential source of Sino--Arab friction and not 
just Arab goodwill.
Support for the Palestinians was urged upon China for 
reasons besides a common Sino--Palestinian view regarding 
the indispensability of armed struggle. What strengthened 
the Sino--Palestinian axis was the application of Soviet-- 
American collaboration to the Middle East. Beijing 
interpreted in Moscow's December 1968 Five Point Proposal 
(and the U.S.' lack of resistance to it) as a joint effort 
to freeze the status quo in the Middle East preparatory to 
the superpowers' partition of the region between them.
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Accordingly, Beijing identified the Palestinian guerrillas 
(especially in light of the seeming paralysis of Arab 
regimes) as the key force in the broader Arab struggle to 
frustrate the superpowers' 'criminal designs in the Middle 
East' ,43
Supporting the PLO not only served to oppose the United 
States in the region, but by so doing compelled Washington 
to divert its attention and deploy its resources more 
widely. By contributing in this way to the global dispersion 
of American commitments, China in the longer term aimed at 
accelerating the process of U.S. decline. In the immediate 
future, such a tactic was diversionary: offering relief of 
pressure from China's borders. This approach was consistent 
with the traditional Maoist view that if the enemy is 
divided, it can be defeated - or at least held at bay until 
its strength is sapped. The struggle of the PLO was, in this 
sense, considered one of many bush fires the Chinese sought 
to fan, not necessarily in the grandiose expectation that 
the U.S. would be engulfed, but in the more realistic hope 
that it would be exhausted by its efforts to extinguish 
them.
On the surface, parallel Sino--Palestinian opposition to 
external intervention offered a promising basis for 
cooperation: China and the Palestinians rejected peace 
formulas advanced or embraced by the superpowers, or adopted 
by the U.N. (from which, until China's induction in 1971, 
both parties had been excluded). At the short-term expense 
of irritating Arab leaders, this common position offered the 
long-term prospect of sparking a general Arab reawakening
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and recommitment to armed struggle.
While dismally unrealistic in hindsight, this expectation 
was bolstered at the time by China's impression - or hope - 
that Palestinian guerrilla activity was on the upswing.44 
Beijing seemed further encouraged by the joint action of 
Fatah and Palestinian commando units.45 Even as late as July 
1971 the Beijing official press expressed China's 
satisfaction with the election of a PLO Central Committee at 
whose first meeting a military command was formed.46 Whether 
these reactions reflected a genuine faith in Palestinian 
unity or wishful thinking, is of course impossible to tell. 
Lillian Craig Harris has suggested that China's view of the 
PLO struggle and of the PLO was anything but a romanticised 
one; and that, accordingly, regardless of the actual 
quantity of Chinese material assistance delivered to the 
Palestinians (which, in any case, as will be discussed 
later, is difficult to determine precisely), from 1970 aid 
was predicated on unity.47
How then can Beijing's applause for Palestinian 
'successes' be accounted for? In what proportion did 
compliments in the official press represent jubilation or 
relief on the part of the Chinese leadership? It is 
improbable that Beijing failed to have noticed or to have 
been disappointed by the movement's many shortcomings.
First, the movement's fragmentation - on practical and 
doctrinal 'people's war' grounds - warranted concern. While 
commending undertakings aimed at unification, Beijing 
surely recognised that pro forma agreements among
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Palestinian factions to cooperate under PLO auspices were 
honored more in the breach than in the observance.
Second, China eventually found the movement's military 
operations to be tactically unwise, if not
counterproductive. Consisting by the early '70s of sporadic 
raids and increasing resort to terrorism, PLO military 
actions eventually earned China's disapproval.48
Third, the September '70 and July '71 clashes between 
Jordanian authorities and the PLO further weakened China's 
confidence in the movement for two reasons: (a) the
dispersion of the PLO further contributed to the movement's 
disintegration; and (b) the fragmentation of the movement 
drove individual factions into the laps of rival Arab 
regimes, with some of whom China's disagreement over the 
Palestinian issue had impelled its affiliation with the 
movement in the first place.
Perhaps most upsetting of all to China was the PLO's 
association with the Soviet Union. In the mid-'50s, when the 
Sino--Soviet alliance was fundamentally intact, Nasser 
(albeit to suit his own purposes) had facilitated Moscow's 
initial contact with the Yemen. More than a decade had 
elapsed, however, since China, which had initially profited 
from Nasser's mediation between Yemen and the U.S.S.R., was 
on good terms with either Nasser himself or with Moscow. 
Thus, it was an unsurprising repetition of history, with an 
unhappy twist for the PRC, when in December 1969, Nasser 
dispatched a delegation to Moscow with the aim of fostering 
a relationship between Fatah and the Soviet Union.49 Adding 
to the irony was the indirect feedback to the PRC, which,
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seeking to gain ground in the ongoing polemic with the 
Soviet Union, had advertised Moscow's inattention to the 
Palestinian cause. After years of increasing public 
criticism from Beijing, Moscow (inopportunely for China) 
began to address the PLO need for alternative sources of 
material support.
To some extent China overcame the fractiousness of the PLO 
by focusing on Fatah, whose comparatively large size and 
cohesiveness earned it a reputation as the linchpin of the 
PLO.50 Yet Beijing eyed Fatah with some suspicion, 
especially as Arafat appeared responsive to Moscow. A 
practical constraint on China's material support to Fatah 
(or to any other PLO wing for that matter) was the 
difficulty of arranging and ensuring arms deliveries to the 
intended beneficiaries. The combination of great distances 
and Palestinian guerrillas' residence on the soil of 
sovereign Arab states caused China to rely on the 
transshipment of weapons and equipment. The success of these 
endeavors depended on the goodwill and (sometimes) active 
cooperation of intermediaries - Syria and Iraq, in 
particular. To the extent that Moscow enjoyed a degree of 
influence in Baghdad and Damascus unmatched by Beijing, 
cooperation was potentially (though not necessarily) more 
difficult for the PRC to obtain.
In July 1971 Syria reportedly seized a large shipment of 
Chinese-furnished weapons bound for the Palestinians and 
said to have included up to 200 tanks and armored personnel 
carriers.51 Prior to the actual confiscation, a dispute
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erupted between Fatah and the Iraqi-sponsored PLA General 
Command as to who should take delivery.52 Compounding this 
and presumably motivating the confiscation was the belief 
that the weapons were earmarked for the new 'Yarmouk 
Brigade', which was to consist of a large number of 
defectors from the Jordanian army. Probably suspecting that 
the weapons would be turned on Jordan rather than Israel, 
the Assad regime - only one year in power and determined in 
any case to rein in Palestinians residing in Syria - ordered 
the seizure. In a related development, Syrian authorities 
imposed stringent new regulations to curb commando movements 
and arrested Fatah members.53 While the maintenance of 
regime security and the improvement of Syrian--Jordanian 
relations provided ample incentive for Damascus to adopt 
these measures, speculation also emerged at the time that 
Moscow had encouraged Syria's interception of Chinese 
supplies. If indeed this is true, then the Syrian--Soviet 
reconciliation (previously discussed) had the additional 
consequence of jeopardising China's efforts vis-a-vis the 
PLO.
Regardless of possible Soviet interference, the transfer 
of arms and equipment to guerrilla movements is, by 
definition, a secretive business. As such, it is as 
difficult to report as it is to control. This is the case 
regarding China's material assistance to the Palestinian 
guerrillas. The circuitous route by which 'Chinese' weapons 
(many of which are either Soviet-made, Soviet-refurbished, 
or Soviet-copied) reach the hands of PLO commandos - if 
they ever do - mock attempts to measure Chinese support
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accurately.
Furthermore, as in the case described above - where 
weapons were alleged to have entered Syria from Algeria - it 
is impossible to verify that the order to initiate movement 
originated in Beijing.54 Reasons abound for those who 
publicise the discovery of arms caches (on those occasions 
when they consider it prudent to do so) either to exaggerate 
or to undervalue their contents. Likewise, donor or 
recipient may harbor ulterior motives which, in the end, 
obfuscate rather than clarify who is responsible, and for 
how much. Such are the many ambiguities associated with 
assessing China's 'actual' support of the Palestinians 
during those periods when the consensus is that they were 
indeed very supportive.
The discussion has thus far cited the practical 
constraints which made the process of transferring arms to 
the PLO difficult for China to accomplish; and difficult for 
the analyst to evaluate. Joseph Camilleri supplies an 
additional set of considerations which help to explain the 
boundaries of China's involvement with the PLO:
In the first place, regardless of the claims 
or requirements of her revolutionary 
ideology, China was obliged to behave within 
a fragmentary system of states as a 
territorial power committed to the defense of 
her own sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and other vital national interests which, by 
their very nature, often precluded the 
implementation of larger or more 
internationalist objectives. Similarly, the 
demands of her geography often combined to 
minimize the level of material assistance 
that could be extended to the revolutionary 
cause. But perhaps the most critical limiting 
factor in China's relationship with external
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movements was her preoccupation with the 
requirements of state-to-state diplomacy.
[emphasis added]55
Thus, it is useful to view China's assistance to the PLO 
within the broader framework of China's commitment to 
internationalist goals; and to appreciate not only China's 
difficulties in delivering arms, but also China's problem of 
reconciling support for armed struggle and responsible 
behavior within the international state system.
(iv) Fall of Lin Piao, rise of intergovernmental ties:
During 1971 a series of dramatic events occurred which 
urged China's adoption of a more decisively pragmatic 
foreign policy. One important event was the fall of Lin 
Piao. Besides contributing to the further stabilisation of 
China's political situation, Lin Piao's departure also 
removed perhaps the strongest voice in favor of retaining 
support of national liberation movements as the dominant 
feature of Chinese foreign policy.
Second, beginning with the 'Canadian formula' - which was 
applied in rapid succession by Italy, Chile, Austria,
Turkey, Belgium and others in 1970--71 - China won 
recognition from a host of countries, hastening its 
immersion in 'regular' international politics.
Third, the United States' repeated overtures to China 
appeared more credible in the wake of Kissinger's July '71 
visit to China and President Nixon's momentous trip the
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following February. These meetings persuaded China of the 
seriousness of American intentions to improve bilateral 
relations as well as its determination to wind down its 
involvement in Vietnam.
Fourth, the PRC's induction into the U.N. as a permanent 
member of the Security Council, together with the second 
wave of recognitions generated by it (developments closely 
associated with the Sino-American rapprochement), further 
enhanced China's self-image. These breakthroughs did not in 
themselves promise a significant relief of strategic 
pressure against China. Yet, they offered the prospect of 
China's confronting it in less isolation.
Finally, as Soviet Far Eastern forces expanded to more 
than fifty divisions (culminating in the resumption of 
border clashes in 1972), China grew increasingly preoccupied 
with Soviet expansionism, not only on, but also beyond, its 
immediate doorstep.
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Chapter IV 
An evaluation
What was the context?
Chinese foreign policy springs from the conscious effort 
of China's leaders to produce a coherent picture of the 
developing trend in world affairs which entails identifying 
the main enemy, accurately estimating changes in its 
relative capabilities, and anticipating shifts in its 
tactics. The period 1969--1971 was one of strategic 
reassessment occurring simultaneously with China's emergence 
from the Cultural Revolution. As such, the importance of the 
Middle East to China as well as China's activities there 
bore the mark of a foreign policy in transition.
In this period imperialism remained the chief threat to 
China and to the 'world's revolutionary people' over whom 
China claimed leadership. Yet, Beijing read America's 
military engagement in Asia as contributing to the political 
fragmentation and economic deterioration of the Western 
bloc. Furthermore, offsetting Beijing's wariness of 
Washington was an undercurrent of conciliation spirited by a 
series of American initiatives towards which China appeared 
favorably, though cautiously, inclined.
At the same time, China inferred from enhanced Soviet 
military capabilities and the uses to which they had already 
been applied, the U.S.S.R.'s reversion to the expansionist 
policies of pre-revolutionary Tsarist Russia; or at least 
publicly portrayed Soviet conduct as such. Furthermore, in 
the onset of detente, Beijing saw a dangerous Soviet--
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American collaboration aimed at China's isolation, if not 
actual encirclement. Accordingly, China observed, welcomed 
and sought to nourish resistance to both the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. at the intergovernmental level and (initially with 
greater emphasis) at the level of national liberation 
movements as well.
By 1969, support for the continuation of the policies of 
the Cultural Revolution had seemed already to have eroded 
considerably. Still, the primacy of Mao's personal 
leadership appears to have remained, if not unquestioned, 
essentially intact. As previously, Lin Piao exerted a strong 
influence on China's politics: just as the heavily weighted 
militant component of China's foreign policy from 1969 until
Lin Piao's fall in mid-1971 bore his personal imprint, so
too the de-emphasis of China's support for national 
liberation movements towards the end of this phase was 
directly traceable to his demise. Therefore, while the PRC's
vigorous reentry into world politics - urged mainly by
events external to China - seems to have enjoyed a consensus 
despite internal political factionalism, China's renewed 
involvement in world affairs acquired its character partly 
as a_n outgrowth of that struggle.
China's withdrawal from the Middle East during the 
Cultural Revolution had occurred as part of its broader 
retreat (relatively speaking) from international affairs. 
Similarly, China's reengagement in world politics 
incorporated its resumption of activities in the Middle 
East. Prompted by its revised assessment of the global
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situation - which combined the easing of U.S. pressure on 
East Asia and a growing Soviet threat to Chinese security - 
Beijing did not attach special strategic importance to the 
Middle East in this phase. Yet, China detected a softening 
of Soviet--American relations, and sought to check any 
perceived attempt at superpower 'collusion,' including in 
the Middle East. Incipient Soviet--American detente. in 
Beijing's view, freed a dangerously militarised Soviet Union 
to pursue an expansionist foreign policy deemed ultimately 
harmful to China.
What were China's objectives?
In the immediate aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, 
China reaffirmed the instrumental value of the Middle East, 
which it considered a secondary strategic bulwark against 
Soviet--American global domination. Following the June '67 
defeat of the Arabs, China noted two initially promising, 
inversely related local developments: (1) the discrediting
of Arab regimes; and (2) the strengthening of national 
liberation movements. In the re-establishment of full 
diplomatic ties with Arab regimes and the simultaneous 
support of the PLO and the PFLOAG, China sought to take 
advantage of the weakness of Arab governments as well as to 
compensate for it in pursuing one overriding interest: 
resistance to the perceived formation of a Soviet--American 
condominium in the Middle East.
China aimed to exploit discontent within Arab societies 
(in the Arabian penninsula) and to capitalise on the 
unresolved Palestinian problem not merely for the sake of
14 8
ideological consistency but also for the purpose of 
counteracting superpower involvement in the region by 
circumventing recalcitrant or client regimes where it could 
not, or preferred not, to directly challenge them. China's 
principal objective in the Middle East at this time, 
therefore, was the displacement (as distinct from the 
replacement) of the United States and the Soviet Union.
At the same time, China rejuvenated its effort to gain 
international recognition, as much to serve the end of 
opposing superpower hegemony as to enhance national pride, 
to build international legitimacy and to strengthen 
international prestige. The seemingly modest objective of 
achieving 'preventive influence' in the Middle East, 
however, required a degree of tactical flexibility not 
entirely at China's disposal as well as a degree of local 
docility and superpower acquiescence beyond rather than 
within China's grasp.
What were China's tactics?
From 1969 until 1972, China's approach to the Middle East 
- normalising relations with local governments while 
nurturing the region's principal national liberation 
movements - mirrored the politically contradictory 
directions of its policy towards the superpowers, which 
trumpeted Beijing's opposition to the international duopoly 
of power even as it steered a course for rapprochement with 
Washington.
At the intergovernmental level, China strove to renew full
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diplomatic relations and subsequently to revive the practice 
of exchanging official delegations with those countries with 
whom it had dealt prior to the Cultural Revolution. 
Typically, as in the case of Egypt (with whom a complete 
resumption of official ties did not occur until shortly 
before Nasser's death), China continued to insist, though in 
language less patronising than in previous years, that local 
regimes abrogate relations with the U.S.S.R. As ever, such 
advice was not only rejected, but resented.
Seeking a broad base of intergovernmental relations (not 
only) in the Middle East from which to resist superpower 
hegemony and shatter its diplomatic isolation, China cast 
for friends among the newly independent as well as 
established Gulf states (Kuwait and Iran in particular). As 
in its early 1960s Middle East 'offensive', when China 
(however reluctantly) courted national--bourgeois regimes, 
between 1969 and 1971 the PRC displayed a willingness to go 
one step further: namely, courting conservative Gulf 
monarchies. [This will be discussed in detail in the next 
chapter.]
By the end of this phase China's customary utilisation of 
its membership in international organisations to boost its 
prestige and enlist support against its adversaries was 
employed from the high ground of international legitimacy 
provided by its 1971 induction into the U.N. Security 
Council. From this position Beijing attacked superpower 
interference in the Middle East; opposed their peace 
proposals; condemned Israeli acts of 'aggression' and 
'intransigence'; linked the plight of the Arabs to that of
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underdeveloped countries generally; and defended the cause 
of the Palestinians.
Beijing sought to marry economic policy instruments to its 
Middle East diplomacy in the form of aid and trade. China, 
which had pioneered the unfamiliar strategy of extending 
foreign aid despite itself being a developing country, 
revived the practice. Although in dollar terms Africa was 
placed far ahead of the Middle East as a recipient of 
China's foreign aid, still Beijing targeted Syria, Iraq and 
South Yemen for significant sums. In dispensing aid to these 
countries, China apparently sought to outmanoeuver the 
Soviet Union, which had graduated in China's strategic 
reassessment from a mere socialist rival to a global 
predator at least on a par with the U.S.
The case of China's trade with the region revealed a 
similar pattern. In addition to concentrating its commercial 
relations on Syria, Iraq and South Yemen, Beijing also 
intensified its trade relations with Egypt (which had 
consistently been regarded as China's bridgehead to Africa).
China's cultivation of intergovernmental relations with 
Middle East countries in this transitional period was 
subordinated to its support of national liberation movements 
for several reasons: (1) the two major local movements (the
PFLOAG and the PLO) had by then received only token support 
from the Soviet Union; (2) the movements' leaders, unlike 
local governments, appeared to share Beijing's commitment to 
opposing externally imposed settlements of their grievances;
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(3) their tactics, if not their revolutionary credentials, 
roughly matched China's doctrinal formula for waging 
successful 'people's war'; and (4) the movements' material 
needs more realistically approximated China's capacity to 
satisfy them than was the case with Arab governments'.
Figures on the number and value of Chinese weapons 
delivered to the two movements are scarce and unreliable. 
Several factors account for this. First, claims by arms 
donors or recipients, intermediaries or interceptors, are 
more apt to be weighted in favor of preference than of 
truth. Second, offers of assistance, even where quantities 
are specified and publicised, while they are certain to be 
accepted, are not certain to be delivered. Third, trans­
shipment of weapons/equipment is as difficult for the 
analyst to trace to its eventual destination as it is for 
the donor to guide to its intended destination. Fourth, 
notwithstanding the possibility of clearly identifiable 
markings and resemblances, even when weapons themselves 
reliably reveal the country of their manufacture, they do 
not necessarily denote the country that furnished them.
Nevertheless, the rough outline of credible information 
regarding Chinese arms transfers to the PFLOAG and the PLO 
shows a more sustained provision of weapons/equipment of 
greater quantity and higher quality to the PLO than to the 
PFLOAG, with a strong preference for Fatah (though not to 
the total exclusion of radical wings such as the PFLP).
Were China's efforts successful?
Beijing succeeded in reviving its diplomatic relations
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with Egypt, Iraq, Syria and South Yemen. In addition, China 
earned formal recognition from both Kuwait and Iran.
Although these diplomatic coups were important, they were 
not indispensable, as China herself has recently proved that 
it is possible to conduct commercial and military 
transactions in the absence of official diplomatic ties.
Still, to China, whose longstanding campaign to 
acquire international legitimacy was, and continues to be, an 
issue related not only to its prestige but also to its security, 
the resumption and attainment of full diplomatic relations should 
not be underestimated.
Ironically, in the aftermath of the '67 war, when Beijing 
arguably could have capitalised on the Arabs' disillusionment with 
Moscow, China was embroiled in the Cultural Revolution. When China 
finally emerged from the Cultural Revolution, Middle East regimes 
hesitated to establish or resume ties with the PRC. They balked at 
deepening relations thereafter for several reasons.
First, as of 1969, even if the Cultural Revolution had been 
pronounced dead, memories of its excesses had not died with it. 
China's maltreatment of its Muslim population evoked a lingering 
mistrust and suspicion in the Middle East.
Second, China's tactics in the Middle East continued to be 
confrontational rather than cooperative or conciliatory. For most 
of the period, China continued to press upon Arab leaders militant 
positions that were ideologically unappealing and strategically 
unaffordable. For Arab regimes, opposing either or both 
superpowers remained an expedient, not an orthodoxy. It was 
employed as circumstances warranted, not as ideology dictated; by
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choice not as the result of cajolery.
In seeking to enlist Middle East regimes against the 
superpowers, China essentially revived the largely unsuccessful 
pre-Cultural Revolutionary practice of defining local allegiances 
in terms of external rivalries. To Middle East governments, whose 
security and development needs China could not hope to meet, the 
PRC's bid to displace Moscow was unacceptable in the absence of 
its ability to replace Moscow.
By any estimate Beijing's support of the PLO and the PFLOAG was 
a highly economical and ideologically consistent course culled 
from a narrow range of options that delivered mixed results. By 
helping to sustain the PLO, China contributed to the derailment of 
superpower peace initiatives. [In that local resistance to such 
initiatives was strong irrespective of China's position and 
efforts, the PRC's contribution in this respect should not be 
exaggerated.]
Second, China's assistance to the PLO earned a measure of Arab 
goodwill by stoking the fire of the Palestinian cause. 
Paradoxically, however, these same efforts threatened to embarrass 
Arab regimes, or else to endanger them by unnecessarily 
implicating them in China's provocative militancy. Thus, at best, 
the Sino--Palestinian connection was received with a mixed 
reaction in the Middle East. Sino--Middle Eastern relations were 
thereby complicated nearly as much as they were consolidated by 
China's support for the PLO.
Third, in beating Moscow to the sides of the PLO and the PFLOAG, 
China struck a blow in its polemic with the Soviet Union. 
Ironically, the damage rebounded to China's disfavor, as Moscow 
increased, rather than downgraded, its support for the PLO.
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Additionally, China dealt itself the unhappy lesson that, in the 
Middle East perhaps more sharply than anywhere else, opportunism 
cuts both ways: just as the PRC had exploited Moscow's distance 
from the PLO, the PLO, by extending feelers to the Soviet Union, 
appeared to play Moscow and Beijing off against one another.
China's support to the PFLOAG, with its simultaneous 
encouragement of OPEC and cultivation of bilateral ties with Gulf 
states revealed difficult choices on the horizon. For the time 
being, however, Beijing's assistance to the PFLOAG outflanked the 
Soviet Union without pre-empting relations with Gulf states which 
were, in any case, only just getting under way.
One is struck by the degree to which, by the end of 1971, events 
in the Middle East (as well as in the broader theater of China's 
foreign relations), on balance, evolved if not directly in China's 
favor, then at least not to its detriment - often irrespective of 
its efforts and sometimes despite them. The ring of encirclement 
did not close around China at the Middle East. On the contrary, 
China by the end of this phase enjoyed an unprecedented degree of 
international acceptance. The persisting militancy of China's 
foreign policy did not fatally impair its drive to resume or even 
expand its intergovernmental contacts. Inter-Arab rivalries, 
heedless of Beijing's clarion call for unity, might have actually 
advanced rather than retarded the cause of opposing superpower 
domination. A divided Arab world appeared as effective in 
preventing superpower domination as a united Arab world (for which 
China had so ardently campaigned).
At the same time, rapprochement with the United States offered 
to do more to reinforce China's drive towards respectability in
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the Middle East than any of the numerous efforts China had aimed 
directly at the region. Indeed, while it would be an overstatement 
to suggest that Washington's opening to Beijing opened the Middle 
East to China, the two developments are not independent of one 
another. Thus, entering 1972, as China found itself escorted to, 
if not deposited at, the threshhold of foreign policy pragmatism, 
it also discovered that the door to the Middle East stood, as 
ever, ajar.
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Chapter V 
The greater enemy 
1972 —  1977
A. Sino— American rapprochement:
Between 1972 and 1978 China's move towards foreign policy 
pragmatism gathered momentum, fueled by the interplay of 
important international and domestic developments. Chief 
among these developments was a perceived shift in the East- 
West balance in Moscow's favor, coupled with an internal 
politico— economic situation plagued by uncertainties. Drawn 
principally from these circumstances, China's foreign policy 
in this phase featured: (1) a steady though cautious
movement into closer tactical alignment with the U.S. 
against the Soviet Union; and (2) an increasing attention 
to, and courtship of, the governments of the world's small 
and medium powers. Accordingly, the period 1972— 1977 
represents an intermediate stage in the evolution of Chinese 
foreign policy pragmatism. It follows, more than it departs 
from, the path taken in the preceding three years.
Prior to 1972 Beijing adhered to the view that Soviet—  
American rivalry had a dual character, consisting of both 
collusion and contention in varying proportion to one 
another. After 1972, Beijing continued to adhere to this 
view, which provided the conceptual basis for its 
interpretation of superpower detente. Beijing regarded the 
flowering of Soviet— American detente as a 'smokescreen' for 
Soviet expansionism, ultimately working to China's
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disadvantage.1 China traced the emergence of this new 
pattern of superpower rivalry to two related developments: 
the continuing erosion of U.S. strength and the 
corresponding increase in the Soviet Union's military 
capability and assertiveness.2 At the intersection of 
American decline and Soviet ascendancy Beijing saw the 
superpowers scrambling for position, primarily in the 
developing world.
The additional expansion of Soviet Far Eastern forces and 
the resumption of Sino--Soviet border hostilities in 1972 
contributed to the further deterioration of the two 
countries' relations. Having previously recast its former 
ally as a socialist rival, and later as an imperialist 
accomplice, China in this period reclassified the Soviet 
Union as its 'principal' enemy.3 Beijing expressed concern 
about the buildup of Soviet land forces along the Chinese 
frontier and the continuing development of Soviet naval 
capabilities (which appeared aimed at the U.S.S.R.'s 
eventual attainment of 'sea hegemony'4) . Soviet involvement 
in Africa in the mid-'70s, specifically in Angola and the 
Horn of Africa, reinforced the belief that the U.S.S.R. had 
become the 'more ferocious' superpower: reckless, 
treacherous, the most dangerous source of world war.5 
In the light of Soviet behavior, American decline was as 
troubling to Beijing as it was encouraging. That decline was 
amply illustrated to Beijing by economic recession,
Watergate and the withdrawal from Vietnam. Measured against 
a dangerously militarised Soviet Union, these developments
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impelled Beijing to seek an improvement in its relations 
with the United States.
China's preoccupation with the Soviet threat helps to explain 
Beijing's undisguised approval of the American decisions to 
trial-produce the Cruise missile, to initiate production of 
the B-l bomber, and to test-launch the Trident system. The 
Chinese press welcomed these developments as Washington's 
'awakening' to 'real' Soviet intentions and capabilities.6 
Sensitivity to the Soviet threat, however, did not blind 
Beijing to America's enduring strengths and tendencies. The 
impairment of the American position in Asia, owing 
principally to the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, signified 
to China that the Soviet Union had dislodged the U.S. as 
China's principal enemy. Yet, there was no suggestion that 
the U.S.S.R. had replaced the U.S. as China's only enemy.
For the time being, then, Beijing's ambivalence about 
tilting towards Washington was resolved in favor of
political situation following the deaths in rapid succession 
of China's three principal leaders in 1976 ensured that, 
throughout this period, China's strategic movement into de 
facto alliance with the United States was anything but 
inexorable.
B. Third World emphasis, intergovernmental level:
Thanks in part to improved Sino--American relations, 
Beijing would succeed by the end of 1977 in establishing 
diplomatic ties with 114 countries. This development serves 
as a clue to China's tactics as well as evidence of its
without entente. The uncertain domestic
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achievements. Building upon Mao's 'Theory of the Three 
Worlds' as articulated in Deng's 1974 speech to the U.N., 
China placed new stress on cultivating intergovernmental 
relations, though not necessarily with a 'loss of 
revolutionary perspective or a denial of principle'.7
The basis of China's relations with the Third World in
Q
this period was economic nationalist, not socialist aims. 
Regarding the Third World as an 'increasingly important 
force,'9 Beijing's policy towards developing nations was a 
means of confronting changes in the international situation, 
deemed to have occurred chiefly as the result of changes in 
the relations between the superpowers.10 R. Sutter 
identifies the CCP Tenth Party Congress (August 1973) as a 
'milestone' in the development of Chinese foreign policy. He 
argues that, as of this congress, the PRC emphasised 
geopolitical considerations, with little attention to 
revolutionary movements and armed struggles.11
C. Superpower rivalry in the Third World:
The intensification of superpower contention appeared to 
Beijing to be concentrated in, though not exclusive to, the 
Middle East. With the end of the Indo--Pakistani war and the 
convening of the Paris peace talks, Beijing saw a tempering 
of superpower competition on two fronts, but not on all 
fronts. Throughout this period, the Chinese official press 
devoted a great deal of space to coverage of Soviet and 
American naval activity in the Indian Ocean and eastern 
Mediterranean.12 The Soviet navy was said to be 'swarming'
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in the eastern Mediterranean, where the U.S. had 
strengthened its forward deployed Sixth Fleet. A spate of 
articles shared the conclusion that these activities were 
symptomatic of a superpower struggle for 'maritime 
supremacy'.13
Following from this analysis, the Middle East acquired its 
importance as a 'pivotal area'.14 The region's critical 
geostrategic position - linking two theaters of superpower 
competition - boosted the Middle East's significance to 
China.15 Beijing was particularly attentive to the behavior 
of the Soviet Union. By 1977 the thesis would become more 
explicit: having mapped the activities of the U.S.S.R., 
Beijing would come to portray them as a coordinated effort 
to outflank the West. Hua Guofeng's Political Report to the 
Eleventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is 
revealing in this respect:
Soviet--U.S. contention extends to every 
corner of the world, but its focus is still 
in Europe. The Soviet Union has massed its 
troops in Eastern Europe and at the same 
accelerated its plunder of strategic 
resources and its scramble for strategic 
bases in Africa and the Middle East in an 
attempt to encircle Europe from the flanks by 
seizing the Persian Gulf in the East, 
thrusting round the Cape of Good Hope in the 
South and blocking the main navigation routes 
of the Atlantic Ocean in the West.16
The 1973 Middle East war and its aftermath incorporated 
all of those crosscutting features of local politics and 
superpower rivalry that led China to adopt this thesis. 
Occurring in tandem with American disengagement from 
Indochina, the outbreak of the October War fired Beijing's
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enthusiasm - or hope - for coordinated Third World 
opposition to superpower hegemonism, and Soviet expansionism 
in particular.17 To Beijing, the war was notable for its 
unprecedented display of Arab unity and initiative. At 
least, this is where China chose to place its emphasis.
Deng Xiaoping's speech to the U.N. General Assembly (10 April
1974) not only commended the Arabs on their initiative, but
also presented the rationale for China's support:
... In the fourth Middle East war, the people of 
the Arab countries and Palestine broke through
the control of the two superpowers and the state
of 'no war, no peace' and won a tremendous vic­
tory over the Israeli aggressors... China is a 
socialist country and a developing country as 
well. China belongs to the Third World...the 
Chinese government and people firmly support all 
oppressed peoples and oppressed nations in the 
struggle to win or defend national independence 
develop the national economy and oppose colonial­
ism, imperialism and hegemonism.18
Yet, the outcome of the war provided China with as much 
cause for concern as for confidence. The prevailing 
condition of no— war, no--peace was not only an outgrowth of 
superpower rivalry, but also food for its continuation. At a 
time when China was especially wary of the U.S.S.R., this 
stalemate was viewed by Beijing as evidence of the Soviet 
Union's enhanced capabilities; and as an invitation to 
further Soviet penetration of the region. Accordingly,
China's Middle East policy during this period reflected a 
desire to help transform 'the epicenter of the world's 
trouble' into a barrier against superpower hegemonism and 
Soviet expansionism in particular.
However, it is important to avoid exaggerating the Middle
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East's strategic significance to China; and to avoid drawing 
the conclusion that China's strategic interest in the Middle 
East during this period was its exclusive interest in the 
region. Regarding the first point, Soviet--American 
contention in the Third World at this time was as intense in 
Africa as in the Middle East. China's military clients and 
military outlays in Africa during this period reflected that 
fact.19 The Middle East, therefore, as a strategic priority 
to China, was related to, if not on a par with, its interest 
in Africa. Second, as this chapter will demonstrate, in 
addition to the region's strategic value, China discovered 
and began to cultivate other avenues of cooperation with the 
region's states.
D. De-emphasis of support for revolution:
(i) Relations with the PFLOAG;
Consistent with its increasing emphasis on cultivating 
intergovernmental relations, China correspondingly de­
emphasised its support for national liberation movements. In 
the case of the PFLOAG, China virtually abandoned the 
movement, confining itself to applause for the PFLOAG's 
self-reliance.20 The occasion of the commencement of the 
eighth year of the Dhofar insurrection witnessed the first 
allusion of any kind to the movement in the Chinese press in 
months; seen in this light, China's praise for the PFLOAG 
seemed more a commemoration of its past struggles than a 
rededication to the movement's future.21 Thus, in 1972 China 
became the first communist state to terminate aid to the 
Dhofari insurgents, as it would be the first among them to
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normalise relations with the Sultanate of Oman six years 
later.22 What could explain China's change of heart?
By 1970 the PFLOAG was thought to have recruited 2,000 
full-time guerrillas as well as 4,000 part-time civilian 
supporters; and to have amassed sufficient weapons and 
ammunition to wage an effective campaign against the 
royalists.23 From that point, however, both the shortcomings 
of the organisation and the efforts of the Sultanate to 
combat it dimmed the PFLOAG's revolutionary promise, 
probably contributing to China's decision to withdraw 
support. The 1970 coup by Sultan Qaboos, who introduced 
plans for a changed political and economic future for Oman, 
also laid the basis for the reorganisation of the Sultan's 
Armed Forces (SAF). By addressing grievances, the Sultan won 
defectors; by bolstering the military, the Sultan won 
battles.
The PFLOAG's own tyrannical practices - which included 
preaching against Islam, confiscating property, and 
abducting children to ensure 'popular' cooperation - 
crippled the movement. So too did the ideological splits 
within it between Marxists and Dhofari nationalists.24
As China moved to consolidate relations with Kuwait and 
Iran, continuation of support for the PFLOAG became 
increasingly problematic. The reorganisation of the SAF, 
which resulted in the formation of an armed force of 10,000, 
included not only British RAF and SAS teams but also the 
Imperial Iranian Battle Group (as well as a detachment of 
Jordanian engineers) in a support capacity.25 Thus, placing
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Chinese weapons in the PFLOAG's hands risked alienating 
Kuwait (which extended non-military support to the 
Sultanate); it also threatened to inflict casualties on 
Iranian soldiers, thereby indirectly jeopardising Sino-- 
Iranian relations. China's continuation of aid in such 
circumstances would have been a costly enterprise aimed at 
an apparently lost cause.
lii) Relations
Support for the Palestinians, unlike assistance to the 
PFLOAG, was not necessarily incompatible with China's high 
priority nurturing of relations with Arab regimes. To some 
extent, continuing support for the Palestinian cause served 
rather than endangered Sino--Arab relations, for the cause 
of Palestine was the cause of the Arabs: regime status, if 
not stability, depended on looking after it.
In the past China had used the Palestinian cause partly to 
circumvent uncooperative Arab leaders, Nasser in particular, 
in order to satisfy its overriding strategic aim: thwarting 
superpower domination. By this time, circumstances had 
changed, even if, fundamentally, China's aims had not. For 
one thing, Nasser had died. For another, China's interest in 
removing the taint of its subversive image was ascendant. 
Furthermore, the role and actvities of the PLO - an 
instrument of, as well as a catalyst for, inter-Arab 
rivalries - continued to evolve.
In 1974, the PLO acquired a degree of legitimacy that it 
had not previously had, both within the Arab world and the 
broader international community. Arab heads of state at the
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Rabat Summit officially bestowed upon the PLO a status which 
they had formerly withheld: sole legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian people. Largely through the efforts of 
the Arab League, the PLO in the same year earned U.N. 
observer status. Notably, the PLO facilitated its own 
acceptance by declaring a change in its own policy: 
expressing for the first time its willingness to pursue a 
diplomatic solution, while reserving the right to utilise 
armed struggle.
The improvement in the status of the PLO provided a 
convenient opportunity for China to transfer its support of 
the Palestinian cause from the battleground of the Middle 
East to the forum of the U.N. Doing so enabled China to 
maintain its commitment openly yet within the bounds of 
international acceptability. In this way, China could 
conceivably enhance as well as preserve its reputation. 
China's delegates to the United Nations supported and 
applauded the admission of a Palestinian representative to 
the international body; it waved the plight of the 
Palestinians before the General Assembly as an illustration 
of superpower insensitivity; and it attributed the 
irresolution of the Palestinian problem to 'superpower 
obstruction and sabotage'.26
Notwithstanding its use of the U.N. to trumpet the cause 
of the Palestinians, China continued to regard this forum as 
'a platform for pronouncements rather than a vehicle for 
change'.27 One illustration of this was China's reaction to 
joint draft resolutions S/11036 and S/11039 worked out
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between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the '73 war. Huang 
Hua attacked these efforts as a 'concoction... allowing of no 
full consultation between the states members of the Security 
Council. . . '28
When eight nonaligned nations collaborated to submit 
revised draft resolution S/1146/Rev., which recommended the 
establishment of the UNEF II, the Chinese delegation was 
less openly critical but no more supportive of the measure. 
In the end, although it did not exercise its veto power, 
China nonetheless opted not to participate in the 
proceedings or financing arrangements for setting up the 
UNEF II.29
Unsurprisingly, therefore, China's provision of weapons to 
the Palestinians did not altogether cease. In 1976, PLO 
officials still credited China as 'the main source' of 
weapons since the organisation's inception. While conceding 
that no weapons had been transferred by the PRC for more 
than one year, Hamad al-Aydi (head of the PLO mission to 
Beijing) nevertheless emphasised that China continued to 
provide 'a very high percentage' of all assistance rendered 
to the PLO.30
The chief reason for the continuing flow of Chinese arms 
and equipment to the Palestinians lay in China's efforts to 
wrest the movement, Fatah in particular, away from the 
Soviet Union. From 1972, in yet another illustration of the 
Middle East's revolving door, the Soviet Union had 
reportedly stepped up its support of the Palestinian 
guerrillas in order to offset its declining influence in 
Egypt, much as China had done when Nasser proved troublesome
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in the 1960s. Soviet calls for a Geneva conference weakened, 
as a by-product of Soviet— Egyptian friction. Accordingly, 
the Palestinian resistance movement (together with Syria) 
emerged as the sole remaining channels for direct Soviet 
input in the Arab--Israeli dispute.31
China's interest in the PLO during this period reflected 
its interest in obstructing the Soviet Union. To the extent 
that Chinese assistance to the Palestinians might have 
appeared to fluctuate, some explanation can be found in the 
changing interests, efforts and fortunes of the Soviet Union 
with respect to the Palestinian movement.
E. Upgrading intergovernmental ties:
China's intergovernmental activities in the Middle East 
during this period are important for several reasons. First, 
1972--77 is a watershed in China's involvement in the region 
in terms of the number, variety and duration of its ties. In 
the past China's intergovernmental contacts were sporadic. 
Those regimes with which Beijing enjoyed cordial relations 
were few in number and radical in orientation. This phase 
marks the beginning of China's sustained engagement with a 
wide range of regime types that includes the central pillar 
of the Arab world, Egypt.
Second, 1972 is the point at which China's 
intergovermental ties assumed priority over its dealings 
with revolutionary movements. Formerly, the PRC had pursued 
a bi-level approach to the region, simultaneously courting 
local governments and revolutionary groups. With the
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exception of assisting the PLO, from 1972 and consistently 
thereafter, China confined its relations in the region to 
intergovernmental activities.
Third, whereas prior to 1972 China's interaction with 
Middle Eastern regimes had been predominantly political and 
cultural, in this period Sino— Middle Eastern relations laid 
a foundation for an entire complex of ties to follow. 
Previously, China's military role in the region had been 
limited to the low-level supply of weapons and equipment to 
national liberation movements. Likewise, its trade with, and 
economic aid to, the region - except for its partnership 
with South Yemen - was as generous as circumstances 
permitted (but circumstances normally permitted very 
little). The years 1972--77, however, mark the stage at 
which China entered the Middle East arms bazaar to stay and, 
more tentatively, steered a course towards significant 
economic ties with the region.
Fourth, the increasing scale and complexity of China's 
relations with Middle East regimes produced correspondingly 
more numerous and important implications: for China, for the 
constituent states of the region and for the superpowers.
.(i) Relation? with Egypt;
Following Nasser's death, China attempted to reconstruct 
and expand its relations with Egypt. Early in 1971 Beijing 
had already appeared to have laid the groundwork for a more 
constructive Sino--Egyptian dialogue. One explanation for 
Beijing's muted support for the PLO from early January '71, 
for example, was the incentive of building better ties with
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Cairo.32 Additionally, China's first U.N. delegation had 
heartily supported Sadat's early peace efforts: partly, 
because they had been initiated by a local, rather than an 
external, party; and as importantly, to send a signal of 
goodwill towards Egypt's new leader. The gesture was 
celebrated as such in the Cairo press.33
In the years 1972--77 China built upon this foundation by 
supporting General Numeiry (initially against a Soviet- 
backed coup attempt) in Sudan. Almost certainly the Soviet 
Union's opposition to Numeiry was the major determinant of 
China's decision to assist him. After all, the Sudan was 
geostrategically positioned near China's large East African 
investments; it was also crucially placed to advance or 
impede Moscow's presumed bid for maritime supremacy.
Inseparable from Beijing's interest in undercutting
Moscow, however, was its aim to win over Egypt whose
national security and regime stability required a close 
attention to developments in the Sudan. China's support of 
Numeiry implicitly expressed respect for the integrity of
Egypt's national sovereignty and Sadat's leadership. Thus,
it can be regarded as an important confidence-building 
gesture towards Egypt.34
China rode the momentum of Sadat's efforts to distance 
Egypt from the Soviet Union, exchanging high-level 
delegations with Cairo in March 1972.35 It is 
insubstantiable and probably exaggerated to conclude that 
these discussions resulted in President Sadat's subsequent 
expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt. Nevertheless, the
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meetings clearly indicated Sadat's intention to lessen 
Egypt's dependence on the Soviet Union and his willingness 
to pursue more fruitful relations with China in order to 
help do so.
Less than a month after the Chinese delegation returned to 
Beijing, President Sadat proclaimed (in a statement reported 
in the Chinese press) that Soviet installations in Egypt 
were 'facilities,' not 'bases'; and that there were no 
restrictions on Egypt's consolidating relations with the 
PRC.36 Other than acting as a warning to Moscow and an 
invitation to Beijing, Sadat's message had important 
domestic audiences. At the time Sadat issued his statement 
he remained preoccupied with solidifying his political 
position within Egypt. Thus, these considerations are likely 
to have contributed to his decision to evict the Soviets: a 
desire to suppress the 'left' opposition which was closely 
attached to Moscow; a need to accommodate the Egyptian 
officer corps which was dissatisfied under Soviet tutelage; 
the wish to provide evidence of strong leadership to a 
population exhibiting both anomie and restiveness. 
Accordingly, Sadat's manoeuvering between China and the 
Soviet Union was rooted in Egypt's domestic politics.37 
Thus, an opening to China had its instrumental value to 
Egypt as much on a domestic political plane as on an 
international one.
China reacted to President Sadat's expulsion of Soviet 
personnel from Egypt with unconcealed jubilation.38 Beijing 
cheered the Egyptian press' ripostes to Moscow's charges of 
ingratitude and unreasonableness as though Cairo's cause
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were its own, classifying the Soviet Union as a cheap 
' ornament dealer', unwilling rather than unable to meet 
Egypt's legitimate needs.39 Ironically, these accusations 
echoed the jeers which China had aimed at the United States 
in the period immediately preceding the Czech arms deal.
The development of Sino--Egyptian ties during this 
seemingly fertile period stalled, however, with the outbreak 
of the '73 Middle East war. Moscow's massive resupply of 
weapons and equipment represented an investment China could 
not have matched even had it wanted to. Indeed, the Soviet-- 
Egyptian quarrel had been papered over - even before the 
outbreak of the war. Rubinstein asserts that, 'by the fall 
of 1972 Sadat appreciated that there was no substitute for 
access to the Soviet arsenal'.40 Furthermore, the 
restoration of the Soviet— Egyptian military relationship 
followed a conciliatory gesture by Sadat (i.e. the 
unilateral extension of the five-year agreement which 
granted the U.S.S.R. naval facilities in Egypt). By March 
1973 Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt resumed. Meanwhile, 
Soviet weapons transfers to Syria rose to unprecedented 
levels of value and sophistication.
China was unable to govern the Soviet--Egyptian 
relationship, and possibly unable to fathom it. Were Sadat's 
differences with Moscow profound and irreconcilable? Or, was 
Sadat's caviling mere dissimulation, aimed at wresting 
concessions from the U.S.S.R. and building false confidence 
in Israel? For the most part, Beijing was confined to 
reacting to events impossible to predict. Nevertheless,
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China responded astutely to Sadat's gambit in launching the 
October '73 war and in acceding to the cease-fire 
arrangement that terminated it. In this instance, China 
confronted a situation that it did not have a hand in 
shaping. Yet its position was no worse than that of the 
superpowers, which had deployed comparatively greater 
resources and entertained much larger risks. Happily for 
Beijing, the initiative taken in launching the war came from 
Cairo, not Moscow or Washington. If Beijing had reservations 
about Sadat's move, they were not publicly expressed. 
Meanwhile, China celebrated Egypt's decision to attack 
Israel as an historic breaking of the Middle East stalemate, 
whose imposition it had consistently attributed to 
superpower machination. It was on this basis that China 
registered its unequivocal support.41
China's response to the cease-fire arrangement required 
more careful treading. Beijing's disapproval of the cease­
fire was grounded in the same reasoning as its approval of 
the launching of hostilities: whereas the latter had 
overridden the preferences of the superpowers, the former 
acceded to them. On the other hand, the suspension of 
fighting - no matter who orchestrated it - saved the 
Egyptian Third Army. China did not want an Arab defeat, nor 
did it wish to advocate a position which could be construed 
as an invitation to catastrophe. Beijing resolved its 
ambivalence on the cease-fire issue by opting to abstain 
from U.N. Resolution 338.42
China's decision not to oppose the cease-fire resolution 
might have been influenced by additional considerations. For
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example, were a cease-fire not to have been reached, more 
superpower involvement would probably have followed. 
Conversely, peace negotiations while the cease-fire was in 
effect promised to expose additional Soviet--American 
divergences, displaying and aggravating the contradictions 
between them and local regimes.
Furthermore, at a time when Beijing was concentrating its 
energies on cultivating better relations with the Third 
World, a strong stand against the cease-fire might have been 
construed as a position in favor of more bloodshed.43 Thus, 
Beijing's behavior differed from past practice, when its 
militancy squandered even minor opportunities to earn 
goodwill.
Following the '73 war, President Sadat was no less intent 
than before its outbreak on distancing Cairo from Moscow. As 
though to rein in Sadat, Moscow stood firmly against the 
cancellation of Egypt's arms debts and postponed trade talks 
aimed at reviving the Egyptian economy.44 Barely one month 
later it was reported that China had donated 30 MiG engines 
to Egypt.45 Though not substantial in purely military 
terms, this transaction had important implications, both 
military and otherwise.
First, the engines were a gift, which contrasted sharply 
with the Soviet practice of selling arms, payment for which 
had contributed to the intensification of Soviet--Egyptian 
discord following the war. Supplying military equipment in 
the form of a donation, therefore, not only squared with 
Beijing's call for mutually beneficial Third World
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cooperation; it also embarrassed the Soviet Union.
Second, the 30 MiG engines (especially as Egypt had about 
600 combat aircraft) represented a comparatively small 
military transfer. Still, it was a helpful addition to the 
Egyptian arsenal.46 More importantly, the gesture set a 
foundation for future Sino--Egyptian military (and perhaps 
economic) cooperation.
Third, the effect, if not the purpose, of the donation was 
to provide political ammunition for President Sadat. As 
previously mentioned, some Egyptian officials associated 
Egypt's military security with continuing reliance on Soviet 
military assistance. The Chinese donation served as a sign 
that there may indeed be life after Moscow.
Events proceeded somewhat rapidly following the MiG engine 
donation. Within several days of each other, Chinese 
Ambassador Chang Tung met first with Egyptian Prime Minister 
Mamdouh Salem and then Vice-President Hosni Mubarak,47 after 
which it was disclosed that China had offered to cooperate 
with Egypt on its industrial development.48 Less than one 
week after the disclosure, Mubarak was dispatched to Beijing 
where an airport greeting complete with honor guards and 
dancing girls displayed China's enthusiasm at the developing 
Sino--Egyptian ties.49 Mubarak's meeting with Chairman Hua 
culminated in the signing of an historic arms protocol, 
providing for China's supply of spare parts for Egypt's MiG- 
17 squadrons.50 Soon thereafter, it was revealed that China 
had promised to overhaul hundreds of Egypt's grounded MiG 
and Sukhoi aircraft.51
Cairo's newspapers which, subsequent to Mubarak's visit,
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painted the Chinese as altruistic heroes, used the protocol 
as a platform from which to snipe at Moscow.52 In Sadat's 
May Day speech, the Egyptian President referred to the
c o
results of the Mubarak trip as 'unimaginably wonderful.'
Yet Sadat was careful to suggest that Egypt's actions should 
not be construed as a wish to break 'historic ties of 
friendship with any party' [viz. Moscow].54 This 
qualification reaffirmed Sadat's commitment to greater 
foreign policy independence - to China, a less than ideal 
but acceptable outcome.
To appreciate fully China's consolidation of ties with 
Egypt one must place these developments in the broader 
context of Sino--Soviet rivalry at the time. China's 
overtures to Egypt were part of a set of global initiatives 
which included Beijing's success in resuming full diplomatic 
relations with India and in winning Singapore Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew's pledge to visit China's capital.55 In a 
sense, Egypt was one of several Third World countries over 
which Beijing and Moscow competed for influence. 
Interestingly, China served much the same purpose for Egypt. 
Prior to having solidified ties with Beijing, Egypt had 
unsuccessfully sought aid from India; after having courted 
China, Egypt immediately renewed its efforts to negotiate a 
new trade package with the U.S.S.R.56 Hence, China and Egypt 
used one another partly to influence their respective 
relations with Moscow: Egypt, to extract further commitments 
on favorable terms from the Soviet Union; and China, to help 
relieve Egypt's dependence on the Soviet Union, thereby
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subverting Soviet efforts in the region.
(ii) Middle East oil and China;
During Chou En-lai's 1964 tour of Africa, he had stressed 
the importance of the careful utilisation of natural 
resources. In so doing, he had asserted a recurring theme in 
Chinese foreign policy: the indivisibility of political 
independence and economic self-reliance. Yet, not until the 
beginning of the next decade did the substance of 
international relations appear to catch up with, if not 
overtake, the slogans of Chinese foreign policy.
On the eve of China's admission to the U.N., OPEC 
ministers decided in Caracas to raise oil taxes and oil 
prices. Unsurprisingly, a Renmin Ribao editorial applauded 
the action as a triumph over 'big-nation hegemony.'57 
Shortly thereafter, Renmin Ribao's Commentator drew a more 
explicit connection between the superpowers' strategic 
rivalry in the Middle East and initiatives to regain 
indigenous control of oil, and considered the implications 
of one for the other:
In the eyes of the imperialists, the so- 
called Middle East question is, in essence, 
the oil question, the question of how to 
divide spheres of influence...Warring for 
supremacy among themselves, they have brought 
terrible upheaval and disasters to the 
area...The demand of OPEC member states for 
higher oil posted prices and tax rates 
reflects the strong desire of the people of 
these countries to rid themselves of 
imperialist plunder and exploitation.58
The events which evoked these somewhat predictable 
observations spurred no sustained coverage by the Chinese
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press and produced no perceptible retooling of Chinese 
foreign policy. Throughout the remainder of 1971 and in the 
early months of the next year, the subject of Third World 
resource power surfaced in the form of responses to the 
intermittent, though encouraging, actions of OPEC members to 
improve their oil income.59 Beijing appeared preoccupied 
during that time with the official business of occupying its 
seat rather than visibly focused on defining its role in the 
international community.
Chou Hua-min's April 1972 address to the third plenary 
meeting of the UNCTAD, which pledged 'resolute support' for 
the redress of Third World economic grievances, was the 
first official indication of the content of China's evolving 
Third World policy.60 In effect, the speech formally 
rededicated China to the promotion of 'economic justice' 
without, however, arrogating to China any particular 
responsibility for ensuring its achievement. It announced, 
or perhaps merely presaged, China's commitment to the 
attainment’of essentially revolutionary ends with reliance 
on essentially reformist means.
In the Arabs' use of the 'oil weapon' in 1973, the 
potentials of the exercise of Third World resource power, 
which Chou En-lai had expounded in the previous decade, 
seemed to Beijing to be set on course for their full 
realisation. China interpreted the ramifications broadly, 
predicting that:
[it will] have a far-reaching influence on 
the people of the Arab and Third Worlds in 
their future struggle against imperialist
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aggression and plunder and in defense of 
independence, state sovereignty, and national 
resources. 61
The use of the Arab 'oil weapon' in 1973 transformed 
Chinese foreign policy. First, it injected substance into 
Beijing's otherwise hollow exhortation of the Third World to 
wage war against superpower hegemony. Second, in emphasising 
the Third World's application of economic pressure to 
redress its grievances, China was able to salvage its 
materialist--revolutionary credentials while simultaneously 
continuing to recast its image as a responsible member of 
the international community. Thus, the '73 oil embargo 
sparked China's call for Third World control of Third World 
resources, the centerpiece of Beijing's Third World policy 
from the late 1970s onwards.62
The oil politics of the '73 Middle East war had other 
important consequences for China's foreign policy. First, at 
a time when the U.S. only nine months previously had signed 
the cease-fire agreement with Hanoi and China's concern was 
rising over the possibility of Moscow's consolidating its 
position in Indochina, Beijing used the oil embcirgo as an 
opportunity to re-establish links with its Southeast Asian 
neighbors. China (which, by 1965, had become a net oil 
exporter) compensated for shortfalls in oil supplies to 
Thailand and the Philippines by offering them low sulfur 
content crude.63
At the same time China sharply criticised Moscow's oil 
sales and pricing policies during the crisis, accusing the 
Soviet Union of war profiteering and extortion.64
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(Ironically, one decade later - while selling arms to both 
belligerents in the Gulf conflict - China would find itself 
trying to sidestep similar criticism.) Thus, the use of the 
oil weapon supplied China with an opportunity to win friends 
as well as to denounce old enemies, suggesting that a 
position on the sidelines had its benefits.
Yet, the benefits could not be reaped without facing 
certain costs. In exploiting the opportunity to urge Third 
World states to reassess their relations with the 
superpowers and form coalitions among themselves, China was 
in effect counselling America's allies to reassert their 
independence. This position created a degree of tension 
between China's Third World policy and the process of 
improving relations with the United States. Furthermore, in 
endorsing use of OPEC oil price rises in order to 
demonstrate its solidarity with the Arabs and the Third 
World generally, China in effect advocated economic 
disruption of oil-dependent states.
F. Focus on the Gulf:
As indicated in the previous chapter, one of the new 
twists in China's Middle East policy following its emergence 
from the Cultural Revolution was its turn to the Gulf.
During the years 1972--1977 Beijing continued with 
reasonable success to woo the Gulf states, concentrating its 
energies as before on Iran and Kuwait. The withdrawal of 
Britain from east of Suez had raised the possibility of a 
Soviet effort to augment its military presence in the area. 
It is almost certain that Beijing was aware of, and
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concerned about, such an eventuality.
The American response to the declining British presence 
and a massive Soviet naval buildup in the Indian Ocean 
consisted of two elements: (1) the accelerated construction
of its military installations on Diego Garcia; and (2) 
reliance on Iran to ensure regional stability. The common 
Sino--American strategic interest in thwarting perceived 
Soviet expansionism in the area not only bolstered U.S.-- 
Chinese detente but also supplied Beijing with a strong 
motive to pursue bilateral ties with Gulf regimes, 
irrespective of their political orientation and 
independently of Washington.65
(i)-itelatiQPS with I tan;
Beijing's initial ties with the Shah, officially 
commencing in August '71, may have appeared to be 'a 
rapprochement between two incongruent states'66 Yet, the two 
countries did in fact have compatible interests and 
perspectives. First and foremost, they shared a common 
border with, as well as a common mistrust of, the Soviet 
Union. The strategic dimension of improved Sino--Iranian 
relations was of particular importance to China. To some 
commentators, China appeared interested in forming 'a chain 
of friendly states reaching all the way to the Balkans along 
Russia's southern flank'.67 According to this view, Iran was 
a vital part of China's effort, a potential block against 
the physical link-up of Soviet— Indian forces; a zone of 
passage for Chinese flights to and from Eastern Europe; and
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a coiuntry which could help share the burden of China's 
costly security assistance to Pakistan.68 The Shah's visit 
to Rumania and Yugoslavia to' consolidate relations with them 
seemed to match China's support of these Soviet 
'rejectionists.'
Second, the Shah aimed to divide domestic political 
opposition while Beijing wished to disarm Soviet-leaning 
Iranian communists; for similar though not identical 
reasons, therefore, Beijing and Tehran had common ideas 
about the character of Iran's domestic political order.
Finally, just as the Shah entertained a larger regional 
role for Iran, Beijing sought a more influential Third World 
role for China. Viewed separately, each country's objective 
was enhanced by a more active foreign policy that included 
(but of course was not limited to) the two countries' 
cooperation with one another. It is important to note, 
however, that the two countries' individual ambitions were 
not necessarily compatible with each other.
The Beijing--Tehran connection had a primarily strategic 
foundation strengthened by the two countries' continuing 
quest for status and prestige. At first limited to symbolic 
and political gestures of goodwill towards one another,
China and Iran not long thereafter also explored the 
possibility of more fruitful economic ties. On Iran's part, 
the Shah's probable motive for carrying Sino--Iranian 
relations forward to economic cooperation was emphasis on 
Iran's development. Economic modernisation, together with a 
strong military base and an activist foreign policy, formed 
the tripod on which rested the Shah's plan to enhance
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Iranian's security and status. China was a potential new 
market for Iran's infant industries: if nothing more, at 
least a hedge against declining Western demand or increasing 
political pressures.
Beijing probably recognised in the Shah's drive for 
modernisation its own pursuit of economic development, a 
priority to which Chou En-lai officially committed China in 
January 1975.69 Even before that time, however, China had 
begun to invigorate its foreign trade. In fact, by autumn 
1973 the PRC, by its own account, had entered trade 
relations with 140 countries, signing protocols with 50 of 
them.70 Economic cooperation with Iran based chiefly on 
trade, therefore, was part of a global initiative undertaken 
by China to expand its intergovernmental relations and while 
doing so, to support its own economic development. During 
this period - with Sino--Iranian trade relations an 
exemplary case - China continued to use foreign trade 
principally as an instrument to bolster its strategic and 
political aims, with the impact of foreign trade on Chinese 
modernisation viewed mainly as an added bonus.
The $70.4 million value of Sino--Iranian trade in 1972 
represented a seven-fold increase in their bilateral trade 
over the 1970 figure.71 China contracted for the purchase of 
50,000 tons of sulfur, to be supplied during the first half 
of 1973 by the NIOC (National Iranian Oil Company),72 Sino-- 
Iranian trade ties were cemented in April 1973. At that 
time, Iranian Minister of Economy, Hushang Ansari, visited 
Beijing where he signed the first long-term Sino--Iranian
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trade and payments agreement.73 This accord envisaged a 
turnover valued at 4.8 billion rials, with 70% of the goods 
consisting of Iranian industrial exports (including chemical 
fertilisers) to China, and the transaction conducted on a 
barter basis.74
Trade talks in 1976 pledged the two countries to a 30--40% 
increase in the value of their trade for the following year. 
Discussions produced two additional modifications of the '73 
accord: the expansion of Iran's export list to include 
petrochemicals and heavy machinery; and the commitment to 
ensure a better trade balance for Iran.75 In 1977 an 
agreement was reached on the exchange of industrial and 
consumer goods, calling for a trade total of $30 million.76 
At the same time, China arranged to purchase $600,000 worth 
of ball bearings to help offset a one-year suspension in 
sales by Japanese suppliers.77 Such trade was enhanced by 
China's willingness to accept the Iranian rial in payment 
when other countries would not.78
The exchange of manufactures, however, was not the only 
important aspect of Sino--Iranian economic cooperation. Iran 
seemed to be a stable Third World country, on a course for 
development; moreover, as a member of OPEC, it was well- 
situated (even if not necessarily inclined) to exercise 
leverage against 'superpower hegemony'. Such were the 
political implications of Iran's oil wealth; there was also 
the economics of oil itself. Iran constituted an 
'independent' Third World source of oil to fill shortfalls 
in China's domestic production. China began to purchase 
Iranian crude oil in 1974, the arrangements most likely made
during Li Chiang's visit to Tehran in that year.79 In 1977 
China negotiated an additional purchase of Iranian oil, 
estimated at 300,000 tons.80
Additionally, Iran, with access to Western oil technology, 
had the potential to advise on as well as demonstrate oil 
exploration and extraction methods useful to China's own 
energy development. Interestingly, the discussions that took 
place during Li's Chiang's 1974 visit are believed to have 
focused on Beijing's desire to secure Iranian investment in 
China's domestic petroleum industry.81 Perhaps not 
coincidentally, Li's visit followed soon after the Shah's 
trip to Moscow, during which he had accepted in principle a 
Soviet offer to assist in the construction of a natural gas 
pipeline to pass through Russian territory in the direction 
of its potential West European customers.
In 1972 a Chinese oil study group visited Iran.82 Less 
than one month before the Yom Kippur War, the Chairman of 
the NIOC, Dr. M. Eqbal, visited Beijing.83 Although an exact 
account of these meetings never emerged, it is easy to 
speculate as to the nature of China's interest. The NIOC 
had, by 1972, gained a wide reputation as one of the most 
effective organisations within oil-producing countries in 
the areas of oil exploration and extraction.84 The NIOC had 
a proven track record of international oil exploration 
activities that included work in Britain's North Sea fields, 
as well as international experience in refining, 
distribution, and transportation - where China's petroleum 
industry was bottlenecked.85
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The early 1970s therefore constituted the formative stage 
of Sino--Iranian relations. Shared concern about the Soviet 
Union stimulated the search for avenues of bilateral 
cooperation.
(ii) The importance of domestic factors;
Neither Sino— Iranian trade ties nor China's trade with 
the Middle East as a whole emerged as an essential component 
of China's modernisation campaign during this period. In 
fact, though economic modernisation had been proclaimed a 
Chinese policy priority, China's domestic political 
situation was not conducive to a full-scale drive towards 
development. Even had it been, it is doubtful that foreign 
trade would have constituted the central element of China's 
economic modernisation.
China's seeming hesitancy to assign priority to 
modernisation and to commit itself to a significant 
deepening of foreign economic relations reflected more than 
an unresolved internal debate over economic choices. Between 
1972 and 1978 China's domestic political situation was 
fluid, and at times, turbulent. Strikes in China's major 
cities as well as peasant resistance to agricultural policy 
during this period reflected social discontent arising from 
China's economic stagnation, which in turn was related to 
China's political uncertainties.86
Structurally, the competition between three institutional 
hierarchies - the state, the CCP, and the PLA - exacerbated, 
if they did not actually cause, China's continuing economic
o n
woes. Even when major transfers of PLA regional commanders
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in 1974 signalled the subordination of the military in 
domestic affairs, civilian jockeying for position offset the 
potential gains.88 Finally, the deaths, in rapid succession, 
of Premier Chou En-lai, NPC Chairman Chu Te, and Party 
Chairman Mao (in January, June, and September 1976) added 
even further uncertainty to China's political situation, 
spilling over into its foreign policy. Not until the arrest 
of the Gang of Four in the late autumn of 1976 did China's 
foreign policy take a softer line, or modernisation receive 
full attention. Not until the political resurrection of Deng 
at the end of the following year did foreign trade occupy an 
important place in what became China's first priority: 
development.
Thus, it is clearer why Sino--Middle East trade did not 
figure as prominently in China's regional policy as perhaps 
it could have, and later did. Yet it is important to note 
with whom, in what product areas, and on what terms China 
did trade during this 'preparatory' phase, if only to view 
the development of Sino--Middle East trade in its proper 
light - as a gradual rather than a sudden phenomenon, as a 
potentially enduring rather than a transitory one.
Relations with Kuwait;
China, even at this time, was far from inactive in 
initiating trade ties to improve its domestic economic 
situation. In addition to its relations with Iran, Beijing 
turned to Kuwait, focusing its interest on the purchase of 
chemical fertilisers. There was of course the added 
incentive of using Sino--Kuwaiti trade ties as yet another
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potential lever to gain input into OPEC policy.
Despite these attractions and some initial progress in 
their commercial relationship, the association between China 
and Kuwait failed to strengthen during this period, chiefly 
because of lingering memories of China's persecution of its 
Muslim minorities and its more recent support for Gulf 
revolutionary movements. Chinese insistence on Kuwait's 
termination of relations with Taiwan also impeded the 
development of Sino-Kuwaiti ties.
Not until August 1975 did Kuwait dispatch its first 
ambassador to Beijing.09 In Spring 1977 Foreign Minister 
Huang Hua met his Kuwaiti counterpart, Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmad 
al-Jabar,90 presumably to discuss consolidation of Sino-- 
Kuwaiti ties. This effort followed by several weeks the 
visit to Beijing of a seven-member delegation representing 
the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce. A trade agreement between 
the two countries was finally concluded in the last month of 
1977.91 On the whole, however, it can be said that the mid- 
'70s served as a period of Sino--Kuwaiti familiarisation and 
confidence-building rather than substantial cooperation.
The context and content of China's nascent economic 
cooperation with Iran has already been addressed. Hopefully, 
the brief discussion of China's domestic situation has 
uncovered additional evidence as to why Sino--Iranian 
relations did not develop further and faster. What this 
discussion has not intended to suggest, however, is that 
China's internal troubles and policy debates pre-empted the 
initiation of new forms of cooperation with Middle Eastern
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governments, or stifled progress in relationships that had 
only recently been struck. This discussion is also not meant 
to suggest that China's internal political and economic 
situation was the exclusive, or even the primary, reason why 
Sino— Middle East economic cooperation failed to expand more 
than it did.
(iv) Relations with Iraq;
Simo--Iraqi relations, like China's relations with Kuwait, 
received a comparatively late start, though for different 
reasons. In seeking improved relations with Iraq, China 
confronted both an obstacle and a risk: Beijing had to 
determine how to compete successfully with Moscow, whose 
ties with Baghdad were too intimate to avoid; and how to 
avoid alienating Iran and Kuwait, whose relations with 
Baghdad were too antagonistic to overlook.
In April 1972 Iraq concluded a Friendship Treaty with the 
Soviet Union. This accord was sandwiched between two highly 
concentrated periods of expanding political, military, and 
economic cooperation between Moscow and Baghdad. Because 
China could not hope to match the Soviet Union's 
considerable investment in Iraq, the budding relationship 
between Moscow and Baghdad in the early and mid-'70s might 
have sparked China's interest, but also discouraged its 
involvement.
At about the mid-point of the decade, two sets of 
developments occurred, offering prospects that China's 
dilemmas might be resolved. The first development was 
Soviet--Iraqi friction. One indication of the shallowness of
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Soviet--Iraqi 'friendship' (despite the scale of Soviet 
involvement in Iraq) came in the form of a comment made by 
Iraq's irascible Saddam Hussein, who remarked that 
'communism' (i.e. the U.S.S.R.) was a 'rotten, atheistic 
yellow storm which has plagued Iraq.'92 The suggestion here 
is that differences between Moscow and Baghdad was possibly, 
but not necessarily, advantageous to China. Furthermore, it 
is impossible to tell how much of Saddam Hussein's rhetoric 
was substance, and therefore how deep the rift between the 
Iraq and the Soviet Union truly was. Finally, Saddam's 
comments, if taken literally, offered China no more hope 
than the U.S.S.R. of being on intimate terms with Baghdad.
When, in 1975, the tension between Iran and Iraq was 
defused by Algeria's successful mediation, a second 
impediment to China's pursuit of better relations with Iraq 
was removed. It can hardly be attributed to coincidence that 
Beijing had refrained from warming to Baghdad until that 
time. Thus, circumstances appeared to have rescued China 
from having to make uncomfortable choices.
When Sino--Iraqi relations finally took root (in 1975), 
they had a strong economic orientation. In that year China 
laid the cornerstone for its construction of a 666-meter 
bridge linking the Baghdad--Mosul highway with the 
international road to Turkey.93 This choice of project is 
revealing in two respects. First, it illustrated China's 
preference for helping to build its partners' 
infrastructure. Second, in effect, if not by design, it 
served as China's answer to Moscow's gas pipeline scheme for
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I ran .
Bridge construction began shortly after China had 
contracted with Baghdad in May 1975 to purchase some 50,000 
tons of sulphur for the ensuing six-month period, largely to 
compensate for supply problems due to worldwide shortages.94 
This transaction led to more substantial purchases later, 
such as Iraq's agreement to provide an additional 100,000 
tons in partial implementation of a July '77 trade protocol, 
the full details of which were not disclosed.95 Even before 
the signing of this accord, however, China had rapidly 
emerged as an important Iraqi trade partner in some 
commodity areas, agreeing to purchase over 100,000 tons of 
Iraqi dates, thereby becoming Iraq's leading customer for 
this product.96
It is useful to examine these purchases against the 
backdrop of Chinese economic policy at the time in order to 
grasp fully what purposes they were intended to serve. 
Throughout this period foreign imports were meant to play 
only an 'auxiliary role'97 in China's development. It is 
therefore probable that China's purchases from, and general 
expansion of economic ties with, Iraq aimed mainly to 
sweeten the political atmosphere between the two countries, 
at a time of souring relations between Iraq and the Soviet 
Union.
Whereas it is difficult to attribute China's emergence as 
a major customer for Iraqi dates exclusively to the dietary 
habits of the Chinese population, this is not to suggest 
that all of China's purchases from Iraq were designed 
chiefly to gain political advantage at the expense of
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Moscow. China's imports of Iraqi fertilisers, for example, 
served a compelling economic interest. Throughout 1975--76, 
Beijing wrangled with Japan (its principal source of 
fertilisers and leading trade partner) over the twin issues 
of volume and price. In a round of negotiations that ended 
in deadlock, China sought from Japan expanded supplies at 
further discounted prices while Japan pressed for supply 
cuts and price increases.98 This may well have induced China 
to diversify its suppliers. The Gulf regimes (in this case, 
Iraq) were especially suitable candidates since China, in 
any event, sought more advantageous political and strategic 
relations with them.
In reviewing China's relations with Iraq during this 
period it is important to comment on two things: the tactics 
employed and the record of achievement. China's utilisation 
of foreign economic relations to establish or consolidate 
strategic and political ties in the Middle East was not a 
new approach. What was new, however, was the extension of 
this approach to the Gulf sub-region, and its application 
against, rather than in solidarity with, the Soviet Union. 
Such activity appeared to pave the way for amicable 
relations between China and Iraq. Yet, no corresponding 
deterioration in Soviet--Iraqi relations could be attributed 
to China's efforts.
.Iy ). .Relations with North_.ami_S.outh Yemen;
China continued to nourish its relations with North and 
South Yemen by relying on trade and aid to an extent
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unequalled in its relations with other Middle East 
countries, if only because the small size and backwardness 
of the two countries made it more feasible to do so.
In South Yemen (January 1975), groundbreaking ceremonies 
marked the beginning of China's technical assistance in the 
construction of a farm tools and hardware factory." Notes 
were exchanged between Chinese and South Yemeni officials 
announcing agreement on China's construction of a 224-km. 
road from Shihr to Sayhut.100 In December of the same year, 
the two countries signed an industrial cooperation agreement 
planning for the construction of a yarn mill.101 Further road 
construction agreements were concluded following China's 
completion of the Mahfid--Mukalla highway in 1977.102
In North Yemen (YAR) China also concentrated on relatively 
small, 'high impact' projects to improve basic living 
conditions. In September 1975 China turned over to North 
Yemen the Taiz Revolutionary General Hospital which it had 
built and donated.103 China later signed an agreement to 
work towards the establishment of an agricultural 
experimentation station in North Yemen.104 In June 1977 
Beijing announced its intention to dispatch medical teams to 
the YAR.105 Later in that year a Chinese delegation appeared 
in San'a to negotiate with the state company responsible for 
equipping the YAR's armed forces and security apparatus.106 
Finally, not long after the Chinese completion of the Huth-- 
Sa'da leg of the San'a--Sa'da highway, the two countries 
signed a trade agreement.107
Still, despite China's efforts to strengthen the economic 
infrastructure of both South Yemen and the YAR individually,
197
relations between Aden and San'a alternated between conflict 
and rumors of possible merger. These unpredictabilities 
broadcast the clear message to Beijing that the local 
situation was not necessarily conducive to building - in 
accordance with Beijing's wishes - a stable buffer against 
Soviet expansionism. Of course, it was perhaps reassuring to 
China to know that the volatility of the South Arabian 
penninsula was no easy environment for the Soviet Union to 
operate in, or from.
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Chapter V 
An evaluation
What were China's objectives?
Several important developments converged to form the basis 
of China's Middle East policy between 1972 and 1978: (1) the
reclassification of the Soviet Union as China's principal 
enemy; (2) the corresponding thawing of Sino--American 
relations; and (3) the fluidity of China's domestic 
political situation (especially towards the end of this 
period). The combined impact of these developments caused 
China to focus more intently on the Second and Third Worlds, 
emphasising intergovernmental relations in order to combat 
the superpowers' drive for hegemony, especially that of the 
Soviet Union. China also set for itself a second and related 
task, that of modernisation, tentatively opening its door to 
more vigorous foreign economic relations in order to do so.
As of 1972 Beijing observed a shift in the East--West 
balance in Moscow's favor and an intensification of 
superpower contention occurring chiefly in the eastern 
Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. These circumstances 
accentuated the Middle East's strategic importance to China. 
Soviet activity in the Middle East was viewed in connection 
with its seeming efforts to fill the vacuum in Indochina 
created by the U.S. withdrawal. Regarded as parallel 
initiatives aimed at China's encirclement, Soviet moves in 
Southwest Asia were strategically related to, though not 
equated with, Soviet activities in Southeast Asia. Thus, 
whereas twenty years earlier China had supported the Soviet
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Union's effort to challenge Western predominance in the 
Middle East, China in this phase sought to curry favor with 
local regimes in order to combat the expansion of the Soviet 
presence and influence in the region.
By 1972 China had succeeded in normalising relations with 
most of the countries of the world. Still, China had not won 
universal recognition nor had the recognition it had 
attained necessarily assured it of a degree of prestige and 
influence commensurate with its strategic needs or political 
aspirations. In the Middle East, particularly in the Gulf, 
Beijing sought to engage local regimes in official bilateral 
relations in order to: (1) enhance its strategic position
vis-a-vis Moscow; (2) detach them from Taiwan; and (3) boost
China's status as the legitimate leader of an emergent force
in world politics, the Third World. While not dissimilar 
from its campaign for status and influence elsewhere,
China's political objectives in the Middle East at this time
acquired special importance following the use of the Arab 
oil weapon, which demonstrated to Beijing the potentialities 
of Third World resource power and the desirability of 
becoming its champion.
Beijing's drive towards economic modernisation got a late 
start, and then proceeded cautiously. Overall, China's 
foreign policy during this period placed security ahead of 
modernisation. Yet, the urgent need to modernise the Chinese 
economy did begin to make its presence felt in the PRC's 
foreign relations. Tentative though they were, China's 
efforts to bolster its economy through foreign economic
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relations were noteworthy. This was as true in its Middle 
East policy as in its foreign policy generally. For the 
first time, Beijing pursued economic ties in the Middle East 
not merely to further its strategic and political interests, 
but also in (limited) service of its development.
What were China's tactics?
In the previous period, although foreign policy pragmatism 
may have been China's general direction, it was not clear 
that it had been China's unequivocal choice. On the 
contrary, even while appearing set on responding favorably 
to Washington's overtures and having taken steps to build 
its intergovernmental relations, Beijing nonetheless had 
placed primary emphasis on support for a select few national 
liberation movements. In the Middle East, China had 
concentrated its energies in this regard on the support of 
the PFLOAG and the PLO. Between 1972 and 1978, however, 
Beijing reversed the emphasis, laying greater stress on 
developing intergovernmental ties while correspondingly 
tapering its support to liberation movements.
In the case of the PFLOAG, Beijing's material assistance 
was discontinued by 1972. Gradually, Beijing also withdrew 
its rhetorical support: first, by breaking with the PFLOAG's 
maximalist aim of liberating the entire Gulf; later, by 
reducing the frequency of its verbal support for the 
PFLOAG's perseverence and self-reliance; and finally, by 
eulogising the movement's past struggles.
While Beijing's relations with the PFLOAG consisted of a 
steady drift towards complete dissociation, its relations
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with the PLO between 1972 and 1978 were much more complex. 
Tactically, China utilised its position in the U.N. as well 
as its provision of material assistance to conduct its 
relations with the PLO. In the first half of the period 
Beijing maintained a comparatively low level of material 
support to the PLO that reflected: (1) lingering
disappointment with the PLO's displacement from Jordan; (2) 
disapproval of the upsurge of PLO-sponsored acts of 
terrorism; (3) increasing reliance on Arab governments as 
the primary vehicles for regional change; and (4) 
displeasure with the PLO's links to the Soviet Union.
By 1974, however, Beijing resumed material support to the 
PLO that carried into the next phase of China's Middle East 
involvement. Several factors converged to produce this 
change. First, in the wake of the '73 war, Arab governments' 
unanimous recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people in effect gave 
China the 'green light' to upgrade its support of the 
organisation without fear of alienating Arab regimes.
Second, the admission of the PLO to the U.N. with 'observer' 
status, coupled with the PLO's stated willingness to 
consider a political solution, presented Beijing with a 
face-saving remedy for continuing support without impairing 
its fragile international image. Third, in response to the 
Soviet Union's post-'73 efforts to find a channel through 
which to influence or impose a peace settlement, Beijing 
used its material assistance to the various Palestinian 
guerrilla factions to preclude the U.S.S.R.'s co-optation of
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the movement.
China used the U.N. consistently as a platform for its 
pronouncements in support of the Palestinian cause which in 
turn enabled Beijing to discredit the superpowers and rally 
the Third World against them. The manner in which Beijing 
used its voting power in the U.N., however, was more 
illustrative of its true policy than the fervor of its 
rhetoric. In abstaining from, rather than opposing, cease­
fire resolutions and peace proposals, China revealed that:
(1) though it no longer reviled the U.N. as a mere 
superpower prop, it still did not regard the institution as 
a major vehicle for change; (2) it would not openly press 
its own militancy or the militancy of the PLO against the 
will and wishes of moderate Arab governments; and (3) it 
would not terminate its support of the Palestinian cause 
which it continued to view as the crux of Middle East 
turmoil whose root cause was superpower meddling.
At the intergovernmental level, China intensified its 
efforts to add breadth and depth to its relations with local 
regimes, regardless of their political orientation. While 
continuing to rely heavily on exchanging delegations of 
various kinds at various levels in order to cultivate a 
better image, Beijing mixed its policy instruments and 
policy partners. Though foreign trade was not yet an 
integral part of China's modernisation effort, there were 
signs that foreign economic relations could compensate for 
problems with domestic production. Thus, in its relations 
with Iran, Iraq and Egypt as well as in its interest in 
Kuwait and Bahrain, Beijing strove to diversify its sources
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of aluminum, ball bearings, crude oil, and chemical 
fertilisers.
Despite its increasing commitment to its own 
modernisation, China did not abandon its aid program to the 
Middle East nor alter the generous terms of its economic 
assistance. It concentrated its aid efforts on small-scale 
projects aimed primarily at improving basic living 
conditions (e.g. constructing small mills, factories, 
hospitals, roads and bridges). Though directing those 
efforts mainly where its presence was already significant 
(e.g. South Yemen and the YAR), Beijing diversified its aid 
recipients to include Egypt. Iraq and Syria. China's most 
important aid transfer during this period was its first-time 
military donation (i.e. MiG engines) to Egypt in 1976.
On both a bilateral and multilateral level, China stepped 
up its 'oil diplomacy', largely as the result of the 
momentous use of the Arab oil weapon during and after the 
'73 war. At first confining its support to OPEC's supply and 
pricing initiatives, China broadened its position by 
encouraging the Third World generally to press its claims 
against the superpowers by exercising resource power.
Were China's efforts successful?
During this period China failed to win official 
recognition from additional Middle East governments, though 
it did prepare the ground for such an achievement, 
particularly in its courtship of Bahrain.
In itn bid to deliver more fruitful economic benefits from
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its relations with Kuwait, Beijing was only mildly 
successful during this period. As illustrated by the delayed 
posting o I. its oiticial envoy to Beijing, Kuwait exhibited 
some misgivings about plunging too deeply too quickly into a 
relationship with China, whose record of accomodation with 
its own Muslim population and whose support of Gulf 
stability was too recent to be convincing.
Sino--Iranian relations were also somewhat tentative 
during this period, though for different reasons. On China's 
part, its hesitancy might be attributable to its concern 
about the Shah's regional hegemonic ambitions which were a 
potential source of local disturbances, not merely a 
deterrent to them. Perhaps less important, yet of probable 
consideration, was the Shah's hostility to communism. 
Notwithstanding the Shah's growing reliance on U.S. arms, he 
was not unwilling to consider economic cooperation with the 
Soviet Union. It is not clear how this was regarded in 
China. Were the Shah's overtures to Moscow considered by 
Beijing merely as a ploy to draw more attention and 
benefits from the United States? If not, such overtures 
might have been greeted in Beijing with some misgiving.
Recall that, in nurturing Iran's independence, Beijing 
sought to improve its own strategic and political position. 
It is impossible to say precisely whether or not either 
country's position was significantly enhanced by their 
relations. Less ambiguous, however, was China's success in 
obtaining short-term economic benefits from Iran as well as 
improving its image in Tehran by providing an additional 
market for Iranian products.
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In the early part of this period, China's courtship of 
Baghdad was less than enthusiastic. China's incentive for 
pursuing closer ties with Iraq was boosted by the 
amelioration of Iran-Iraq tensions in 1975 and the 
intensification of Soviet--Iraqi friction shortly 
thereafter. Even in the late 1970s, however, China's 
economic relations with Iraq developed somewhat slowly, 
partly because Baghdad had not yet devised a specific 
development scheme. Nevertheless, China's engineering and 
construction work - modest in scale though it was - built a 
lasting reputation.
Worry about over-identification with Washington might have 
contributed to opening Iran to China. Likewise, concern 
about over-reliance on Moscow perhaps impelled Iraq to build 
ties with China. Alternatively, one could argue that Iran 
and Iraq each sought to win additional concessions from 
their respective superpower allies by making overtures to 
China. Similar logic could be used to explain the progress 
in Sino--Egyptian relations. In that respect, whether China 
was exploiting opportunities or itself being used by Middle 
Eastern regimes is irrelevant. For, one thing is beyond 
dispute: China during this period gained 'access' to the 
region, and in so doing, began to establish both a 
reputation as well as a presence that it had not formerly 
had. For example, more important than the quantity, dollar 
value, or level of sophistication of Chinese arms 
transferred to the region was the fact that they were 
furnished promptly and unconditionally when needed. The same
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can be said of China's political support. The manner of 
Beijing's giving - perhaps more than the gift itself - 
accomplished two things. First, it highlighted the 
inadequacies of the superpowers. Second, it earned China 
unprecedented respect and appreciation; and therefore the 
possibility of more productive future relations.
China's withdrawal of support from the PFLOAG deprived 
Beijing of an ideological weapon in its propaganda war with 
the U.S.S.R. Yet, by paving the way for China's adoption of 
a credible position of support for Gulf stability, it began 
the process of beating the superpowers to the side of peace. 
In its support for the PLO, Beijing succeeded in doing 
enough to preserve its revolutionary credentials, to prevent 
Moscow's cooptation of the organisation, and to stay on the 
right side of an important Arab issue - without doing too 
much so as to impair its relations with Arab moderates.
Beijing's relative success in channelling the 'right 
amount' of support for the PLO, however, was greatly 
facilitated by several developments at the local level. 
First, a less instransigent and militant Arafat made 
Beijing's moderate stand appear less expedient. Second, 
Arafat's determination to obtain support where he could get 
it, without bankrupting the movement's independence, made it 
possible for Moscow to attach itself to the PLO but 
impossible for it to absorb the PLO.
As previously shown, China's tactics and developments in 
the Middle East had not always co-existed harmoniously. 
During this period, however, China's efforts and the 
region's politics for the most part converged. In some
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respects, China's 'open door' seemed well-suited to the 
revolving door of Middle Eastern politics.
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Chapter VI 
'Leaning to the other side'
(1978 —  1981)
A. Modernisation first:
The course of Chinese foreign and domestic policy (197 8 —  
19 81) as well as the connection between them is inseparable 
from the political ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping. The Eleventh 
Party Congress (August 1977) was a watershed both in terms 
of Deng's personal political career and in the course of 
China's policy.1 The Congress confirmed Deng's political 
resurrection by approving the policy changes he espoused. 
Thus, economic modernisation became the centerpiece of 
Chinese policy, both foreign and domestic. Placing 
development first, however, did not imply that China's 
strategic position had suddenly improved; nor did it 
guarantee certain improvement in the immediate future. 
Rather, the emphasis on modernisation acknowledged the 
indivisibility of security and development. It signified, if 
only implicitly, a recognition and acceptance of the 
principle that: security is unobtainable in the absence of 
development, and development is unachievable in a climate of 
international instability.
B. Sino— American entente:
From the outset, however, the perceived intensification of 
superpower rivalry - more overt with the unravelling of 
Soviet-American detente - appeared to place at risk China's
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'New Long March.' In Beijing's view, the U.S.R. continued to 
be the principle cause of instability, revealing by its 
behavior 'its strategy for world domination.' When the 
Sino--Soviet alliance had been intact, China had regarded 
the U.S. as the primary instigator of regional conflict. 
During this period, however, China portrayed turmoil in the 
Third World as being directly linked to Soviet aggression.
Events not only appeared to confirm this analysis; they 
reinforced it. Threatening China's immediate strategic 
position (or at least its regional aspirations), relations 
with Vietnam deteriorated. By July 1978 the PRC had 
terminated aid to Hanoi.3 Unhappily, Vietnam signed a Treaty 
of Friendship with the Soviet Union in November of the same 
year,4 formalising a relationship which China had watched 
develop with increasing misgiving. Within two weeks of the 
signing of the treaty, the first shipment of Soviet MiG-23s 
arrived in Hanoi.5 Then, in February--March 1979 Sino-- 
Vietnamese tension, heightened by the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia, gave way to open conflict.
Sino--Vietnamese hostility came increasingly to be 
regarded by Beijing not as a localised problem, but as part 
of a set of global developments occurring at Soviet 
instigation.6 Other events, though perhaps less alarming to 
Beijing, were similarly interpreted. Moscow's augmented 
supply of weapons to India, for example, though by no means 
the first of its kind, was viewed not as a discrete act, but 
as part of a broader set of intiatives displaying hostile 
Soviet intentions.7 The 1979 invasion of Afghanistan was 
viewed not as an isolated case of Soviet aggression;
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instead, it was regarded by Beijing as a key element in a 
Soviet global offensive which fed on Washington's 'feeble 
remonstrations'.8
Beijing's concern about the augmentation of Soviet 
military capabilities and activities in the late 1970s 
echoed the sentiments that had been expressed twenty years 
earlier about the United States. Concern about the security 
of Chinese territory, as two decades before, intensified 
Beijing's concern. Beijing had once exhorted the Soviet 
Union firmly to resist U.S. 'aggression'; and had eventually 
expressed displeasure about Moscow's 'timidity'. Likewise, 
in this period - of necessity, if not by preference - 
Beijing relied on the U.S. to curb Soviet 'expansionism'; 
and, similarly, voiced its dissatisfaction with Washington's 
response.
Beijing's deep appreciation of the Soviet menace helped 
resolve its ambivalent attitude towards the United States in 
favor of de facto entente. Sino--American alignment in turn 
resulted in the temporary de-emphasis of Beijing's cardinal 
strategic principle, the 'Three Worlds Theory' into a period 
of relative dormancy.9 Yet, it did not diminish China's 
interest and activity in the Third World. On the contrary, 
the Third World continued to figure prominently in China's 
strategic, economic, and political future. As the zone of 
greatest instability, it constituted a vast belt of danger 
and opportunity, directly linked to China's security and 
important to China's modernisation.10
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C. Economic basis of Third World relations:
As successful modernisation came to be increasingly 
associated with China's deeper immersion in the world 
economic system, moderation supplanted militancy as the 
hallmark of Chinese foreign policy conduct, especially in 
the Third World. The idea of pursuing modernisation was not 
new, but the level of commitment to it, along with the chief 
means for its accomplishment, were qualitatively different. 
Prior to Deng Xiaoping, Hua Guofeng had committed China to a 
set of economic reforms which A. Doak Barnett referred to as 
'palliative rather than fundamental'. 11 Deng departed from 
his predecessor by, among other things, assigning a major 
role for China's modernisation to foreign economic 
relations.12 China's main objective - more readily 
achievable in the context of Sino--American entente - was 
the acquisition of Western technology and investment.13
Focus on the U.S., Western Europe and Japan, however, did 
not correspondingly reduce Chinese interest in expanding 
economic cooperation with the Third World. As one observer 
astutely noted,
China can hardly overlook the primacy of 
enlarging imports from the Third World 
and socialist economies on a selective, 
if not a special, basis - if only to 
siphon off to the extent possible trade 
balances with the West, notwithstanding 
the political considerations thereof.1
Formerly China had been at the center of Third World
controversies, deservedly earning a reputation for stirring, 
if not starting them. As this analysis will go on to show, 
beginning in 1978 Beijing sought to avoid controversy and to 
pursue consensus; to pursue avenues of economic cooperation
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with, rather than attempt to stir revolution within, Third 
World countries.15 Lin Zhimin asserts that the new emphasis 
on seeking stability rather than fostering change introduced 
a 'conceptual gap'; that is, it presented Beijing with the 
problem of dtermining how to profit from greater contact 
with other countries while remaining a champion of Third 
World causes.16
D. Expanding Sino--Middle East relations:
The Chinese view of the Middle East between 1978 and 1981 
reflected its preoccupation with Soviet behavior. Meanwhile 
Beijing's policy approach to the region reflected its 
decisive tilt towards Washington and its emphasis on the 
economic dimension of foreign relations. Chinese 
publications made frequent references to the Middle East as 
an integral link in the Soviet effort to forge an 'iron ring 
of encirclement' around China.17 Such remarks, perhaps more 
metaphor than worry, nonetheless revealed Beijing's close 
attention to events in the Middle East, and close 
association of these devlopments with Soviet activity. China 
regarded the Middle East both as 'an[sic] epicenter of the 
world's trouble' and as a prime target of Soviet 
troublemaking.18
Beijing closely monitored what it regarded as a determined 
Soviet effort to 'outflank' the United States in the Middle 
East (as well as Africa).19 The period began and ended with 
regional disturbances construed by China as having a Soviet 
source or as being conducive to Soviet exploitation: the 
isolation of Egypt in the Arab world and the subsequent
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assassination of Sadat; turmoil in the South Arabian 
penninsula; revolutionary upheaval in Iran, followed by the 
outbreak of the Gulf war; and new patterns of Israeli 
aggression, epitomised in the extension of Israeli law to 
the Golan Heights and the pre-emptive air strike against 
Iraq's Osirak nuclear facility.
To Beijing this chain of circumstances was unparalleled. 
Its cumulative violence and unpredictability maintained at a 
high level of risk, including the possibility of superpower 
confrontation, at a time when China had decisively 'leaned 
to the other side'. To repeat, these events did not occur in 
isolation, nor were they perceived as such by Beijing. 
Sandwiched between them was the Sino--Vietnamese conflict 
and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The second incident 
confirmed Moscow's willingness to resort to force; the first 
case demonstrated the implications of Soviet behavior for 
China's own security.
At the time, Chinese security was defined in especially 
broad conceptual and conspicuously non-territorial, terms. 
During this period, the Middle East figured prominently in 
Beijing's strategic calculations primarily because 
disturbances in the region jeopardised the stable 
environment seen as the precondition for Chinese 
modernisation; and because successful modernisation was 
deemed to be the bedrock of Chinese security.
LL)_Relatians with Egypt;
During this period Beijing and Cairo continued to find
common ground for political, military, and economic 
cooperation. The basis for Sino--Egyptian understanding was 
the two countries' resistance to the Soviet Union, both 
outside and within the Middle East.20
Yet there were difficulties with, if not limits to, 
Beijing's political alignment with Cairo. Sadat's separate 
peace with Israel resulted in Egypt's isolation. Such a 
division among the Arabs hardly favored a durable peace. The 
absence of a comprehensive and enduring Arab--Israeli 
settlement raised the possibility of continuing, if not 
strengthening, Soviet influence in the region. For, Beijing 
regarded division among the Arabs as fertile ground for 
Soviet meddling. This is precisely what China had hoped to 
prevent.
Beijing's rather bland reaction to the treaty, which was 
more remarkable for what it did not say, underlined China's 
ambivalence. Beijing's response did not. for example, 
explicitly criticise or openly express reservations about 
the Egyptian--Israeli peace. It did, however, emphasise 
Soviet 'gains', and it voiced scepticism about U.S. 
'credibility'. The governing sentiment of the official
r\ i
reaction was a thinly disguised resignation. Such lukewarm 
support on this important matter illustrated China's 
overriding concern with the effects of Sadat's peace 
initiative on Arab rejectionists' ties to Moscow.22 
Ironically, Sadat, upon whom Beijing had primarily relied to 
offset, if not weaken, the Soviet relationship with Arab 
rejectionists, presented instead the occasion for its 
further consolidation.
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Another dramatic step forward in Sino--Egyptian military 
cooperation, however, partially compensated China for this 
disappointment. In January 1978 Egypt reportedly sent a 
Soviet MiG-23 to China.23 Later, it was revealed that the 
Soviet plane had been exchanged for 80 Chinese fighter 
planes as well as Beijing's pledge to assist with their 
assembly and pilot training.24 According to sources in the 
Japanese Defense Agency, the MiG-23 transfer was the first 
in a series of contemplated swaps, expected to include small 
numbers of SAM land--air missiles, MAT anti-tank missiles, 
and T-62 tanks.25
The importance of this transaction lay in its timing and 
in the circumstances which supplied the motives for it. At 
the time the Soviet Union had taken advantage of the United 
States' initial hesitation in throwing full support behind 
the Sadat initiative. Moscow had begun to press the Arab 
rejectionists to derail the Egyptian peace effort. 
Accentuating Cairo's growing isolation, Libyan troops were 
mobilising on Egypt's borders. In addition, $1.5 billion in 
U.S. military credits were not forthcoming.26 The Carter 
Administration's tactic of 'tying together' arms transfers 
to Egypt, Jordan and Israel was stymied by strong opposition 
in the U.S. Congress.27 Saudi Arabia compounded Cairo's 
difficulties by its failure to finance the proposed purchase 
of 50 F-5s, citing their exhorbitant cost.28
Thus, on Egypt's part, the aircraft swap promised 
immediate relief, both in symbolic and concrete terms.
First, the acquisition enabled Cairo to free its MiG-21
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squadrons for redeployment along the increasingly hostile 
Libyan border. Second, the Chinese supply of aircraft 
(however inadequate as a substitute for either U.S. or fresh 
Soviet equipment) demonstrated to the superpowers that, in a 
limited sense, they were not indispensable. Third, the 
aircraft deal notified the Egyptian military that Cairo 
could make good on its declared intention to diversify its 
sources of arms.
In Beijing's case, the Sino--Egyptian aircraft swap should 
be viewed in the broader context of its desire to modernise 
the military, and not merely the civilian, sectors of its 
economy. By this time a modified Chinese concept of national 
defense, focusing on the protection of China's urban and 
industrial strongholds, had already begun to evolve.29 That 
concept stressed the relationship between weapons and 
tactics, with attention centering on military research and 
development.30 Without exaggerating its importance, the 
procurement of the MiG-23, which came at a time when the 
MiG-21 was the most sophisticated combat aircraft in China's 
inventory, assisted in these efforts.31 The MiG-23 served as 
a prototype for cheap, labor-intensive aircraft production. 
As importantly, the MiG deal set a precedent for future 
Sino--Egyptian military cooperation. As the lessons of the 
Sino--Vietnamese conflict were absorbed, reliance on 
international collaboration to re-equip the PLA figured more 
prominently than before in Beijing's calculations.32
Ties between Cairo and Beijing also had a noteworthy 
economic dimension. Trade between the two countries grew 
steadily from a total of $120 million in 1978 to a height of
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$210 million in 1 981.33 China's special interest in Egypt 
centered on phosphates and minerals. In Spring 1979 a 
Chinese geological delegation examined the quantity and 
quality of phosphate ores in Egypt's western desert, 
concluding its study with discussions about future joint 
prospecting (involving the Egyptian Survey Authority).34
Besides its interest in mutually beneficial trade and ore- 
mineral exploitation, China also exhibited interest in 
collaborating to develop Egypt's petroleum industry. 
Apparently, this was a major reason why an Egyptian 
petroleum delegation led by Minister of Industry, Oil and 
Mines, Ahmed Hillal visited Beijing in early 1978.35 China 
contributed to Egyptian development projects under the aegis 
of the United Nations' FAO as well as through its own 
AGRICON (the China International Engineering Corporation for 
Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishery). In 1979, for example, 
with an investment of 4 million Egyptian pounds, the PRC 
completed the construction of the Ismailia fish farm; 
trained Egyptian specialists in fish breeding; and planted 
20,000 fruit trees.36
In a sense, China's cooperation with Egypt in all of these 
endeavors is reminiscent of the assistance it had rendered 
two decades earlier. At that time, China, as a member of the 
Soviet bloc, aimed to rescue Egypt from the adverse 
consequences of Nasser's unilateralism. On this occasion, 
Beijing, informally aligned with Washington, opted to assist 
Egypt in surviving the unilateralism of Sadat. In both 
cases, Beijing's efforts were strongly motivated by the
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optimal desire to detach Egypt from, but a willingness to 
settle for lessening Egypt's dependence on, one or the other 
superpower.
Despite its relatively small scale, Chinese assistance to, 
and economic cooperation with, Egypt should not be 
underestimated. Measured purely in monetary terms, these 
endeavors might have been of relatively unimportant. In the 
longer term, such involvement might have set a foundation of 
political confidence in the ultimate quest for political 
influence.
,Iii) Relations with Jordan;
China's 'breakthrough' in Egypt was a new and encouraging 
stage in an old and often tumultuous relationship. In 
contrast, Sino--Jordanian relations had no history and held 
comparatively less promise. In the past, China had 
derisively referred to the Jordanian monarchy as a stooge of 
Western imperialism. Less prone to public displays of 
invective, King Hussein generally appeared no more keen than 
Beijing to establish relations. Yet, in July 1978 the two 
countries signed their first trade agreement, stipulating 
the reciprocal granting of most-favored-nation trade 
status .37
Three decades of acrimony and avoidance hardly favored the 
creation of a trade partnership. The turn-around in Sino-- 
Jordanian relations was, however, the product of a much more 
current history. Jordan's special appeal to China at the 
time was its closer association to Washington than to 
Moscow. King Hussein, in publicly expressing his displeasure
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about 'indiscriminate' Soviet arms transfers to the 
region,38 practiced a politics that was roughly compatible 
with China's.
Based on the 1978 trade agreement, China made sizable 
purchases of Jordanian phosphates and expressed interest in 
future purchases of potash.39 In turn, China agreed in 1981 
to participate in a third-party joint venture with France to 
build a 1,523-unit apartment complex in the first stage of a 
large housing construction project near Amman.40 Such 
instances of Sino--Jordanian economic cooperation, modest at 
the outset, probably received an initial boost from the 
loose politico--strategic linkage of Washington, Amman, and 
Bei jing.
Xiii) Relations with the PLQ;
Beijing sought during this period to improve its relations 
with Arab moderates and with Washington, without making a 
casualty of its commitment to the Palestinians. However, 
China's attitude towards the Palestinian issue was one of 
growing impatience - with Washington as much as with the 
PLO.
The source of Beijing's trouble with the United States was 
Washington's apparent 'vacillation.'41 The Chinese held the 
view that the United States was inconsistent in two 
respects: the energy and sense of urgency with which it 
pursued a comprehensive peace settlement; and the standards 
of accountability to which it held the opposing sides in 
the Arab--Israeli conflict regarding the employment of 
force. As the period progressed, China - like the Arabs -
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began to question the wisdom of relying on American 
diplomacy to resolve the Palestinian problem.
The Camp David process was a landmark in the history of 
U.S. Middle East peace efforts in terms of the sustained 
attention devoted to, and the results earned by, the 
enterprise. How, then, is one to interpret China's silence? 
It is probable that Beijing welcomed the initiative, but 
questioned the approach. The Camp David process brought 
Israel and Egypt to the bargaining table, engineered a peace 
between them, and led to the return of the Sinai to Egypt. 
What Camp David failed to accomplish (and perhaps could not 
realistically have been expected to) was the 
resolution of the Palestinian question which, China had 
consistently regarded as the 'crux' of the Arab--Israeli 
dispute. The Camp David process called for future 
negotiation of the Palestinian problem, but did not 
set the negotiations immediately in motion.
Beijing's silence in respect of the Camp David agreements 
surely did not mean that China had no opinion. What it did 
mean was that the opinion held could not be openly expressed 
without generating political controversy. Public support of 
Camp David would have been tantamount to approval of a 
framework for peace that, whatever its merits, had excluded 
the PLO, not to mention other Arab states with which China 
was cultivating relations. In effect, Camp David postponed 
(ultimately indefinitely) the question of Palestinian 
autonomy which China deemed crucial to an overall 
settlement. On the other hand, there were strong reasons for 
Beijing to refrain from publicly criticising Camp David: (1)
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the desire to avoid damaging relations with either the U.S. 
or Egypt; and (2) the wish to withhold judgment pending 
clear indication that 'stage one' of Camp David (i.e. a 
separate Egyptian--Israeli peace and return of the 
Sinai) would be followed negotiations over Palestinian 
autonomy.
Additional evidence suggests that China's silence about 
Camp David masked disapproval, or at least lack of 
confidence, rather than support. The tell-tale sign of 
China's disillusionment was a recommitment to the PLO 
chiefly in the form of support for the positions which it 
espoused. Within the period spanning fall 1978 and summer 
1980, at least three major PLO--Fatah delegations travelled 
to Beijing to confer with Chinese leaders. Sandwiched 
between them was Premier Hua Guofeng's June 1979 address to 
the Chinese People's Congress in which he declared support 
for a political solution to the Palestinian question, but at 
the same time voiced China's support for Palestinian 
statehood and the right of return, neither issue expressly 
dealt with in Camp David.
Subsequent to Camp David, if not partly because of it, the 
Arabs were in disarray and Israel was emboldened. Neither 
the achievements nor the shortcomings of Camp David rendered 
the PLO irrelevant. Paradoxically, the PLO was consolidated 
by being thrust on the defensive. PLO 'diplomacy' was 
reinvigorated: Arafat divided his time between manoeuvering 
within and mending inter-Arab rivalries in order to keep the 
Palestinian movement alive. Consequently, in reaffirming its
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support for the PLO, Beijing was challenged to adapt to its 
ambiguous role: to maintain a commitment to the Palestinian 
cause in order to nourish its relations with Arab regimes; 
to continue to support the PLO in order to offset the 
influence of Moscow; yet to disassociate itself from PLO 
excesses, verbal or otherwise, which might irritate the 
Arabs or antagonise Washington.
Divergences between Beijing and the PLO leadership, though 
perhaps only visible from time to time, were never fully 
reconciled.42 Beijing, which fruitlessly encouraged the U.S. 
to abandon its partiality towards Israel, was equally 
unsuccessful in its efforts to hold the PLO to its own 
evolving standards of acceptable conduct. Arafat's first 
trip to China in ten years (October 1981) threw into bold 
relief the sharp differences between Beijing and the PLO 
which lay beneath the surface of their amicable relations. 
Coinciding with the assassination of Egypt's President 
Sadat, Arafat's visit became an unexpected embarrassment to 
Beijing when the PLO Chairman used the occasion to denounce 
Sadat's peace efforts.43 Only one month before Arafat's 
indiscretion, reports from Beijing had indicated that China 
had supplied arms to the PLO.44
PLO ties to Iranian oppositionists also placed China in an 
awkward position. China's support for the PLO was confined 
to the context of the Arab--Israeli dispute. A stable Iran 
served the common Sino--American strategic purpose of 
providing a buffer against Soviet expansionism. China could 
not have sought to encourage, or to have wished to be 
implicated in, subversion of the Shah. It was not until
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the latter part of the period in discussion that 
serious opposition was mounted against the Shah. Thus, 
the PLO--Iranian oppositionist link was a potential 
dilemma for China, but a remote one.
(iv.) Relations w ith Israel;.
China performed yet another tightrope act in quietly 
developing its relations with Israel. Unlike its cooperation 
with Egypt - which threatened to distance China from Arab 
hardliners only - a visible improvement in Sino--Israeli 
relations jeopardised China's ties with the Arab world 
generally. Nevertheless, Israel's highly prized military 
technology and expertise constituted a powerful inducement 
for Beijing to assume political risks. Of course, military 
cooperation with Israel and a softer stand on the Arab-- 
Israeli dispute was not a fixed cost. At any given time, the 
real price for Sino--Israeli cooperation depended on China's 
not going too much further politically than the Arabs 
themselves; and proceeding at least as quietly in non­
political areas of cooperation.
A March 1978 People's Daily editorial indicated the 
nuancing required to strengthen Sino--Israeli contacts 
without weakening Beijing's position among the Arabs. The 
language of the article offered the oblique suggestion that 
China was prepared to recognise Israel were Israel willing 
to tame its aggressiveness.45 However, Israel's settlements 
policy, bombing raid on Iraq's nuclear reactor site and 
activity in South Lebanon rendered this formula irrelevant;
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thus, the merits of its vagueness were never fully tested.
Three months before this editorial, in discussions with a 
visiting delegation of the American Jewish Congress, Chinese 
Deputy Premier Keng Piao had declared that, with respect to 
Israel, China was 'essentially in agreement with Egypt.'46 
These remarks are notable for reasons other than their 
obvious ambiguity. First, they reveal China's cautious 
willingness to follow Egypt's lead rather than to define its 
own position. Second, they illustrate Beijing's tactical 
preference for keeping all political channels open, for 
practicing evasion rather than entertain the risk of being 
held to account for strong conviction.
As early as 1979 China sought to capitalise on its 
relationship with the United States and Arab moderates. 
Beijing is reported to have suggested to Washington a 
division of labor in brokering a Middle East peace 
settlement. At that time Foreign Minister Huang Hua is said
to have recommended to the members of the U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that the United States exert 
pressure on Israel while the PRC used its leverage on Arab 
moderates.47 Such an arrangement promised a role for China 
that it otherwise could not obtain, while implicitly 
excluding Moscow.
However, the success of such a project (other than 
securing the willingness of Washington to participate in it)
depended on two developments that in fact never
materialised: a less 'biased' U.S. position towards Israel 
and a more conciliatory position by Israel. The 'strategic 
cooperation' agreement between Washington and Tel Aviv
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evoked perhaps the most open sign of Beijing's frustration; 
up to that time China's criticism of the United States was 
tame.48
The combination of Israeli activity buffered by American 
passivity, hindered the launching of open and direct Sino-- 
Israeli relations. Perhaps more importantly, it deprived 
China of an enlarged role in the peace process. Despite 
these political disappointments, China could take 
encouragement from both present circumstances and future 
possibilities. True, an enhanced political role had 
temporarily eluded China. Still, the loss of an apparent 
opportunity was not accompanied by a squandering of 
political capital. Beijing had committed itself to the cause 
of peace, working behind the scenes to offer assistance. 
Offering to collaborate did not appear to have compromised 
its position among the Arabs.
_(v) China and revolutionary Iran;
As previously mentioned, China and the United States had a 
common strategic interest in supporting the Shah of Iran. 
Although Sino--Iranian relations had been formally 
established in 1971, Chairman Huang Hua's arrival in Tehran 
on 29 August 1978 marked the first visit made by a high- 
ranking Chinese official to Iran.49 Thus, when in 1979, Iran 
was no longer the Shah's, Beijing shared Washington's 
dilemma. As one observer noted,
Pro-American anti-Soviet Iran was the 
spindle on which China's strategic 
calculations turned. The spindle broke 
and the Chinese became uncomfortably
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aware that the first non-Communist leader 
their Chairman had ever visited [Hua 
Guofeng's visit to the Shah, 1978] was an 
execrated fugitive, for whose blood his 
vengeful successors were ready to outrage 
all established codes.50
The fall of the Shah had far-reaching implications for 
Chinese foreign policy which were related to, not divorced 
from, Beijing's strategic alignment with Washington. First, 
the Iranian revolution deprived Beijing - as it did 
Washington - of a reliable cushion against Soviet 
expansionism.
Second, by publicising the excesses of the Shah's regime, 
the revolution highlighted Beijing's past association with 
tyranny. This was a source of great embarrassment to China, 
given its claim to Third World leadership.
Third, the Khomeini regime's revolutionary militancy, by 
threatening neighboring countries, jeopardised the stable 
international environment deemed essential to successful 
Chinese modernisation.
Fourth, the revolution complicated Sino--American entente 
by threatening to make Beijing as culpable for its silence 
as for its association with either antagonist. China was 
compelled to camouflage its differences with Washington over 
Iran, by quoting others and accusing the Soviet Union of 
gloating.51
For China, the emergence of Khomeiniism in Iran was ill- 
timed and ironic. China had spent the better part of a 
decade successfully rehabilitating its image and integrating 
itself gradually into an international system which the 
militant Iranian revolution repudiated in principle and
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challenged in practice. This was not only difficult for 
Beijing to reconcile ideologically. It also complicated the 
business of conducting relations at the intergovernmental 
level with Tehran. Furthermore, Iran's primary adversary in 
the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Shah, the United 
States, was temporarily Beijing's co-defender against Soviet 
expansionism. The immediate targets of Iran's militant 
foreign policy were the Arab Gulf states, with whom China 
had only recently improved ties. How to preserve relations 
with Iran's revolutionary regime, in the context of Sino-- 
American entente and in a manner which did not alienate the 
Arabs thus became the peculiar dilemma of China's initiation 
in Gulf politics.
Towards the revolution itself, Beijing was little more 
than coolly receptive. Initially, the Chinese press referred 
to the revolution merely as 'turmoil' or 'turbulence.' 
Afterwards, Beijing confined itself to factual reporting, 
commenting tersely on the course of events.52
Once the revolution succeeded in deposing the Shah,
Beijing appeared intent on making the best of a situation 
that it could not change. Encouragingly, the Khomeini regime 
rebuffed a Soviet offer of military aid.53 This refusal also 
provided post facto justification for Beijing's earlier 
unwillingness to support the American campaign to impose 
sanctions on Iran.54 Tehran's expulsion of a Soviet diplomat 
six months later further improved Tehran's credentials in 
Beijing's eyes.55 In contrast, Beijing, which had exhorted 
the U.S. to exercise restraint in its dealings with Iran,56
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made less of an effort to disguise its disapproval of 
Washington's behavior, particularly in the wake of the 
hostage rescue attempt.57
Both in so far as the revolution and the related U.S.-- 
Iranian tension were concerned, Beijing sought deliberately 
to remain on the political sidelines as a means of 
preserving friendships with both countries. When the Gulf 
war erupted between Iran and Iraq, Beijing adopted the same 
tactic, quickly declaring its neutrality.58 On the 
other hand, assuming these positions implicitly acknowledged 
China's inability to prevent or suppress local developments 
potentially hostile to its interests, they were merely 
a function of China's impotence. On the other hand, China 
might be seen to have made a merit of its weakness.
Declaring its neutrality in the war sent a signal of 
goodwill to the belligerents and displayed a commitment to 
the .peaceful resolution of conflict. Viewed this way,
Beijing demonstrated a keen appreciation of the ways to 
which apparently harmful circumstances could be turned to 
its advantage.
,( v i )  R e l a t i o n s  w i t h _ . K w a i t
As the situation in Iran became increasingly turbulent, 
China's interest in Kuwait correspondingly grew (though 
there is no evidence of a causal link between the two). 
Beijing's attraction to Kuwait in fact ante-dated the 
Iranian revolution; moreover, it had political and economic, 
not merely strategic dimensions. Within OPEC, Kuwait was 
notable for having staked out an independent position,
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highlighted by its firm stand against the Western oil 
'majors'and Saudi domination of OPEC policy.59 Insisting on 
its right to alter prices and production according to 
fluctuating market conditions, Kuwait announced two 
substantial cutbacks to its three major Western customers 
(BP, Gulf and Shell) .60 Kuwait's initiatives in this respect 
coincided with China's efforts to link Third World states in 
the exercise of their resource power. The purpose of 
Kuwait's efforts - to conserve its assets until such time as 
it could sell processed products61 and to campaign for a 
more favorable deal for oil producers62 - intersected with 
those of China.
During this period, China displayed an appetite for 
Kuwaiti oil and not just a fascination with Kuwaiti oil 
policy. At the same time that Beijing was applauding 
Kuwait's assertiveness, it was negotiating directly with 
Kuwait for flexibility in supplying crude oil to China.
China had not imported Kuwaiti oil since the mid-'70s. 
However, when domestic production stuck at a plateau of 106 
million tonnes in both 1978 and 1979, China turned to the 
Gulf.63 In the same period and for similar reasons - lagging 
domestic production and a desire to diversify its foreign 
sources - China imported substantial quantities of Kuwaiti 
chemical fertilisers (from a value of $77 million in 1977 to 
a high of $121.4 million in 1980). 64
Kuwaiti oil policy was complemented by an inventive 
security policy which served the additional (financial) 
purpose of finding outlets for surplus petrodollars. 
Primarily aiming to purchase security and goodwill, Kuwait
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spread its money liberally in the Gulf as well as, more 
broadly, in the Arab and Muslim worlds. These efforts, first 
of all, converged with Beijing's emphasis on South--South 
cooperation. More importantly, because the investment of 
Kuwaiti petrodollars reached into East Asia, Kuwaiti policy 
converged with China's immediate strategic concerns, as the 
subsequent discussion will show.
Following the departure of the Shah, for example, Kuwait 
extended $200 million in soft loans to Pakistan.65 
Subsequent joint political efforts between Kuwait and 
Pakistan to oppose the Soviet presence in Afghanistan66 
meshed comfortably with Chinese interests. Similarly, 
Kuwait's offer of $167 million in grants to Indonesia, in 
conjunction with its support for ASEAN's efforts to find a 
political solution to the Kampuchean problem, were welcomed 
by China.67 Thus, the effect, though presumably not the 
intention, of Kuwait's effort was to bolster Third World 
economies and political initiatives in areas of strategic 
sensitivity to China.
As indicated, China was the indirect and unintended 
beneficiary of Kuwait's loans and investments to West and 
East Asian governments. The ready availability of Kuwaiti 
petrodollars also sparked Beijing's interest in drawing 
funds directly to China. In 1981, Chinese officials 
discussed for the first time just such a possibility with 
their Kuwaiti counterparts.68
Kuwait was targeted to play yet another role in the 
expansion of China's foreign economic relations. Beijing
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sought to use Kuwait as a channel through which to probe the 
Middle East export market. In September 1981, the Sino-- 
Kuwaiti trade center opened an exhibition designed to market 
Chinese products and expertise to the Arab world.69
Sino— Kuwaiti interests, though convergent, were not 
coincident. Kuwait displayed a foreign policy pragmatism 
that resembled Beijing's, but adopted specific policies 
that, in some cases, were directly opposed to China's.
Kuwait counterbalanced its assistance to Pakistan by 
providing substantial quantities of crude oil to India.70 
Second, while supporting the cause of an exclusively Arab 
security arrangement, Kuwait - which spurned a U.S. arms 
sales proposal, ostensibly for financial reasons - moved to 
finalise weapons purchases from the Soviet Union.71 Third, 
notwithstanding its condemnation of Soviet aggression, 
Kuwait, the only Arab country to have full diplomatic 
relations with both superpowers at this time, encouraged its 
Gulf neighbors to establish links with the U.S.S.R.72
These divergences between Kuwait and China, however, were 
soon to be resolved when Beijing itself adopted a similarly 
balanced approach to the superpowers. In tghe meantime, 
however, Kuwait's position with respect to the Soviet Union 
was only minimally satisfactory to China.
(vii) Relations wi.th_N.Qrth South Yemen (PPEX-Li
Chinese publications might have misread or purposely 
exaggerated Soviet activity in the Arabian penninsula when 
referring to it as an imminently successful pincer movement 
aimed at domination of the Red Sea.73 Nonetheless, the
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numerous articles reporting these events indicate China's 
close attention to developments in this area. The Soviet-- 
South Yemeni Treaty of Friendship of 1978 formed the 
official basis for the stationing of large numbers of Cuban 
troops as well as Soviet military advisers, technicians and 
pilots;74 and for the positioning of sophisticated Soviet 
weaponry in South Yemen.75 Early in 1980 Aden conceded the 
expansion of the U.S.S.R.'s Hadibu base on Socotra Island.76 
Estimates ranged wildly, reporting anywhere from 1,000 to 
5,000 troops in Soviet uniform in South Yemen (bunked, 
ironically, in British-built barracks).77 Access to 
enlarged military facilities in South Yemen also 
improved the Soviet Union's ability to conduct 
surveillance activities. Thus, Aden, which had once been 
described as a clearinghouse for Chinese weapons channelled 
to national liberation movements, appeared to Beijing to 
have become a Russian military warehouse, anchoring the 
Soviet effort to knot local regimes into a strategic cordon.
Complementing the augmentation of the Soviet military 
presence in the PDRY was a series of political developments 
equally unwelcome to China. First, Aden did not condemn the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Second, by early 1980 the 
PDRY had already severed ties with Egypt, joining the 
Soviet-supported 'Steadfastness Front'.78 Third, South 
Yemeni officials were reported to have held discussions with 
their Ethiopian and North Vietnamese counterparts, meetings 
which had implications for China's East African investments 
in the first case, and East Asian security in the second.79
In responding to these developments, the PRC did not
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drastically alter its policy. Rather, China patiently 
maintained its trade and aid commitments to the PDRY, 
continuing to play the hand that it was dealt. Beijing's 
patience with - or resignation over - an augmented Soviet 
presence and influence in South Yemen appeared to be 
unexpectedly rewarded by Ali Nasser Mohammed Hassani's 
accession to power in early 1980 . 80 Seeming less doctrinaire 
and more committed to independence than his predecessor, 
Hassani resumed Aden's efforts to heal relations with its 
Arab neighbors.81 Counterbalancing a Spring 1980 visit to 
Moscow, Hassani shortly thereafter travelled to Saudi 
Arabia.82 As though to demonstrate South Yemen's aim to 
moderate its policies, Hassani urged restraint upon the Gulf 
belligerents. This effort received particular attention in 
the Chinese official press, in that it matched Beijing's 
stated policy towards the Gulf conflict.83 Offsetting a 
large-scale Soviet naval visit and the subsequent arrival of 
Soviet Vice-Minister of Defense Sokolov, Hassani called for 
a regional summit to discuss the elimination of foreign 
bases.84
Hassani's seeming pragmatism drew little official comment 
from Beijing. One would have perhaps expected China to have 
expressed approval of Hassani's flexibility. However much 
Beijing might have welcomed Hassani's foreign policy as an 
improvement, there were numerous and compelling reasons not 
to overrate or to overreact to it. First, given the fluidity 
of South Yemeni politics, there was no guarantee that either 
the moderation of PDRY foreign policy or the man chiefly
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responsible for its adoption would survive for very long. 
Second, China could not have failed to have appreciated 
South Yemen's dependence on the Soviet Union, both for arms 
and for aid (though Soviet aid never quite matched South 
Yemen's needs or expectations).85 Beijing surely recognised 
the degree to which the Soviet Union had become entrenched 
in the PDRY. Third, Hassani's rapprochement with Arab Gulf 
regimes produced no zero-sum outcome for China. Although it 
paralleled China's policy approach, it did not clash with 
that of the Soviet Union, which itself had adopted a softer 
line towards the Gulf monarchies and had grown ambivalent 
about a radicalised PDRY. There was no cause therefore for 
Beijing to anticipate either a decoupling from Moscow or a 
significant diminution of Soviet influence.
In neighboring North Yemen the assassination of Ahmed 
Hussein Gashmi brought Ali Abdullah Saleh to power - in the 
same month that developments in South Yemen had opened 
Aden's door to wider Soviet penetration. Thus, the 
turbulence in South Yemen so disturbing to Beijing was 
matched by instability in Sana'a, and exacerbated by a brief 
border war between the two neighbors. Although interested in 
the outcome, China refrained from becoming directly 
embroiled in the local turmoil. Instead, China appeared to 
rely on Saudi Arabia and the United States to defend North 
Yemen. Yet, very few of the $100 million in American arms 
earmarked for San'a and financed by Saudi Arabia were 
actually transferred by Riyadh.86 Thus, the Saudi--American 
connection, which Beijing appeared resigned, if not content, 
to rely upon, was subverted by the overriding influence of
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inter-Arab rivalry.
In sharp contrast, the Soviet Union, which on other 
occasions had reportedly supplied leftist rebels in the YAR 
with tanks and artillery, gained a reputation for directness 
and swift fulfilment of weapons orders.87
Meanwhile Saleh's government, though accepting weapons 
from Moscow, pledged its adherence to nonalignment and 
opposition to entangling alliances.88 Saleh's October 1981 
journey to Moscow did not necessarily signal a betrayal of 
these principles. It probably reflected instead mounting 
domestic pressures. Saleh's trip was most likely aimed at 
bartering a degree of accommodation with the Soviet Union 
inn the form of: (1) a deferral of the YAR's military debts;
and (2) a Russian pledge to lean on the PDRY to end support 
of the National Democratic Front.89
Beijing persevered in seeking to offset, rather than to 
prevent, the possible strengthening of the Soviet position 
in North Yemen. Yet, because of the YAR's small market and 
deteriorating foreign exchange position, China's efforts to 
build trade relations were narrowly circumscribed. Winning 
construction contracts in the YAR was a more realistic (and 
ultimately a more successful) approach. In 1978, on the 
basis of competitive terms that matched the YAR's austerity, 
China won four construction contracts in North Yemen: to 
build an airport and a heliport; and to design two roads.90 
The following year, China agreed to transform and expand a 
Sana'a textile factory.91 Overall in 1979, the Chinese 
Construction and Engineering Company (CCEC) entered
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• • • •into twenty project agreements with the YAR. It was in
Yemen that China first experimented with joint venture 
construction activities, cnter.i ng an agreement to form the 
Yemeni--China Building and Engineering Company. The aim of 
this endeavor was participation in housing construction 
projects outside as well as within North Yemen.93 Beijing 
also signed a protocol in this period, calling for the 
dispatch of a sixty-member medical team to the YAR.94
(viii) Relations with Iraq;
Closer Sino--Iraqi ties during this period were forged in 
an atmosphere of coolness between Moscow and Baghdad, n 
the context of the Ethiopian - • -Somalia n war and the 
Ethiopian civil wars, Iraq had backed Somalia and later, the 
Eritrean separatists, adopting in both instances, positions 
which clashed with those of the Soviet Union.95 Early in 
1980, Iraq promised North Yemen $300 million in aid, an 
initiative taken independently of Moscow which displayed a 
shrewd combination of goodwill and assertiveness in a Saudi 
'preserve'.96 Iraq's conduct, though signifying no complete 
or permanent rupture with Moscow, was probably encouraging 
to Beijing nonetheless.
There were also economic incentives for Beijing to pursue 
closer relations with Iraq. In principle, Iraq shared 
China's aim of developing foreign trade. Receiving a Chinese 
delegation led by Minister of Foreign Trade Li Chiang, Iraq 
First Deputy Taha Yassin Ramadam commented: 'Our objective 
is to free ourselves from the superpowers' rivalry so as to 
preserve the stability of the world situation.'97
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In practice, Chinese--Iraqi economic cooperation centered 
on Chinese construction and labor contracts, and fertiliser 
purchases. China's effort to improve its international 
economic competitiveness at the time included authorising 
state companies to do business overseas. One such 
enterprise, the China Road and Bridge Engineering Company 
offered its first tender in Iraq, outbidding seven other 
international competitors for the contract to build the 
fourth bridge at Mosul.98 In the first case of its kind, 
Japan's Chiyoda Chemical Engineering and Construction 
Company reached an agreement with China to employ 7 00 
Chinese workers in Iraq's Baiji oil refinery project.99 
Besides tying the two Far East giants together into a Middle 
East petroleum venture, this project is noteworthy for 
setting China on a path towards the large-scale export of 
its labor to the region.
Throughout this period, China continued to ply the Middle 
East for cheap supplies of chemical fertilisers. Although 
the PRC derived most of its urea and ammonium phosphates 
from Japan,100 price increases encouraged China to diversify 
its sources.101 In 1978, for example, China contracted with 
Iraq to import $4 million worth of chemical fertilisers.102 
Pursuing deals such as this became increasingly desirable to 
Beijing as, by 1981, the PRC's financial position 
deteriorated, and price negotiations with Tokyo became 
correspondingly more troublesome.103
As a member of the Arab 'Steadfastness Front' with ties to 
Moscow, Iraq occupied a position in the Arab--Israeli 
dispute that had to be considered, if not eventually
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accommodated. The regime of Saddam Hussein possessed two 
additional characteristics which presumably Beijing had to 
consider: its ruthlessness and its independent-mindedness. 
Ultimately how stable and how manipulable was such a regime? 
By the end of the first year of the Gulf conflict, no 
clearcut answer to these questions had emerged. What was 
clear by then, however, was that Iraq had become involved in 
a protracted struggle for its own survival rather than 
emboldened by a quick, decisive victory over its neighbor, 
Iran. Suddenly, Iraq's relationships with its Arab neighbors 
were completely transformed: from having pledged generous 
aid to North Yemen, to having to appeal for, and become 
indebted to, the wealthy Arab Gulf sheikdoms for assistance. 
These changes, by clouding Iraq's future, made the future of 
Sino--Iraqi relations not necessarily bleak, but somewhat 
more unpredictable.
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Chapter VI 
An evaluation
Under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping, modernisation became 
the central objective of Chinese foreign as well as domestic 
policy, and the preservation of international stability 
became the essential prerequisite for its successful 
pursuit. From 1979 China tilted decisively towards 
Washington, and the development of foreign economic 
relations received unprecedented policy emphasis.
What were China's objectives?
As previously, China regarded the Middle East as a 
uniquely volatile region and an important zone of superpower 
competition. To the extent that China associated successful 
modernisation with a tranquil interantional environment, 
developments in the Middle East were carefully scrutinised 
by Beijing. China was especially sensitive to the 
augmentation of the Soviet military presence and activity in 
the region, which it interpreted as part of a global 
strategic offensive. Thus, the economic and strategic 
dimensions of China's Middle East policy merged.
Safeguarding modernisation was closely associated with 
blunting the Soviet Union's apparent Middle East advance.
China's objectives in the Middle East, however, were not 
only to protect modernisation, but also to promote it. China 
hoped to reap military as well as non-military benefits from 
the region. In the military sphere China sought both 
weapons and technology in a cost-effective, selective effort
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to re-equip the PLA and upgrade its indigenous arms 
production capability. Second, China looked to the Middle 
east as a potential export market, with an eye towards 
building its manufacturing base and drawing vital foreign 
exchange. Third, China turned to Middle East suppliers to 
diversify its sources of specific raw materials: especially 
fertilisers, and to a lesser extent, crude oil. Finally, 
China tried for the first time to attract Arab investors.
The overall aims of protecting and promoting modernisation 
took precedence over, but were not necessarily incompatible 
with, China's political objectives in the region. Beijing, 
which had formerly sought Third World leadership as an 
ideological model, strove during this period to gain a 
reputation for its commitment to, and solidarity with Third 
World governments in pursuing economic development. While 
continuing to urge resistance to superpower domination, 
Beijing emphasised modernisation, not revolution. This 
period marks the point at which Beijing clearly subordinated 
'peoples' armed struggle' to regional stability. China's 
approach to the Middle East reflected this general trend.
What were China's tactics?
Ostensibly, 'modernisation first' was an economic doctrine 
aimed at quintessentially economic goals. Underlying the 
commitment to modernisation, however, was an entire complex 
of strategic as well as political considerations. In 
addition to raising China's standard of living, 
modernisation promised to strengthen its security and
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enhance its world political standing.
Initially, Beijing pursued the comprehensive goals of 
modernisation by shifting into alignment with the United 
States. The swing in the direction of Washington promised to 
minimise China's strategic exposure to the U.S.S.R., to 
secure vital access to Western technology, and to complete 
the political rehabilitation of China's international 
political image.
Part of China's modernisation campaign involved the 
reequipment: of its military. In the light of heightened 
concern about the Soviet threat, Beijing looked to the 
Middle East to provide Soviet-made weapons prototypes to 
improve its own aging systems. Swaps with Egypt and, to a 
lesser extent, feelers to Israel for the acquisition of 
technology and expertise were the principle vehicles for 
China's military cooperation with Middle East regimes.
The launching of Chinese modernisation had the ffect of 
reinforcing recent past practices in the area of economic 
cooperation. First, in an effort to improve its agriculture, 
China continued to explore opportunities to develop and 
acquire fertilisers from the Middle East. Second, because 
oil figured prominently in China's overall modernisation - 
notwithstanding improvements in its domestic production 
capability - Beijing maintained an interest in purchasing 
crude oil in modest quantities at reasonable prices from 
Gulf producers.
The application of the 'open door' to the Middle East 
added new dimensions to China's economic relations with the 
region. First, Beijing sought to draw Arab petrodollars to
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China in the form of loans and investments. Second, China 
joined foreign competitors in bidding for engineering and 
construction projects in the Middle East. Third, China 
demonstrated a willingness to participate in third country 
ventures in the region. Finally, Beijing took the 
unprecedented step of entering labor contracts, dispatching 
significant numbers of workers to the Middle East.
Temporary strategic alignment with the U.S. offered China 
interesting tactical possibilities in its aproach to the 
Middle East. Beijing sought to exploit its association with 
Washington in order to improve its reputation and enlarge 
its role in the region, ideally at Moscow's expense. 
Reminiscent of the Sino-Soviet strategic partnership which 
introduced China to the region in the mid-1950s, the Sino-- 
American relationship more than a quarter of a century later 
initially functioned as a channel for China to expand its 
activity in the area.
The Beijing--Washington connection at first suggested to 
China a division of labor that could, by facilitating the 
resolution of the Arab--Israeli dispute, crowd out the 
Soviet Union. Beijing hoped to exert leverage on the 
moderate elements of the PLO as well as on Egypt and Jordan. 
It relied on Washington to deliver Israel and move Saudi 
Arabia to support a negotiated settlement. It is 
important to note, however, that the U.S. had already 
strengthened its hand in respect of Egypt and Jordan 
by disbursing considerable foreign aid to them. Thus, 
how much China realistically could have hoped to have
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contributed is questionable. In any event, China, which had 
striven to play a bridge-building role in the Middle East on 
behalf of the Sino--Soviet alliance in the opening decade of 
the Cold War, briefly revived the tactic, this time to 
undercut Moscow.
Although it is difficult to establish a causal nexus 
between China's revised relationship with the U.S. and its 
political adjustment vis-a-vis Israel, it is impossible to 
avoid the suggestion that the two developments were in some 
way related. Whether or not China's amended position on 
Israel was chiefly influenced by its desire to strengthen 
ties with Washington, the shift was nonetheless gradual and 
subtle. China ritualistically continued to deny reports of 
official contacts with Israelis, playing down their 
significance or rationalising their occurrence when evidence 
of their having taken place was irrefutable. Deftly, Beijing 
committed itself to hinting at normalisation with Israel. It 
allowed foreign journalists and diplomats to convey by 
conjecture what was politically inadvisable for China to 
declare openly: the acceptability of a compromise solution 
on Palestine.
Correspondingly, China - which in the mid-'70s had begun 
to allude to the Palestinian cause as a 'just' rather than 
an 'armed' struggle - appears in this period to have laid 
increasing emphasis on a political, as opposed to a 
military, solution.
Beijing did not, however, manifest its preference for a 
negotiated settlement by launching bold initiatives of its 
own. Rather, China confined itself to encouraging and
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supporting locally inspired peace efforts. Because such 
efforts typically isolated their sponsors, manufacturing a 
paradoxical form of Arab unity, the PRC was careful not to 
lavish praise upon them. Instead, the volume and tone of 
Beijing's support displayed overriding attention to 
preserving friendships.
The unresolved Palestinian problem was a longstanding 
challenge to Beijing's skilfulness in winning and 
maintaining friends in the Arab world. The Iranian 
revolution and the ensuing Gulf war introduced a second, 
equally perplexing policy test. In the Gulf, Soviet 
activities and American interests appeared to be an 
explosive mixture stirred in a crucible of local 
instability. At the outset of the Gulf conflict, it was not 
clear that Washington and Moscow would come to some 
arrangement with one another concerning the war.
China's official declaration of neutrality was a damage- 
limiting exercise in political face-saving. Such careful 
political treading, unlike in the past, was driven by a 
strong economic incentive, and not merely by powerful 
political or secondary strategic considerations. Where 
politics could not be pressed directly into the service of 
modernisation, Beijing was careful to ensure that politics 
would not indirectly interfere with it.
Were China's efforts successful?
Between 1978 and 1981 Chinese involvement in the Middle 
East occurred in the shadow of Sino— American strategic
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alignment. Accordingly, an assessment of China's success in 
the region raises two initial questions. First, what, if 
anything, did Sino-American entente help to produce and what 
did it prevent? Second, did China's activities in the Middle 
East strengthen or weaken its relationship with the United 
States ?
The combined pressure of the Beijing--Washington 
relationship did not deter Soviet aggression or peacefully 
resolve any of the numerous and complex political problems 
in the region. The common U .S.--Chinese interest in 
maintaining regional stability and thwarting Soviet 
penetration from its periphery, however, was buoyed by local 
resistance to territorial and ideological domination. Thus, 
an uneasy equilibrium prevailed irrespective of, and to a 
degree despite, Beijing's association with Washington.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian 
revolution, the onset of the Gulf war, and the intermittent 
eruption of conflict in the southern Arabian penninsula 
formed a chain of events which shifted American attention 
from the Arab--Israeli peace process to developments East of 
Suez. As a result, the Palestinian problem, long considered 
by China to be the crux of the Middle East's chronic 
instability, was seen to fester. Beijing perceived the U.S. 
as enabling Israel to do as it pleased politically as well 
as to get what it wanted militarily. Strongly, but quietly, 
China opposed this approach. Noting a connection between 
Israeli aggression and American passivity, China gradually 
carved a position whose language concealed its true 
substance (in the interest of preventing a rupture with
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Washington).
The 'unsatisfactory' performance of the United States on 
the Palestinian issue contributed to China's overall 
disillusionment with Washington. Washington's response to 
the Palestinian question was tolerable to China only for as 
long as China's temporary alignment was deemed necessary.
During this period a significant political role for China 
in the Middle East was at least theoretically attainable 
within the context of Sino-American ententef but highly 
improbable outside it. In the absence of a firm U.S. 
commitment in practice to drive Israel to the bargaining 
table, and without itself carrying sufficient weight to 
broker a comprehensive peace, China concentrated on a 
preserving friends among Arab moderates and preventing 
further alienation of Arab militants. This involved 
continued political dissociation from Israel, delicate 
separation from U.S. Middle East policy, cautious commitment 
to the PLO, and reserved support for unilateral peace 
initiatives. Accordingly, China practiced preventive 
politics in the Middle East.
Seen in this light China's hand was deftly played. 
Consisting of a proper blend of conviction and equivocation, 
Beijing's distinctive position on key regional issues 
neither crippled Sino— American entente nor visibly damaged 
China's existing relations in the Middle East. Whether China 
deliberately chose the political sidelines or was relegated 
to them, the benefit was the same: a limited role at least 
ensured limited rancor.
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From 1978 economics came to supersede politics as the 
prime mover of China's foreign policy. Still, China's 
economic fortunes in the Middie East were both conditioned 
and constrained by political and strategic circumstance. 
China's establishment of economic ties with Jordan, for 
example, occurred in the context of Jordanian cooperation 
with Washington, at a time when China was itself 
strategically aligned with the United States. Similarly, 
China's heightened economic interest in Kuwait coincided 
with Kuwait's assertiveness within OPEC and financial 
assistance in key strategic areas of the Third World. Thus, 
l ho launching of new economic i e 1 a I. ions with the Middle East 
was not divorced from the region's politics.
The maintenance and expansion of economic ties in the 
Middle East would seem to have required China to refrain 
from any flagrant affront to local sensibilities. In fact, 
how difficult to satisfy would such a condition have been? 
Despite not having official diplomatic relations, China 
nonetheless conducted trade with Israel. This open secret 
did little apparent injury to China's relations with the 
Arabs. Likewise, China's trade with Saudi Arabia operated in 
the absence of official diplomatic ties between the PRC and 
Riyadh, and in the presence of flourishing commerce between 
Taiwan and the Saudi kingdom. China continued to engage in 
trade with Iran, even after the fall of the Shah; and 
invoked neutrality in the Gulf war to maintain economic 
cooperation with both belligerents. Political circumstances, 
therefore, complicated but did not undermine the process of 
China's building economic relations with the region. The
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success of these efforts, moreover, depended less on China's 
leverage over, than on Beijing's steering clear of, the 
region's volatile politics. Thus, business without politics 
was possible; indeed, business without politics flourished.
Between 1978 and 1982 China's economic activity in the 
Middle East built upon nearly a decade of modest efforts and 
achievements in two basic areas. First, in an effort to 
boost its agriculture - a cornerstone of China's 'four 
modernisations' - Beijing continued to explore avenues of 
cooperation in the Middle East. Jordan joined Kuwait and 
Iraq as sources of fertiliser. Second, to supplement its 
domestic energy production, China purchased crude oil, 
especially from Iran.
This period is notable for the introduction of several new 
dimensions to Chinese involvement in the region. In the 
military sphere China collaborated with Egypt to exchange 
equipment needed to upgrade the partners' respective forces. 
Collaboration of this kind was comparatively inexpensive, 
both in political and financial terms. Also, the PRC for the 
first time acquired Israeli military expertise and 
technology. (More details are supplied in the next chapter.)
Apart from military cooperation, China also for the first 
time solicited Arab loans and investments, though the fruits 
of its efforts were not borne for a couple of years. In 
addition, China vigorously competed for, and for the first 
time won, engineering and construction contracts in the 
Middle East. Though relatively few in number, small in 
scale, and confined in geographic scope, these achievements
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too were significant in laying the groundwork for more 
extensive and lucrative deals in the future.
Activity in the Middle East during this period was a cut 
from the broader cloth of China's changing international 
relations. Expanding economic and military cooperation with 
Middle Eastern countries was part of a 'globalisation' of 
Chinese foreign policy which received its impetus and 
character chiefly from the commitment to modernisation.
Thus, the development of Sino--Middle Eastern economic and 
military ties was part of a new phenomenon rather than the 
phenomenon itself.
Furthermore, the period represents merely the exploratory 
phase of the 'open door'. Developing foreign economic and 
military relations received official approval as well as 
encouragement. Yet, in terms of foreign trade, investments 
and technology transfers, this was a period of prospects 
rather than accomplishments. Recognising that the commitment 
to modernisation did not produce China's instantaneous and 
complete integration into the world economy helps to place 
the limited scale of China's activities in the Middle East 
in more realistic perspective.
In order to enrich its prospects in the Middle East, China 
had to practice an astute diplomacy. This entailed facing 
two challenges: (1) how to capitalise on improved relations
with the United States without being held accountable for 
Washington's errors and mis judgments; and (2) how to adopt 
positions on the region's important political issues that 
would not enmesh China in the area's conflicts and 
rivalries.
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On the whole - and unlike in the past - China opted to 
react to, rather than actively to seek to shape, the 
contours of Middle East politics. This was a matter of 
choice not of indifference. The choice suggested a realistic 
appreciation of the possible harmful effects of applying 
pressure, not just an understanding of China's relative lack 
of influence in the region. The period is notable for what 
China did not say and did not do: a cultivated silence 
replaced potentially injurious criticism or denunciation; 
relations were pursued, undertaken and continued without 
political preconditions.
To the extent that China had a message to convey, it was 
pitched in unusually positive terms and cautious language: 
in a manner least likely to offend. In advocating, for 
example, Third World solidarity and the common struggle for 
economic development, China (rather successfully) sought to 
transcend particular regional problems in order not to 
become embroiled in them.
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Chapter VII
Developing influence and influencing development
1982— 1989
'"When elephants fight each other, grass suffers."'1
A. Towards an 'independent' foreign policy:
Beginning in 1982 Beijing proclaimed its commitment to an 
'independent' foreign policy. The rubric of 'independence' 
corresponded in policy terms chiefly to the restructuring of 
China's relations with the superpowers. This readjustment 
aimed at a reduction of tension with the Soviet Union and a 
distancing from the policies of the United States.2 The 
objective of modifying its posture towards the superpowers 
followed from recognition that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
posed comparable threats to China by endangering the 
stability of the international environment deemed essential 
to Chinese modernisation. Strategic neutrality aimed at the 
amelioration of regional tensions, the conservation of 
resources and the development of economic relations.3
Beijing pursued detente with the Soviet Union as a 
supplement to, rather than a substitute for, cooperation 
with the West and self-reliance. Substantive issues 
continued to divide the two countries.4 Meanwhile, China 
explored an improvement in, without immediately seek 
normalisation of, relations with the U.S.S.R. Whereas 
multiple channels of communication featuring active trade 
and institutionalised diplomatic contacts ended Sino--Soviet 
estrangement, they did not spawn a new era of Sino--Soviet
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alignment.5 On the contrary, some commentators viewed 
Beijing's maneuvering into detente with Moscow merely as a 
creative adaptation of the competitive containment of the 
1970s, designed in part to combat the residual signs of 
Soviet hostility.6
China's strategic confidence was lifted by several 
encouraging developments which, on balance, seemed to 
demonstrate the flagging vitality of Soviet expansionism. 
Disturbances in Poland in particular was portrayed in the 
Chinese official press as a sign that the cohesiveness of 
the Soviet empire was at best in flux.7 Growing evidence of 
Soviet economic stagnation, besides posing potential 
challenges to the basis of the Soviet system, introduced 
fresh constraints on Soviet foreign policy.8 The U.S.S.R.'s 
entanglement in Afghanistan, by draining resources and 
damaging prestige, was economically and politically costly.9 
Finally, the U.S. decision to proceed with the development 
of SDI initially promised to preoccupy and burden the Soviet 
Union.10 The perceived blunting of the Soviet strategic 
advance therefore prepared the ground for a less combative 
posture by China towards the U.S.S.R.
B. United Front on cooperative terms:
During this period, Beijing adjusted its Third World 
policy in a manner that complemented the changes in its 
posture towards the superpowers. Reidentification with the 
Third World served as a means of demonstrating independence; 
and pursuing independence functioned as a means of restoring 
China's credibility in the Third World.11
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China, in effect, rehabilitated the United Front, casting 
it in a cooperative rather than an antagonistic mold. The 
major elements of this approach were: (1) a revival of its
foreign assistance program; (2) the extension of new support 
to the U.N.; and (3) emphasis on nonalignment and South-- 
South cooperation.12
The stress on development was not accompanied by a 
deemphasis of politics. Rather, development goals were 
promoted and protected by the adoption of a revised set of 
tactics aimed at pursuing political objectives without 
incurring damage either to China's reputation or its 
existing relations. For example, just as its criticism of 
the superpowers was more even-handed and less vitriolic than 
in the past, China's attitude towards Third World 
'collaboration' with either superpower was seemingly more 
tolerant. To the extent that it discouraged alignment with 
either Moscow or Washington, China relied on a combination 
of persuasion and permissiveness to do so.
China exercised special care in choosing when to take a 
firm political stand and when to avoid one. Generally, 
Beijing adopted strong political positions on issues where 
there already existed a strong Third World consensus (e.g. 
apartheid). Conversely, Beijing skirted issues hotly 
contested within the Third World (e.g. disputes between 
Ethiopia and Somalia). China confined its support to 
movements and struggles which were more or less 'universally 
popular' in the Third World (e.g. the ANC and SWAPO).
Underlying China's policy towards the Third World in this
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period, and its policy towards the superpowers, were an 
important set of views: concerning the roots of conflict, 
the problems and opportunities of developing countries, and 
the content of China's potential contribution as a world 
power. For one thing, war was no longer portrayed as 
monocausal and inevitable. The future was projected as an 
outcome based on crucial choices, but those choices were not 
pitched sharply between capitalism and socialism. Huan Xiang 
captured this change in thinking in an article in Beiiing 
Review in November 1984, writing,
We must boldly, decisively choose between war 
and poverty on the one hand or peace and 
prosperity on the other.13
Thus, by 1984, peace and development were conceptualised 
as a whole. China's reidentification with the Third World 
emphasised the common pursuit of modernisation rather than 
the common struggle against hegemonism. In 1986, Deng 
Xiaoping defined China's world role in terms of its 
potential contribution to world peace; and predicated the 
fulfillment of that potential on China's degree of 
development.14
C. 'Independence' in the Middle East:
Policy towards the Middle East was an important point of 
divergence between Beijing and Washington: firm ground upon 
which to stake out an independent foreign policy. During 
this period Beijing abandoned its position of tolerance and 
quiet disapproval of America's Middle East policy, asserting 
publicly and forcefully that a 'strategic consensus' was
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unobtainable in the absence of Arab support and that Arab 
support was unobtainable in the presence of U.S. partiality 
towards Israel.15
In response to Secretary Haig's two early 1982 Middle East 
visits, Beijing emphasised that the change in Washington's 
Middle East policy nonetheless failed to qualify as a 
'positive Middle East policy' in the light of its ambiguous 
attitude towards the Palestinians.16 Dispassionately yet 
firmly, Beijing characterised the U.S. veto of a U.N. 
Security Council Resolution calling for the imposition of 
sanctions on Israel as 'erroneous policy.'17 As though to 
underline its disassociation from Washington by the 
intensity of its language, Beijing charged U.S. 'connivance' 
with Hitlerian 'gangster logic' in reaction to Israel's 1982 
invasion of Lebanon.18 Consistently, China maintained that 
the U.S.' militarisation of the Eastern Mediterranean and 
the Persian Gulf, besides inciting Israeli aggression and 
provoking hostility, expressed a 'desire to see the world 
plunge into chaos.'19 On the whole China opted during this 
period to ride the wave of moderate Arab disillusionment 
with Washington.20
The diminishing credibility and eroding influence of the 
U.S. in the Middle East during this period reinforced 
China's movement towards foreign policy independence. 
Meanwhile, the reactivation of Soviet Middle East diplomacy 
in an increasingly sophisticated form helped shape the 
character of China's role in the region. As early as 1982, 
Beijing noted Soviet diplomatic efforts to reenter the 
Middle East, predicated on a new round of regional
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instability deemed to have weakened the U.S. position among 
the Arabs.21 Two years later, Beijing remarked that Moscow 
was 'launching a diplomatic offensive to return to the 
Middle East,' counterbalancing its role as peace broker with 
a large-scale military investment in Syria and a resumption 
of arms supplies to Iraq.22
With the ascendancy of General Secretary Gorbachev, the 
Soviet Union exhibited a policy flexibility in the Middle 
East that included meetings with Israeli officials in 
Helsinki; the* promotion of PT,0 factional reconciliation 
indirectly via Algeria and through dialogue hosted by 
Moscow; expressions of interest in financing the UNIFIL 
interim force in South Lebanon; arms sales accords with, and 
an agreement to lease three Soviet ships to, Kuwait; 
diplomatic contacts with Oman and the UAE; upgraded contact 
and trade relations with Saudi Arabia; and efforts to 
resolve the issue of Egypt's military debt.23
There is no evidence that Beijing regarded Moscow's 
'success' in the Middle East as anything more than a 
rectification of its abnormal eclipse from the region in the 
late '70s. Still, China's activism towards the end of this 
period should nonetheless be viewed against the backdrop of 
heightened Soviet activity in the region. The Soviet Union 
was viewed, or at least publicly portrayed by Beijing as 
less of a danger, though no less a challenge, to China. The 
apparent reduction of the possibility of Sino--Soviet armed 
conflict left intact the prospect of continued Sino--Soviet 
rivalry.
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The thawing of relations between China and the Soviet 
Union tended to dilute the strategic importance of the 
Middle East to China. However, the region remained an area 
of Sino--Soviet competition: for markets as well as for 
political influence.
(i) Relations with Egypt:
In December 1982 Zhao Ziyang became the first Chinese 
Premier to visit Cairo in nineteen years.24 Like his 
predecessor, Zhao sought to solidify Sino--Egyptian 
relations in order to enhance China's position, not only in 
the Middle East, but throughout the Third World. Following 
the collapse of Sino--Soviet entente Chou En-lai in 1963 had 
sought to rehabilitate China's image as an independent 
actor, depending on Egypt to serve, among other things, as a 
bridgehead to Africa. Similarly, Zhao, nearly two decades 
later, used Cairo as the jumping-off point for an eleven- 
nation tour of Africa which aimed at restoring China's 
standing within the Nonaligned Movement following several 
years of Sino— American alignment.25 Thus, with the March 
1983 New Delhi conference of nonaligned nations looming on 
the horizon, Zhao's visit to Egypt launched a broad Chinese 
campaign to regain the confidence of the Third World.26
At the time of Zhao's visit, Beijing's wish to 
rehabilitate its image was reciprocated by Cairo, which 
likewise sought to revitalise its prestige among developing 
countries generally and especially in the Arab World. Two 
developments converged to boost Egypt's importance and 
potential usefulness to China: (1) Egypt's gradual
270
reintegration into the Arab world; and (2) Egypt's 
increasingly fluid maneuvering between the superpowers. As 
early as 1982 Jordan and Sudan exhibited signs of a thawing 
with Cairo.27 Iraq reportedly received $400 million in 
Egyptian weapons, leaving Syria, along with Libya, the 
strongest opponents of Egypt's reincorporation.28 By late 
1983, Jordan had ended its trade boycott of Egypt; and PLO 
Chairman Arafat, fresh from defeat in Lebanon, had mended 
fences with Egypt.29 China's relations with Cairo responded 
in part to this dynamic.
Cairo's growing rapprochement with Moscow paralleled its 
increasing difficulties with Washington, rekindling Soviet-- 
American competition for Egypt. The 1983 Soviet--Egyptian 
scientific and cultural agreement, together with Cairo's 
acceptance in principle of the reinstatement of the Soviet 
Ambassador in Egypt (absent since 1981), signalled a warming 
trend between the two countries.30 Egypt's inability to 
obtain satisfactory levels of U.S. military assistance 
reinforced the political incentives to diversify its 
sources.31 Strained Egyptian--American relations formed the 
context of Egypt's turn to the U.S.S.R. for military spare 
parts in 1985; the linkage between the two developments was 
noted in Beijing.32 China's late 1984 forecast of a new 
round of Soviet--American wrestling in the Middle East 
responded to the U.S.' lifting its suspension of arms to the 
region following Moscow's overtures to Cairo. Operating in 
the environment of intensified Soviet--American competition 
for Egypt, China reportedly sold between $500 and $700
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million in arms to Egypt in the first seven and one-half 
years of the '80s.33
Even as Egypt continued to develop its indigenous military 
capability, it depended greatly on arms transfers from 
abroad. While the U.S. remained Cairo's chief foreign 
supplier, the Mubarak government maintained its commitment 
to diversify its sources. China, building on previous 
cooperative ventures in the military sphere, remained 
actively involved with Egypt.34 The new twist in Sino-- 
Egyptian military cooperation involved Egyptian purchases of 
Chinese weapons which were then transferred to Iraq, 
reported to have included 100 F-7s (People's Republic of 
China version of the MiG-21) and 260 tanks (similar to the 
T-54) .35 Activities of this kind helped Egypt to consolidate 
its relations with Iraq, accelerating the Arab--Egyptian 
thaw. More directly beneficial to China, the weapons sales 
earned vital foreign exchange; moreover, by contributing to 
the stalemate in the Gulf war, the transactions supported 
China's economic investment in Iraq without flagrantly 
violating its proclaimed neutrality.
Budding Sino--Egyptian military cooperation had an 
additional spinoff in the 1980s. NORINCO (China's state 
defense manufacturers) used the Cairo International Defense 
Equipment Exhibition to market its hardware. In November 
1987, for instance, China introduced its copy of the Soviet 
AGS-17 Planya 30mm grenade launcher as well as an 
indigenously designed 35mm weapon (type W87).36
Another fruitful aspect of Sino--Egyptian relations in 
this period was the development of economic ties, to which
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Zhao pledged China in an exclusive interview with MENA in 
December 1982.37 In 1984, the CCEC won its first 
construction contract in Egypt, initially contracting to 
build 1,000 flats in Egypt's 'October 6 City,' 17km. from 
Cairo.38 Only two months later the CCEC landed yet another 
building contract, this one for a 6,000-unit complex in 
Alexandria Province valued at 39 million Egyptian pounds. In 
October 1985, China contracted to build 9,000 additional 
housing units, bringing the total value of its building 
activity in Egypt in the two-year period to 200 million 
Egyptian pounds.39
A fascinating example of Sino--Egyptian economic 
collaboration - and illustrative of China's broader program 
of South--South cooperation - was a study of, and 
recommendation on, the use of Egyptian kaolin. The study 
concluded that Egyptian kaolin, if mixed with high-grade 
Chinese kaolin, could be used to produce high voltage 
transmission lines.40 [Eventually, this might lead to Sino-- 
Egyptian cooperation in electrification projects, thereby 
contributing to the partners' development.]
Sino--Egyptian relations in this period consisted of an 
array of activities. In quantitative terms, Chinese 
involvement in Egypt was not comparable either to that of 
the Soviet Union in the past, or to that of the U.S. Yet, 
viewed strictly in relation to the history of Beijing's 
relationship with Cairo, cooperation between the two 
countries - in scale and in kind - was both impressive and 
promising.
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(ii) Relations with Jordan:
China after 1982 continued to encourage a moderate and 
unified Arab position, independent of superpower 
manipulation. Beijing gently pushed for Egypt's gradual 
reintegration into the moderate Arab camp. While Cairo 
remained on the periphery of Arab politics, however, China 
found King Hussein's active diplomacy much to its liking. 
Beijing lauded Jordan's monarch for working to restore and 
strengthen Arab unity while at the same time resisting and 
preventing superpower control of the Middle East.41 Until 
Cairo's reconciliation with Arafat, moreover, Jordan served 
as an important PLO--Chinese meeting place; King Hussein 
hosted a three-way discussion that involved PLO Chairman 
Arafat and Chinese President Li Xiannian in March 1984.42
It is important to note that the warming of Sino-- 
Jordanian relations took place against the backdrop of 
strained relations between Amman and Washington, and 
successful probing by Moscow. The rupture between Amman and 
Washington widened over the subject of weapons sales. In 
March 1984, the Reagan Administration, under U.S. 
Congressional resistance, retracted its offer to sell 
Stinger missiles to Jordan. The unacceptability of U.S. 
conditions on Stinger purchases impelled Jordan to search 
for other sources, resulting, for example, in an agreement 
to buy Soviet air defense equipment.43 The situation further 
deteriorated when some $1.55--1.9 billion in military sales 
was deferred pending meaningful Jordanian--Israeli peace 
talks, and later postponed indefinitely.44 In a rare 
interview with journalists, Jordanian General Zaid ben
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Shaker explicitly declared his country's disappointment over 
U.S. sales to Iran which included Hawk missiles.45 The U.S.- 
-Iranian transaction was particularly disturbing because, 
although Jordan too had been offered Hawk missiles, the 
offer had been tied to unacceptable conditions. Thus, an 
American adversary appeared to have received better 
treatment than an American ally.
Against the background of Jordan's disenchantment with 
Washington and cordiality towards Moscow, China vigorously 
pursued economic, not merely political ties, with Amman. As 
with Egypt, China's construction work anchored its economic 
involvement in Jordan. In 1986, the Jordanian government 
celebrated China's five years' construction work in the 
country on the occasion of the completion of the Tafeilleh 
Polytechnical Institute.46
Certainly the most controversial aspect of China's 
economic cooperation with Jordan was the two countries' 
alleged collaboration in nuclear power plant construction, 
including an installation at Daya Bay, thought to be worth 
$7 billion.47 Jordan's United Trading Company (UTC) was said 
to have contracted with China to participate in the 
construction of such a facility.48 The reluctance of Western 
governments - France and Great Britain in particular - to 
release sensitive technologies is thought to have provided 
the impetus for Sino--Jordanian cooperation.49 Purely 
business considerations (i.e. questions of price and quality 
of technology) no doubt figured prominently in cementing 
this deal. However, it is important to note that, in this,
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as in other instances, Sino--Middle Eastern ties originated 
in the context of other external actors' failure or 
unwillingness to meet demands or fulfil expectations.
Jordan's UTC, the firm involved in the purported Daya Bay
plan, contracted in 1985 with the Fuzhou Electric Power and
Xiamen Electric Power Bureaus for two power generation 
projects in Fujian Province, estimated to be worth $89.5 
million.50 Jordan's satisfaction with such developments, and 
an indication of its appreciation of the advantages of an
enhanced Chinese role in the region, was reflected in
Amman's sponsorship of the 'Sino--Arab dialogue.' During 
these discussions, Prince Ibn Talal stressed the potential 
of combining Arab capital and Chinese labor as the first 
step in broadening economic cooperation between China and 
the Arab world.51
(iii) Relations with Israel:
Were the Palestinian issue to have been resolved to the 
general satisfaction of the Arabs, China would have been 
able to exploit, if not a more vigorous economic and 
military relationship with Israel, then at least one 
involving fewer precautions and less potential 
embarrassment. While China went so far as to endorse the 
existence of Israel,52 the PRC stopped short of establishing 
diplomatic relations. Yet, Moscow's revitalisation of its 
Middle East diplomacy, which included strong hints at links
C  *5
with Israel, exerted competing pressure on Beijing to 
reconsider its policy towards Tel Aviv. China overcame this 
dilemma by proceeding circumspectly and indirectly. Chinese
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officials are believed to have relied on Rumania as an 
intermediary to arrange a meeting with Prime Minister Shimon 
Peres in 1 985.54 When Chinese and Israeli officials met 
directly, Beijing opted for the U.N., where its position on 
the Security Council provided an acceptable cover for its 
discussions.55
During this period, the Soviet Union was pursuing similar 
'quiet' contacts with Israel. It is interesting to note that 
Soviet--Israeli and Chinese--Israeli relations followed a 
similar course. As the decade progressed, both the level at, 
and frequency with which, official contacts took place 
between Israel and the two socialist rivals rose. In 1987 
Prime Minister Shamir, for example, was reported to have met 
with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at the U.N.56 This 
meeting occurred barely one year after China's Permanent 
U.N. Representative Li Luye was believed to have held 
discussions with Israeli Foreign Ministry Director General 
Abe Tamir, also using the U.N. as a venue.57 In 1987 the 
Soviet Union opened a consular mission in Israel; and in 
July of the following year, Israel dispatched a six-member 
consular mission to Moscow - the first in twenty-one 
years.58 No such steps, however, were taken by Israel and 
China.
These developments raise at least two interesting 
questions. First, to what extent were improvements in Sino-- 
Israeli and Sino--Soviet relations on the political front a 
function of the competitive relationship between China and 
the U.S.S.R.? Second, what significance, if any, is there to 
the fact that Soviet--Israeli political relations appear to
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have outpaced Sino--Israeli political ties?
In the first instance, it is useful to note that, for 
Moscow, improved political relations with Israel reflects 
primarily its competition with the U.S. in the Middle East, 
and to a much lesser extent its interest in competing with 
China for influence in the region. Relations with the U.S. 
continue to occupy an important place on China's foreign 
policy agenda as well. One could speculate that improved 
political ties with Israel are a means of 'servicing' Sino-- 
American relations. Furthermore, although the subsidence of 
the Soviet strategic threat might have removed one incentive 
for China to seek to undercut or outplay the U.S.R.R. in the 
region, China's interest in competing successfully for 
political influence in the Middle East is a compelling one. 
Improved political ties with Israel might therefore be 
driven by the urge to keep up with Moscow.
The pace which China has chosen to develop its political 
relationship with Israel is hardly surprising. For nearly a 
decade the hallmark of China's political posture towards the 
region has been caution. Viewed in this light, the Sino-- 
Israeli political relationship has not 'lagged behind' that 
of the Soviet Union and Israel. Rather, Beijing has conceded 
the initiative and the notoriety to Moscow while retaining 
the option of following that course or avoiding it, as the 
political circumstances so dictate.
Israel's primary appeal was its potential contribution to 
China's economic and military modernisation. Israel 
possesses the dual advantages of access to U.S. military
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technology and indigenous capability. Israel has 
specialised in retrofits and upgrades, depending in part on 
Soviet weaponry captured in its 1973 and 1982--85 wars.59 
There is, then, a special compatibility between Israeli 
capabilities and Chinese needs that has formed the natural 
springboard to their collaboration.
The People's Republic of China reportedly succeeded in 
acquiring into Israel's weapons and military technology as 
early as 1976.60 In 1979 Israel is reported to have agreed 
to a deal to mount 105mm cannons onto Chinese T-69 tanks and 
to help the People's Republic of China build a Chinese 
version of the Gabriel sea-to-sea missile.61 In a separate 
development, IMI (Israeli Military Industries), the cannon's 
manufacturer, is believed to have supplied the People's 
Republic of China with a 60mm hyper-velocity gun suitable 
for mounting on armored vehicles or towing.62 From 1981, 
Israel military advisers, previously dispatched in groups of 
24 for 1--2 month shifts were said to number close to 200, 
sent for 3--6 month assignments.63
In 1982 delegates from the Israel electronics firm Tadiran 
went to the People's Republic of China to offer advanced 
electronics equipment for tanks.64 Following an alleged 1984 
defense agreement valued at $1.36 million65 the Israeli 
Defense Ministry Director General travelled to Beijing, 
reportedly to move discussions forward on the sale of 
military hardware believed to include 52 Kfir combat 
aircraft.66 Revealing the concerns and priorities which led 
China to seek Israel's military cooperation, Beijing in the 
same year reportedly contracted for the multibillion dollar
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Israeli installation of an electronic early warning system 
on the Sino--Soviet border.67 If not the most important 
military pact signed by the two countries, certainly the 
most sensational when it was revealed in November 1987, was 
Israel's reported deal with the People's Republic to supply 
the Chinese armed forces with new missile warheads and 
armor-piercing devices.68
Israel's willingness to cooperate in China's military 
modernisation has been fueled by political and economic 
interests. Naturally, Israel hopes that its contribution to 
Chinese military modernisation will be sufficiently 
appreciated to yield political benefits in the form of 
official diplomatic ties; a possible reduction of material 
assistance to the PLO; and a moderate and accommodating 
Chinese voice in the United Nations Security Council. 
Domestically, Israel has had to compensate for the collapse 
of the Lavi jet fighter program. Sending Lavi technicians 
(though not necessarily Lavi technologies) to China 
partially offsets the financial losses and political damage 
associated with the project's cancellation.69
Additional evidence suggests a correlation between 
enhanced Sino--Israeli military cooperation and the downturn 
of Israel's business with South Africa.70 Israel Aircraft 
Industries' loss of a $200 million contract to upgrade 
Spain's Mirage III fighters provided yet another incentive 
for Israel to pursue alternative customers, such as China.71
Sino--Israeli military cooperation is one of those 
relationships that everyone is aware of and no one can
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prove: cloaked in uncertainties and intrigue; briefly
illuminated by sensational revelations that often conceal 
more than they expose. Ironically, Sino--Israeli military 
business has remained shrouded in the same secrecy as 
China's provision of arms to the PLO, with rumor and denial 
their common predictable element. To preserve the relative 
secrecy of their association, the Israelis and Chinese have 
adopted a variety of clandestine games. Israelis have 
travelled to China by circuitous routes that resemble the 
course Chinese weapons have travelled to the Middle East: 
passing first through 'friendly' countries; carrying 
American or false passports; engaging in discussions in Hong 
Kong to minimise visibility.72 Just as China has sought to 
conduct its business covertly for fear of irritating the 
Arabs, so Israel has favored secrecy, not only in deference 
to Beijing but also to avoid antagonising Washington.
Sino--Israeli trade, slightly less sensitive than military 
cooperation between the two countries, but until recently 
conducted under a similar veil of secrecy, has gradually 
increased. China's agricultural modernisation plans have 
attracted it to Israel, whose expertise is widely acclaimed 
in the fields of arid-zone development, irrigation systems, 
seed and breed cultivation, and pest control.73 In 1986 
China was reported to have purchased six Merkav tractor 
prototypes worth $900,000.74 In September of the same year, 
a visiting Chinese agricultural delegation was believed to 
have signed a $500,000 contract for irrigation and 
fertilisation.75 By Spring 1988, nearly 100 joint ventures 
were thought to be under discussion, in areas ranging from
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agriculture to textiles to chemicals.76 In turn, Israel has 
negotiated to purchase Chinese steam coal.77
Typically, Israeli exports have been purchased by foreign 
companies and resold to China without clear Israeli 
markings.78 Israeli businessmen have frequently entered the 
People's Republic of China on other passports, as part of 
non-commercial delegations. In 1986 Agriculture Minister 
Aryeh Nechemkin was rumored to have travelled to Beijing, 
but the visit was vehemently denied.79 Yet signs of a more 
relaxed atmosphere have been evident in recent years. In 
Spring 1986 nine Israeli businessmen entered the People's 
Republic of China using Israeli passports.80 Six months 
later, Chinese officials announced that Israeli experts 
would be permitted to attend international conferences held 
in China.81 Direct telephone links, set up in 1986, have 
facilitated contacts.82 Trade links moved even further out 
of the shadows with a visit to Tel Aviv by a Chinese 
delegation in late 1988.83
The Chinese missile trade in the Gulf did not appear to 
have damaged Sino--Israeli relations. To the extent that it 
disapproved of Beijing's practices, Isreal refrained from 
publicly saying so; and redirected its worries and warnings 
elsewhere. For example, in response to China's sale of East 
Wind missiles to Saudi Arabia, Israeli officials suggested 
that a pre-emptive attack should not be ruled out if the 
missiles were deployed. Tel Aviv also used the sale as an 
occasion to intensify its lobbying efforts in the United 
States in order to obtain funding (i.e. a U.S. contribution
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of 80% of the cost) for production of Israel's Arrow anti- 
tactical ballistic missile.84
(iv) China, Palestine, and the PLO;
As previously argued, Chinese support for the Palestinian 
movement sprang from several considerations: (1) the avowed
wish to defend the Palestinian struggle as a matter of 
commitment to the cause of national liberation, though not 
at the cost of tarnishing China's improving image as a 
'responsible' state; (2) the interest in competing with, and 
undercutting whenever possible, the Soviet Union; and (3) 
the desire to demonstrate solidarity, and thereby 
consolidate relations, with Arab governments.
Before 1982 China had consistently argued that Arab-- 
Israeli reconciliation depended on a resolution of the 
Palestinian problem, and that the participation of the PLO 
was indispensable to its accomplishment. Whereas it chose to 
emphasise the Palestinian issue as a common Arab bond, China 
had long been aware of the fissiparous tendencies of both 
Arab intergovernmental politics and the PLO; and had long 
recognised its own fundamental powerlessness to correct 
those tendencies. A disproportionate amount of the rhetoric 
China had expended on behalf of the Palestinians over the 
years exhorted the various factions of the PLO to close 
ranks and the various Arab governments to line up solidly 
behind a unified PLO.
Prior to this period, the PLO, with Arafat frequently 
besieged at its fractious center, had existed in a complex 
regional and international setting, and had to a large
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degree been subject to its vicissitudes. Other than 
superficially, these systemic constraints did not change 
after 1982, nor did China's limited capacities to insulate 
or liberate the PLO from them. From 1982 onwards, China's 
support of the PLO - which remained part opportunity and 
part dilemma - was essentially reactive: to the spasms of 
violence and the gestures towards peace which alternately 
characterised the period.
The bloody clashes, which erupted in 1982 and resulted in 
the eviction of the PLO from Beirut, were an extension of 
the 1975--76 Lebanese civil war, and a direct result of the 
1982 Israeli invasion. Thus, the events of 1982--83 were 
part of an ongoing and bloody confrontation in which the PLO 
was one of four competing actors, each struggling to assert 
its purposes from, or extend dominion over, a disintegrating 
Lebanese state. It is not surprising, therefore, that as the 
PLO became more deeply enmeshed in the struggle for Lebanon, 
China refrained from becoming further entangled with the 
PLO.
China reacted cautiously to the 1982 strife in Lebanon. In 
response to the June Israeli invasion, the Chinese 
government, as expected, issued a firm condemnation.
Chairman Arafat's discussions with the Chinese ambassador to 
Tunis in July, while perhaps eliciting private assurances of 
continued support, produced a sympathetic but token response 
by China that manifested itself publicly in two ways. First, 
China made two commitments of relief aid to the PLO, 
announced several weeks apart, channelled through the 
Palestinian Red Cross and the UNRWA.85 Second, on the
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political front, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang met with 
Pakistan's President Zia in an apparent, but not discernibly 
successful, effort to open an 'Islamic channel of 
communications' through which to express concern and exert 
leverage.
When the PLO evacuation did in fact occur, a Renmin Ribao 
editorial (27 August) saluted the PLO for having 
courageously withstood a 'severe test.' More revealing, the 
editorial asserted that 'the international community should 
seek to bring about a comprehensive, just and durable 
solution.'86 The wording of this article, rather more 
explicitly and firmly than before, expressed China's 
evolving preference for an international effort to address 
the Palestinian issue. Characteristically, however, the 
editorial refrained from recommending an appropriate forum.
For the most part, then, China waited passively on the 
sidelines while the violence in Lebanon ran its course. The 
twin principles of 'unity' and 'self-reliance' that had 
traditionally guided China's assistance to national 
liberation movements, continued to exempt China, in 
theoretical terms, from an obligation to provide any more 
for the PLO than the PLO was willing and able to provide for 
itself. In practical terms, the meek Arab response to the 
Israeli invasion, coupled with relative Soviet passivity and 
American ambivalence towards it, enabled China to escape 
criticism.
In contrast, some PLO officials did publicly complain 
about Soviet inaction, carrying their dissatisfaction to the
285
floor of the sixteenth session of the PNC at Algiers, where 
they raised the question of the nature and advantages of 
PLO--Soviet relations in open debate.87 It is possible that 
the inaction of the PRC received less attention than that of 
the Soviet Union simply because less was expected of China. 
Yet, if true, this merely points out that possessing, or 
being thought to possess, inferior capabilities entails 
lower risk of embarrassment for having failed to use them.
One of the confrontational axes in the Lebanese situation 
(1975--onwards) pitted Syria against PLO Chairman Arafat. 
Syrian President Assad clashed with Arafat on a number of 
strategic and tactical matters. The Palestinian role in 
Lebanon, and the nature of Palestinian activities within 
Lebanon, formed an important basis for intermittent verbal 
battles between the two leaders, ultimately leading to armed 
clashes between their forces.
Moscow - which favored both Arafat and Assad - was 
occasionally placed in the unenviable position of trying, 
unsuccessfully, to curb this internecine feuding; or 
otherwise seeking to avoid being asked to do so. China, on 
the other hand, neither actively engaged in trying to 
reconcile the two parties, nor was expected to. When, in 
1983, Arafat's followers were besieged in Tripoli, Beijing 
exploited Moscow's apparent inaction by delivering arms to 
Arafat in two shipments, in August and again in October. 
Although their exact value and contents were never 
disclosed, both the International Herald Tribune and Le 
Monde reported that the arms packages 'almost certainly' 
included light as well as medium artillery, guns, mortars
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and grenades. 88
China's response to the violence involving the PLO in 
1982--83 caused no apparent injury to its relations with the 
PLO itself, with Arab governments, or with the United 
States; and did no visible damage either to its reputation 
generally, or to its competition with the Soviet Union. 
Immediately following the PLO evacuation from West Beirut in 
August 1982, however, a new set of challenges arose with 
respect to China's support of the Palestinians. Exploiting 
the PLO's departure, the Reagan Administration launched a 
peace plan, partly as an antidote to Israel's creeping 
annexation of the West Bank and Gaza.
The Reagan Plan did not expressly rule out the possible 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Instead, 
it linked the Palestinian 'entity' with Jordan, thereby 
squeezing out the PLO. The plan also did not call for a 
complete Israeli roll-back to its pre-1967 frontiers.
What was China's response? On the surface, the Reagan Plan 
clashed with China's insistence on direct PLO representation 
in negotiations as well as with its preference for an 
indigenously-sponsored peace effort. Nevertheless, China 
refrained from officially condemning the plan, while the 
Beijing press merely criticised it as exhibiting 'a lack of 
a sense of reality.'89 China's comparatively soft line on 
the Reagan Plan was probably dictated by the following 
considerations. First, in the interest of preserving good 
relations with the U.S. - which remained a strategic pillar 
of China's 'independent' foreign policy - Beijing hesitated
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to launch a vituperative attack on the American proposal. 
Second, the Reagan Plan not only contemplated the direct 
involvement of Jordan but also appeared to enjoy the 
blessing of Egypt, two Arab countries with which China had 
striven to develop close ties. Third, Israel rejected the 
plan within twenty-four hours. That rejection, in 
conjunction with the formula's implicit exclusion of the 
Soviet Union and Syria, doomed the Reagan Plan to failure.
To the extent that it opposed the plan, China could rely on 
the collapse of the initiative without itself having to do 
much to obstruct it. Finally, the PLO itself did not 
categorically denounce the plan (perhaps in order to appear 
comparatively moderate in the light of Israel's rejection). 
Thus, China was spared any uncomfortable choices.
In contrast, China endorsed the (second) Fez Plan, though 
not enthusiastically. Premier Zhao, for example, politely 
complimented the Saudi effort as a 'solid foundation' upon 
which to build. In his 4 October 1982 address to the U.N. 
General Assembly, Foreign Minister Huang Hua called the 
Saudi plan a 'good basis' for a settlement of the 
Palestinian problem.90 To China, the proposal warranted a 
degree of support as much because of who sponsored it as 
because of its contents. The Fez proposal had the merit of 
being an 'Arab' plan, sponsored by a regime with which China 
was seeking an improvement in bilateral relations. Second, 
in contradistinction to the Reagan Plan, the Fez proposal 
reserved a role for the PLO in future negotiations.
Unlike either the Reagan or Saudi intitiatives, the 
Brezhnev Plan drew neither gentle support nor gentle
reproof. Indeed, there was no official reaction whatsoever 
to the Brezhnev Plan. Moreover, the Beijing press failed to 
report that the Soviet Union had in fact introduced a peace 
proposal. Ignoring the Soviet initiative reflected the 
gradual thawing of Sino--Soviet relations as well as China's 
concern not to appear in any way hostile to the call for 
peace.
Consistently, China followed the practice of: reacting 
approvingly, if unexcitedly, to announcements or expressions 
of PLO--Arab government coordination; admonishing the U.S. 
for its inattention to the Palestinian question, or gently 
yet reprovingly commenting on the shortcomings of the U.S. 
approach towards peace; ignoring rather than attacking 
Soviet peace initiatives. Especially during periods in which 
it has detected a flurry of Soviet activity in the Middle 
East, China has more vigorously lent its weight and prestige 
to the PLO, and to Arafat in particular. This was the case, 
for example, in 1984 when, prior to the convening of a full 
PNC conference at Algiers (aimed at PLO reconciliation), the 
Chinese invited Arafat to Beijing and offered their full 
endorsement, including the promise of additional arms.91 
Meanwhile the U.S.S.R. had withheld such support. Soviet and 
East European delegates, for example, uncharacteristically 
did not attend the conference.
Some months later, Arafat - who had already visited Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq and North Yemen - launched an effort to convene 
an international conference under U.N. auspices during a 
trip to Beijing as part of a joint Palestinian--Jordanian
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delegation. Although there is no evidence that China 
instigated the effort, there was every incentive for China 
to welcome it (including the Soviet Union's opposition).92
The pattern of Chinese receptiveness to Arafat's attempts 
to obtain a political solution to the Arab--Israeli conflict 
has been rather consistent. Especially now that the Soviet 
threat has appeared to China to have taken a less virulent 
form, there is little incentive for China to seek to 
obstruct his efforts, even if there might be cause to 
question the prudence of his tactics. The PRC has remained 
duly attentive to, and sympathetic towards, the intifada. 
Seemingly without hesitiation - even if without much fanfare 
- Beijing extended recognition to the newly proclaimed state 
of Palestine in Fall 1988.93
(y L Relations with Kuwait;
Prior to 1982 Kuwait drew Beijing's attention by 
exercising its financial power within the context of OPEC 
and beyond it. Kuwait's financial leveraging served as a 
model of Third World resource power - the cornerstone of 
China's foreign policy in the '80s - and provided a stimulus 
to Chinese modernisation. In more practical terms Kuwaiti 
loans and investments were channelled to beneficiaries of 
geopolitical and strategic value to China. Additionally, 
Kuwait furnished China directly with oil and chemical 
fertiliser. Thus, in both symbolic and concrete terms,
Kuwait had no small appeal to Beijing.
From 1982 Kuwait's importance to China, if anything, grew, 
as Beijing succeeded in attracting Kuwaiti petrodollars to
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the mainland, on numerous occasions and in significant 
amounts. The primary vehicle for loans and investments to 
China was the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, 
which on two occasions in 1982 transferred substantial sums 
of money to assist China. The Fund's first loan to the 
People's Republic of China, in the amount of $50 million, 
was earmarked for the building of the Ningguo cement plant 
in Annhui Province.94 In November 1982 the Fund extended a 
loan of $35 million at generous terms for the construction 
of a wood products plant in Hunan Province.95 In total, in 
the period 1982--83 alone, Kuwait extended over $150 million 
in loans to the People's Republic of China.96
By late 1984 Kuwait was set to launch a second wave of 
loans. Highlighted by a $30 million low interest loan for 
the construction of the Shaxikou hydroelectric power station 
in Fujian, the Kuwait Fund also helped to finance 
construction of a small auto factory in Tianjin, a silk 
factory in Beijing, a glazed brick factory in Shandong, and 
a fibreboard factory in Fujian.97
As the number of projects partially funded by Kuwait 
increased, so did the breadth of Sino--Kuwaiti economic 
relations generally expand. Already by 1984, Kuwaiti 
interest in China spread outside the Fund to Kuwaiti 
industrialists. In December 1984, spurred by the visit of 
China's Sun Fang, Chairman of the Council for the Promotion 
of International Trade, the People's Republic of China 
signed letters of intent with Kuwait's A1 Raes International 
Investment Corporation to undertake projects in China.98 
Almost immediately, a joint company involving Kuwait, China,
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and Tunisia was formed to establish a chemical fertiliser 
production facility at Qinhuangdo." Little more than one 
year later, Kuwait and China signed an investment protection 
agreement presumably aimed at facilitating joint ventures.100 
In 1985 alone Kuwaiti investments in 14 separate projects in 
China topped $300 million.101 In 1988 KFAED funded at least 
two significant development projects: supplying $10.56 
million in loans (39% financing) for construction of the 
Ginan-Yao Shian Airport; and $18.27 million for phase one of
the Jinzhou harbor project (aimed at meeting demand,
• . • • 1 0 ?  especially for oil products, m  Liaoning Province).
China in 1987 announced that its decision not to increase 
oil exports that year was made in support of Kuwait's 
position in OPEC.103 In addition to sending a signal of 
commercial goodwill, this measure built upon growing Sino-- 
Kuwaiti cooperation in the field of oil development. Two 
years prior to this show of solidarity, a visit to China by 
Kuwaiti Minister of Oil and Finance (and also Kuwait Fund 
Chairman), Shaikh Al-Khalifah al-Sabah laid the foundation 
for Sino--Kuwaiti cooperation in the petroleum sector, 
opening the possibility of future joint ventures in energy 
resource development.104 One of the areas under discussion 
was joint exploitation of petroleum and natural resources on 
Hainan Island.105 The following year, the Kuwait Foreign 
Petroleum Exploration Company (KUFPEC) - a subsidiary of the 
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) - entered a joint venture 
with Atlantic Richfield to develop the Yaching B--1 gas 
field nearby Hainan island.106 Thus, China's deferential
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step in Kuwaiti's direction in 1987 sacrificed short-term 
oil export earnings at declining world prices - a stronger 
symbolic than material commitment - to preserve the longer- 
term prospect of energy development cooperation with Kuwait.
Considering the downward pressure on oil prices, the 
staying power of Kuwait's financial activities in the 
People's Republic of China was nothing less than remarkable. 
Kuwaiti investment in China forged ahead in 1987--88, 
highlighted by the funding of a polypropylene project in 
Luyoyang, Hunan Province107 and a decision to cooperate on 
the production of chemicals.108 Meanwhile, Sino--Kuwaiti 
economic relations were not limited to drawing on Kuwaiti 
financial power or eliciting oil development cooperation.
As early as 1985 eight Chinese companies involving 44 
labor service contracts placed no fewer than 10,000 Chinese 
workers in Kuwait.109 Labor service contracts in Kuwait were 
part of a more general effort to generate foreign exchange. 
Between 1979--1986, the People's Republic of China signed 
423 such contracts involving 60,000 workers who together 
raised $530 million in foreign exchange.110
In 1986, a scientific cooperation agreement was signed 
aimed at joint efforts to control desertification and 
develop agriculture.111 Meanwhile, trade between the two 
countries continued to flourish, somewhat surprisingly, 
given the small scale of the Kuwaiti market, whatever the 
marketability of Chinese products and however high the price 
of oil. In 1983 Sino--Kuwaiti bilateral trade amounted to 
$160 million.112 Two years later, the value of that trade 
dipped to $100 million,113 a still not unsubstantial figure.
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Perhaps more illustrative of Beijing's future commitments to 
expand exports not only in Kuwait but throughout the Gulf 
was the 1985 arrival in Kuwait of China's first full 
container transport which inaugurated the PRC's direct 
shipping link to the Gulf.114
China's economic relationship with Kuwait appeared to have 
developed impressively, especially considering its setting: 
regional hostility, big power competition, depressed oil 
prices, superimposed on the invariable problem of distance. 
Yet, Kuwait's willing association with China did not imply 
an intimate political or strategic partnership. For Kuwait, 
cooperation with China occurred in the context of the 
Iranian threat, of less than ideal relations with the U.S., 
and of an overall policy decision to diversify its financial 
portfolio and political contacts.
In 1984, illustrative of its international course and 
following a rebuff by the U.S.,115 Kuwait purchased an 
estimated $327 million in arms from the U.S.S.R. and for the 
first time admitted Soviet technicians to assemble and 
operate equipment as well as to furnish training 
assistance.116 The feasibility of further investment in 
China was studied concurrently with the practicability of 
funding Soviet projects.117 Though Kuwait was by no means 
slipping into Moscow's pocket nor had it ever been in 
Washington's, it did not appear to be in Beijing's either.
-LYi)_Rala.tiQHs.-gltk_Iraq.;.
Unlike neighboring Kuwait, Iraq had been formally aligned 
with the Soviet Union, though the strength of the two
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countries' commitment to each other was never beyond 
question. In 1982, following a two-year suspension, Moscow 
resumed arms supplies to Iraq.118 The U.S., for its part, 
moved to heal a seventeen-year breach in its relations with 
Baghdad by removing Iraq from its blacklist of supporters of 
international terrorism, endorsing the sale of civilian 
aircraft and providing loans.119 By 1984 Washington had 
taken the decision to restore diplomatic relations with 
Baghdad.120 The superpowers shared a preference for a 
stalemate rather than a decisive victory by either 
belligerent in the Gulf war. Beijing sought to profit from 
the stalemate without being responsible for maintaining it.
At least one aspect of China's relations with Iraq 
paralleled its activities in Kuwait; notably, the business 
of labor contracts. In the period 1979--1986, nearly 20,000 
Chinese laborers were assigned to 143 projects in Iraq. 
Unlike in the past, these laborers worked on Chinese 
projects rather than for international contractors.121 
Between 1985 and 1987, China launched 23 such projects, each 
with investments in excess of $10 million and three with 
investments surpassing $100 million.122
Chinese workers remitted substantial sums in foreign 
exchange; moreover, their performance built a reputation 
from which China could bid with confidence both inside and 
outside Iraq. Second, Chinese overseas workers demonstrated 
China's attention to bilateral friendship and South--South 
cooperation.123 Third, Chinese workers abroad were well- 
positioned to learn from indigenous and third parties.
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Finally, Chinese labor-service contracts promised to spur 
the export of Chinese building materials and machinery.
From late 1981, China's construction business in Iraq was 
no longer confined to the provision of cheap, efficient 
labor. Between that time and early 1984, the People's 
Republic of China won 84 construction contracts, generating 
more than $316 million, the most impressive of which was the 
Jifinor irrigation project, itself alone valued at $170 
million.124 In May 1984, the People's Republic of China 
contracted for its largest irrigation project in the Gulf, 
the $174 million Kifil Shinafiya scheme, which aimed at 
bringing large areas in three provinces (i.e., Najat, 
Qadissiya, and Babylon) into productive farming.125 Thus, at 
the half-way point of the decade, China's construction 
activities in Iraq topped $600 million.126
China was a willing partner, and a competitive one.
Chinese labor was cheap and government-supported. The PRC 
was amenable to participation in three-party construction 
schemes.127 China's competitiveness in Iraq was enhanced by 
its willingness to assume risks others preferred to avoid. 
Payments delays, lack of export insurance, scarce credit, 
the sundry changes and uncertainties of operating in a war- 
torn country: all of these risks failed to dim China's 
determination to maintain its position and by doing so, 
hopefully improve it in the future.
Furthermore, in Iraq, Chinese laborers gained a reputation 
for quality work and timely completion of projects. The 
announcement of the Sino--Iraqi agreement to launch the 
Kifil Shinafiya control barrage project virtually coincided
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with the opening of the Saddam bridge at Mosul to 
traffic.128 The Kifil Shinafiya project, in turn, finished 
ahead of schedule. The 1986 agreement that laid the basis 
for the next five years' cooperation in irrigation and 
drainage, highways, and bridge and railroad construction was 
signed as Chinese workers diligently worked to fulfill 
existing contracts.129 Even where there were delays or mid­
project design changes (e.g., the $193 million N. Jazira 
irrigation and $225 million New Hindiya barrage projects), 
the Chinese earned credit for the confidence and 
perseverance displayed in seeing the projects through to 
completion.130
Although China earned significant sums through its labor 
and construction activities in Iraq, by far its largest 
money-oarner was military sales. Thus, while China publicly 
espoused the position that a tranquil international 
environment was the essential prerequisite for its 
successful modernisation, it privately exploited the Gulf 
conflict to its economic advantage. As early as 1982 
Beijing denied that it had sold weapons to Iraq, claiming 
that such activity was incompatible with its principled 
stand.131 Nevertheless reports continued to emerge which 
linked the Chinese to Iraqi arms acquisitions. During March 
and April of 1984, for example, China is said to have 
delivered 300 T-59 tanks to Iraq by way of North Korea.132 
Other reports asserted that China had periodically relied on 
Egypt to pass arms to Iraq.133 The U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Annual Report estimated Chinese arms supplies to
Iraq between 1981--85 to have reached nearly $3 billion.134
Xvii) Relations with Iran;
China practiced its own version of 'neutrality' in the 
Gulf war. For mainly economic reasons, it carried on a 
lucrative arms trade with both Iraq and Iran, while for 
mainly political reasons it denied that it had sold weapons 
to either. Throughout 1985 reports surfaced which indicated 
a flourishing arms trade between China and Iran. In March 
1985 Beijing was reported to have agreed to provide $1.66 
billion in arms to Tehran, including 12 Shen Yang J-6 
aircraft, 200 T-59 battle tanks, as well as an undetermined 
number of multi-barrelled rocket launchers, surface-to-air 
missiles and field guns.135 Several months later, Beijing 
reacted to the disclosure that it had sold Scud 1-A and 1-B 
surface-to-surface missiles to Iran in much the same fashion 
as it had replied to previous reports, flatly rejecting the 
revelations as 'groundless' (a reply containing more 
inadvertent humor than truth).136 HQ-2 surface-to-air 
missiles (based on SAM-2s), alleged to have been furnished 
by China, were sighted during the February 1986 Faw 
offensive.137
A more potentially destabilising arms transaction 
allegedly occurred in 1987 when, it was reported, China sold 
SS-N-2 (i.e. Styx) missiles to Iran. With a range of 80 km., 
these missiles were reported to be deployed at Kuhestak and 
Qeshm Island near the port of Bandar Abbas, positioned 
threateningly at the choke point of the Straits of 
Hormuz.138 In the two-year period spanning the disclosure
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and presumed termination of U.S. secret arms sales to Iran, 
China, according to the Abu Dhabi newspaper Al-Itihad, 
transferred $3.1 billion in arms to Iran.139
Though the core of Sino--Iranian relations during this 
phase was military cooperation, Beijing and Tehran continued 
to explore other avenues of association. The value of Sino-- 
Iranian trade reached $200 million in 1984, for instance, 
and the two countries confidently announced their interest 
in expanding economic cooperation in dam/hydroelectric power 
plant construction.140 In August 1986 Iranian Oil Minister 
Gholam Reza Agazadeh journeyed to Beijing to solicit China's 
support for its campaign in OPEC to trim production and 
stabilise oil prices.141 Also in 1986 Iran signed a letter 
of intent, contracting with the People's Republic of China's 
Great Wall Industrial Corporation for use of its Long March 
III rocket to launch a satellite.142 The following year, a 
Sino--Iranian oil deal was finalised, with Iran to supply 
one million tons of crude oil in the next twelve-month 
period. Discussions also focused on bilateral oil 
exploration possibilities.143
A strong economic incentive drove China's program of 
military sales to Iran. The most obvious inducement was the 
opportunity to earn foreign exchange, which could then be 
applied to purchase both civilian and military technology 
from the West. Once Iran lost its ability to pay cash for 
Chinese arms, Beijing is reported to have accepted payment 
in Iranian oil which in turn, it sought to exchange for West 
European manufactures.144 Yet, China's gradual rapprochement 
with Moscow notwithstanding, Beijing's desire to find
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counterweights to Soviet southern expansionism continued to 
exert a powerful influence on Chinese foreign policy.145 
Thus, the strategic dimension of Chinese arms sales to Iran 
cannot be discounted, for the disintegration of Iran is not 
in China's best interest.
If Chinese arms sales to Iran were primarily economically 
motivated and ultimately financially lucrative, the feedback 
from such transactions was politically unfavorable. 
Especially following the summer 1987 U.S. decision to reflag 
and escort Kuwaiti tankers, China's profitable arms trade 
with Iran collided with America's newly improvised Gulf 
protection policy. In order to safely police commercial 
traffic in the Gulf, the U.S. insisted on curbing Sino-- 
Iranian arms traffic. Thus, while the termination of 
clandestine U.S. arms transfers to Iran indirectly assisted 
China's increased military activities in the Gulf, the post- 
Irangate U.S. Gulf policy inhibited China's involvement.
Indicating the seriousness with which it viewed Chinese 
arms sales to Iran, the Reagan Administration announced that 
the expansion of U.S. technology transfers to China would be 
conditional upon the cessation of China's weapons transfers 
to Iran.146 Paradoxically, China's lucrative trade in arms 
threatened to jeopardise the access to technology that its 
arms income sought to sustain. Reflecting U.S. alarm and the 
strain on the Sino--American relationship, in another 
instance, U.S. officials considered (though they eventually 
rejected) the option of intercepting Chinese weapons bound 
for Iran.147 Heightened American concern in this case arose
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from intelligence reports that Styx missiles - a variation 
of Silkworm, with a mobile rather than a stationery launch 
capability - could jeopardise U.S. vessels. In addition to 
irritating Washington, reports of Chinese arms sales to Iran 
likewise antagonised the Arabs, notwithstanding Beijing's 
reported denials and assurances. In May 1987, for instance, 
a seven-member Arab League delegation travelled to Beijing, 
reportedly raising this issue at all levels of discussion 
with Chinese officials.148
One of the aspects of Sino--Iranian arms trade which has 
been simultaneously an embarrassment and a relief to China 
is the publicity that has attached to it. Despite satellite 
photography and sophisticated human and electronic 
surveillance, the arms flow has been difficult to pinpoint 
at its source and to follow to its ultimate destination. 
Reminiscent of China's arms supply to the PLO in the late 
'60s, its tranfers to Iran have been clouded in no small 
degree of uncertainty. Evidence is fragmentary at best. Even 
while Western European and Asian diplomats are definite in 
linking China to substantial deliveries of arms to Iran and 
share the view that North Korea is Beijing's 'common 
conduit' to Tehran,149 pinning down responsibility and 
ascertaining the exact scale and frequency of deliveries is 
virtually impossible. Thus, while there is an apparently 
yawning gap between what Beijing says and what it does, its 
precise measure is indeterminate. To some extent, China's 
continued 'success' in this area depends upon maintaining 
this uncertainty at some level. On the other hand, to the 
extent that China is unable to fix its arms at a 'safe level
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of rumor,' its lucrative business can be a politically 
costly one.
-Lviii) .Relations with Saudi Arabia;
In this period China's insistence that Riyadh sever 
relations with Taiwan was unofficially retired as a 
precondition to the establishment of fruitful Sino--Saudi 
ties, even if it was not abandoned as an ultimate political 
objective. A similar pragmatism prevailed in Riyadh, where 
the long-range benefits of diversifying trade and political 
relations overrode the Saudis' enduring antipathy towards 
communism.
Between 1978 and 1982 Saudi Arabia had supported anti- 
Soviet activities in the Arabian penninsula and in the Horn 
of Africa. By so doing, Riyadh pursued a strategic objective 
in common with China, though not for identical reasons. From 
1982 onwards, Chinese and Saudi attitudes concerning the 
superpowers continued to correspond with one another. While 
Beijing as well as Riyadh perceived the Soviet strategic 
threat as diminishing, they also shared a growing 
disillusionment with the United States. These parallel 
rather than diverging attitudes towards the superpowers 
supplied a hospitable climate for the improvement of Sino-- 
Saudi relations.
Although it is difficult to establish with any certainty 
which of the two priorities was higher, China sought both 
commercial and political advantages from better relations 
with the Saudi kingdom. Sino--Saudi economic activity 
developed more visibly and more rapidly than Sino--Saudi
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political cooperation. In every year from 1982 to 1986 - a 
trend that began at the outset of the decade - the annual 
value of Chinese exports to Saudi Arabia surpassed $100 
million, making the Saudi kingdom the PRC's leading Gulf 
trading partner.150 In the first nine months of 1987, China 
was reported to have sold goods to Saudi Arabia in excess of 
a value of $231.4 million; during the same period, the PRC 
made $66.8 million in purchases from Saudi Arabia, thus 
preserving a trade balance in its favor.151 In December 
1987, Jia Shi, Chairman of the China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) led the first 
delegation of its kind to Riyadh. The ensuing discussions 
resulted in part in an agreement for China to buy 340,000 
tons of SABIC products (including urea, chemical fertilisers 
and plastics) in 1988, at an estimated cost of $65 
million.152
Both before and after Jia Shi's visit to Riyadh, Saudi 
officials were reported to have encouraged the infusion of 
private Saudi capital into the Chinese economy. The general 
strategy envisaged the repurchase for reexport of Chinese 
products manufactured with the assistance of Saudi private 
investment. Transactions such as this one held certain 
advantages for both of the prospective partners. For China, 
Saudi investment funds offered an additional lubricant to 
the national economy. Buy-back arrangements promised a 
guaranteed external outlet for Chinese manufactures. In 
addition, Saudi marketing and distribution expertise might 
succeed in placing Chinese products in new or protected
303
markets in which China had not previously sold. Other than 
to diversify its economy, the general incentive for Saudi 
Arabia to pursue this avenue of cooperation was the 
opportunity to trade an enduring asset (oil money) for a 
permanent deficiency (labor-intensive industrial 
capability).
Whereas Sino--Saudi economic cooperation, cultivated in 
the absence of diplomatic relations, developed gradually and 
quietly, Sino--Saudi military cooperation occurred suddenly 
and dramatically. In March 1988, revelations of the sale of 
Chinese CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia made international 
news headlines and drew the attention of policymakers in 
numerous capitals, particularly Washington and Tel Aviv. Set 
in the context of growing Sino--Saudi commercial ties, and 
viewed in the light of the Saudi strategic environment which 
made it possible, this transaction was not as astonishing as 
it appeared at the time.
The diminution of the Soviet strategic threat in this 
period was accompanied by the deterioration of Riyadh's 
regional security environment. The menace emanating from 
Iran, coupled with signs of American unreliability, prompted 
Riyadh to reassess its military needs and diversify its 
sources of military equipment. Saudi sensitivity to the 
Iranian threat peaked twice: in 1984, and again in early 
1988. On both occasions, Washington appeared to be hesitant, 
if not unresponsive, to Saudi security concerns.
In 1984, a U.S. election year, Washington shunted aside 
Saudi arms purchase requests. Among the weapons which the 
Saudis sought - but Washington refused to sell - were Lance
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surface-to-surface missiles.153 The Reagan Administration 
further postponed a decision on Saudi weapons proposals 
while it awaited the findings of a government study on arms 
transfers and Middle East regional stability. The priorities 
of the U.S. Congress as well as the White House at this time 
clashed with Saudi Arabia's security concerns and its 
preference to retain the U.S. as its principal arms patron. 
The American government wish to assuage Israeli fears and to 
disarm the pro-Israeli lobby in an election year dovetailed 
with its determination to pre-empt a regional arms race by 
limiting weapons transfers. Not coincidentally, Sino--Saudi 
meetings concerning possible missile sales were reported to 
have first taken place at this time.154
In 1987--88, the Iranian threat was again keenly felt in 
Saudi Arabia while Riyadh and Washington were at 
loggerheads. Under Congressional pressure, the Reagan 
Administration was compelled to modify a $1 billion-plus 
Saudi arms sale, trimming missile transfers from the 
original package. The timing of the U.S. decision was as 
important as its content. In 1987, revelations of covert 
American arms transfers to Iran - though they presumably had 
ceased - magnified the Saudi impression of U.S. 
unreliability. The 'war of the cities' accentuated the 
dangers of using missiles against civilian targets and 
impressed upon Riyadh the need to possess weapons of a 
similar kind, if only for deterrent purposes. An added 
concern at this time was Israel's successful test-launching 
of the Jericho-II strategic missile, which compounded Saudi
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Arabia's worry.
Unlike in 1984, U.S. reluctance to transfer missiles to 
the Gulf was reinforced by emergent superpower detente. One 
of the concrete manifestations of improving superpower 
relations was the signing of the INF agreement in December 
1987. This accord imposed a worldwide ban on the 
superpowers' delpoyment or transfer of missiles with a range 
of 500 to 5,000 kms. The CSS-2 missiles eventually sold by 
China to Saudi Arabia are an INF-range system. Thus, China 
profited not merely from what the U.S. was unwilling to 
furnish, but also from what the superpowers were forbidden 
to provide under the terms of their treaty.
The context (i.e. the Gulf war) and the type of weapon 
(i.e. a missile of a range never before deployed in the 
region) stirred such controversy that other aspects and 
implications of the sale were overshadowed. First, Saudi 
Arabia was not the first Arab country to have sought 
alternative suppliers once its demands were spurned by the 
U.S. Congress. Second, China was not the only source whom 
the Saudis approached and from whom they acquired weapons to 
supplement U.S. arms. Third, even at $100 million each, the 
10--15 missiles purchased from China represent only a tiny 
fraction of the estimated $31 billion in American arms and 
military construction projects 'conceded' by the U.S. 
Congress between 1978 and 1987, or the multibillion-dollar 
Tornado fighter aircraft deal concluded with Great 
Britain.155
Finally, to the extent that attention was paid to the 
political - and not merely the military - reasons for the
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deal, that attention seemed to concentrate on Saudi Arabia's 
motives for acquiring the missiles. A closer examination of 
the context in which the deal occurred uncovers an 
additional political incentive for China to agree to provide 
the weapons. As early as 1984, the Soviet Union had made 
overtures to Saudi Arabia (about the time that China is 
believed to have first discussed the possibility of arms 
sales to the Saudis). In early 1988 (not long before the 
missile sale was reported to have occurred) Foreign Minister 
Shevarnadze made the first trip to Riyadh of any such high- 
ranking Soviet leader. It is therefore possible that an 
element of Sino--Soviet competition was present in China's 
decision to go ahead with the sale. With the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the ending of the Cold 
War, the U.S.S.R. can only emerge as a more effective 
competitor for political influence, investment funds, and 
other forms of cooperation. While there is no evidence that 
China clearly foresaw this challenge, it is not implausible 
to suggest that China acted on the Saudi request for 
missiles for reasons besides short-term cash earnings.
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Chapter VII
An evaluation
What were China's objectives?
China's objectives in the Middle East since 1982 have been 
shaped by its general aim of carving an independent foreign 
policy. Its goals in the region, therefore, spring from a 
global strategic first principle: close attention to 
superpower rivalry without close alignment with either 
superpower. China's activities in the region recently have 
represented an overall attempt at reidentification with the 
Third World on its own merit, with primary emphasis on 
economic cooperation.
China's emergent first interest in the Middle East since 
1982 has been to do business. The amelioration of Sino-- 
Soviet relations has helped to make this priority 
strategically affordable. At the same time China's 
decoupling from Washington has facilitated its 
implementation. As China has increasingly sought to place 
business ahead of politics in the Middle East, its strategic 
repositioning between the superpowers has enabled it to 
apply more freely economic criteria to its choice of 
partners and activities.
Whereas economics has been the central focus of Sino-- 
Middle Eastern relations in ths period, it has not been the 
exclusive one. Moreover, although China's maneuvering 
between the superpowers has had a primarily beneficial 
impact on its cultivating economic ties in the region, it 
has not had a determining one. Presenting a favorable
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political image, though not indispensable to conducting 
business in the Middle East, has remained an important 
consideration for at least two reasons: first, because of 
China's continuing interest in acquiring a world leadership 
role; second, and related, in order to compete effectively 
for influence with the Soviet Union. Producing this image 
has entailed above all, reestablishing credibility on the 
issue of Palestine and reaffirming a position of neutrality 
in the Gulf war.
What were China's tactics?
The distinction between ends and means is difficult to 
sustain in the case of China's economic involvement in the 
Middle East since 1982. China has stepped up the effort to 
enlarge exports to the region, yet this has apparently not 
been done for its own sake. Without intending to suggest 
that income from Middle East exports has been earmarked for 
special purchases, it is clear that foreign exchange 
earnings have helped China pay for Western technology. Thus, 
development of the Middle East as an export market - linked 
as it is to the acquisition of western technology - has been 
placed in the service of a very important goal of Chinese 
modernisation. The desirability of using exports to earn 
vital foreign exchange helps to explain China's dramatic 
shift from donor to salesman in the military sphere. In 
1982, China altered its practice of granting generous 
military assistance in favor of generating military sales 
instead.
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China targeted Egypt, with whom it had steadily developed 
reliable military cooperation, to serve in a variety of 
capacities: as customer, as showroom, and as intermediary: 
buying Chinese weapons, exhibiting and transferring them. 
Furthermore, China sought to turn the Gulf war from a 
political dilemma to a profitable enterprise by selling or 
bartering weapons to both belligerents. Saudi security 
concerns arising from the Iran--Iraq war converged with 
repeated U.S. congressional reluctance to match Saudi 
requests for arms transfers. Thus the events in the Persian 
Gulf, along with the U.S. position on the Arab--Israeli 
issue, invited China to cast for military sales in Saudi 
Arabia.
If, with respect to Egypt and its three Gulf customers 
(i.e. Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia) China's emphasis in the 
military sphere has been on sales, its focus, with regard to 
Israel, has been on acquisitions. Beijing has solicited 
Israeli cooperation particularly in those areas in which, 
conveniently, China's military modernisation plans and 
Israel's expertise complement each other (i.e., tank, 
missile guidance systems).
Besides seeking Israeli cooperation in the military field, 
China has solicited help from the Middle East for another 
component of its modernisation. As China's modernisation 
plans have evolved, so has the danger of uneven development. 
Coincidentally, the populations of two of China's more 
backward provinces, which, significantly, lie along the 
Sino--Soviet frontier are substantially Muslim. China has 
sought Arab loans and investments especially but not
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exclusively to develop these regions, where a natural 
compatibility of interests may not only alleviate China's 
concerns but also lay groundwork for further cooperation.
In this period China has concentrated on participating in 
ventures in the Middle East at least as vigorously as it has 
solicited Arab funds for projects in China. The vanguard of 
this effort has been its involvement in construction 
projects, an area of economic cooperation in which China's 
reliability and competitiveness in the Middle East have 
already shown themselves. Since 1982 China's involvement in 
this field has developed beyond the mere supply of Chinese 
labor. Chinese firms have competed for a wider range of 
customers, for larger-scale contracts, and for opportunities 
to engineer as well as to supply materials, not just 
manpower.
China's political tactics in the Middle East have been 
employed to serve Chinese modernisation and to advance 
China's standing in the Third World. While consistently 
adhering to the principle that the Third World must resist 
superpower manipulation, China has invoked new ways to 
attain that end. In addition to promoting South--South 
cooperation, China has adopted an apparently contradictory 
posture of strongly urging peace while at the same time 
canvassing for customers for its arms. The principal forum 
for its peace advocacy has been the U.N. while the major 
showcase for its weapons in the Middle East has been the 
Persian Gulf.
It is more apt to suggest that, during this period, China
311
has practiced astute politics, rather than no politics at 
all. In the past, China had had few commerical relationships 
of significant value with the region. In the relative 
absence of economic interests or economic prospects, China 
had acquired a reputation in the region for stirring 
controversy which was painfully difficult to dispel. To a 
much greater extent than in the past, China has sought to 
practice politics in the Middle East in such a manner as to 
least interfere with doing business in the Middle East.
On the two key issues of the period - the Arab--Israeli 
dispute and the Gulf war - China has cast itself in the 
cause of peace. China did not crudely denounce any peace 
initiative, regardless of its sponsor; nor denigrate any 
peace effort, regardless of its prospects. The mild praise 
reserved for the Fez Plan, the mild criticism in response to 
the Reagan Plan, and the carefully crafted silence in reply 
to the Brezhnev Plan demonstrate a consistent effort on the 
part of China to avoid needless antagonisms. By declaring 
neutrality and holding to that policy throughout the Gulf 
conflict, China likewise sought to cultivate the image of a 
country unwilling to meddle in regional disputes.
Were China's efforts successful?
Applied to the Middle East, Beijing's 'independent' 
foreign policy (1982--89) has consisted mainly of a gradual 
disassociation from the practices of Washington. The 
perceived improvement in China's strategic situation vis-a- 
vis the Soviet Union has appeared to make such a shift 
affordable; the heightened visibility and flexibility of
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Soviet Middle East diplomacy has made it advisable. China's 
'independence' then has amounted to a position of political 
non-affiliation with either superpower. In the short term, 
this approach offers expanding commerical ties; in the 
longer term, greater political influence.
Interestingly, many if not most of China's major 
opportunities to cut its own path in the Middle East have, 
as in the past, derived from superpower initiatives in the 
region or superpower responses to regional developments. In 
the area of arms sales, for example - where the PRC has 
recently generated as much controversy as currency - the 
superpowers' unwillingness or inability to fulfill local 
expectations has provided opportunities for China to 
exploit. Thus, the precise character of China's policy 
independence has to a large extent depended on what the 
superpowers have or have not done.
An assessment of China's efforts in the Gulf to do 
business without doing politics begins fittingly with a 
paradox: though successful modernisation is thought 
generally to rely on a tranquil international environment, 
tolerable levels of regional hostility have provided 
substantial economic benefits to China. Beijing accurately 
read and exploited the superpowers' common commitment to 
maintain a stalemate in the Gulf conflict. As a result, its 
arms sales to both Iran and Iraq earned considerable foreign 
exchange. Moreover, the publicity attaching to these sales 
has served as free advertisement of the availability of 
Chinese military merchandise and of the quality of its
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combat performance. China's practice of treating Iran and 
Iraq solely as customers inflicted direct injury on Beijing 
more in contemplation than in actual fact. Neither side 
publicly denounced China for provisioning its enemy, 
suggesting that what was intended primarily as business was 
sanguinely regarded as such.
Taking no sides in the war while selling arms to both 
belligerents was lucrative business but not trouble-free 
politics. First, this practice almost certainly damaged 
China's international image, and may have rekindled 
suspicions about its trustworthiness. Beijing in this period 
had sought to portray itself as a strong advocate of peace 
and South--South cooperation. Large-scale arms sales to Iran 
and Iraq clashed with this latest tactic in China's 
longstanding quest to capture the prize of a Third World 
constituency.
Second, Chinese missile sales to Iran have antagonised the 
United States, with whom Beijing has sought a politically 
independent yet economically fruitful relationship. 
Washington expressed its irritation in potentially disabling 
terms: predicating the liberalisation of future technology 
transfers to China on Beijing's cessation of missile sales 
to Tehran. Thus, China was made to suffer an affront to its 
nationalist sensibilities and to sacrifice an immediate cash 
payoff for the future promise of technology it needs but 
might not be able to afford.
The introduction of Chinese missiles into the Iran-Iraq 
conflict produced yet another set of consequences, bearing 
sharper ironies and deeper controversies, not merely more
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lucrative trade: namely, the redefinition of the security 
needs of the entire Middle East. Oddly, Saudi Arabia's 
purchase of Chinese missiles was taken largely as a 
countermeasure to blunt an Iranian threat made more menacing 
by the acquisition of Chinese missiles. Thus, China profited 
by helping to secure Riyadh from the danger it was 
instrumental in creating.
The range of Saudi missiles obtained from China enables 
them to be deployed at a safe distance from anything 
currently in the Iranian inventory. At the same time, 
however, these weapons, which are suitable for carrying 
nuclear and chemical payloads, give Saudi Arabia the 
putative capability to strike Israel. Naturally, China's 
sales to Riyadh have raised widespread speculation and 
concern in Israel, where work on the Jericho missile system 
has duly accelerated, with assistance wrung from Washington. 
Washington in turn - pressed by the competing demands of its 
Israeli ally for enhanced security, the obligations of the 
recent INF agreement, and the challenge of Moscow's peace 
diplomacy - has leaned on China to pre-empt a local arms 
race and further 'slippage' in America's managerial role in 
the region. The Assad regime's expression of interest in 
Chinese missiles, indicative of its determination to keep 
pace with its Israeli adversary and Arab rivals, suggests 
that Washington's concern is not misplaced. Therefore, in 
largely unintended and unforeseeable ways, China's sales 
have had a tremendous impact: on the military balance in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict; on the pace and character of inter-
315
Arab rivalry; on the dynamics of the U .S.--Israeli alliance; 
and on the pattern of Sino--American relations. Thus, in 
fulfilling its primary objective of extending its commercial 
military ties to the Middle East, Beijing has irrevocably 
set in motion crosscutting sets of events, not all of them 
favorable to China.
The drama that has understandably accompanied Chinese 
missile sales to the Gulf has tended to overshadow one 
additional avenue of Chinese military invlovement in the 
Middle East while calling unnecessary attention to still 
another - each of them rich in its own contradictions. In 
comparative silence, Beijing has continued to enjoy military 
cooperation with Cairo, which in this period has functioned 
as a channel for Chinese weapons headed to Baghdad. Chinese 
arms, therefore, have served as a quiet vehicle for the 
thawing of Egyptian--Iraqi relations, and more broadly, for 
the reintegration of Egypt into the Arab fold.
In contrast, the furore over Chinese missile sales to the 
Gulf focused eyes on the development of Sino--Israeli 
military cooperation. The possible participation of Israeli 
technicians in the improvement of Chinese missile guidance 
systems implicated the Israeli government in the development 
of weapons sold and deployed to Arab customers, causing 
disturbance in Washington and posing a danger to Israel. 
Moreover, such cooperation pointed to much broader Sino-- 
Tsraoli economic ties, not only complicating Israel's 
dialogue with the Soviet Union but also embarrassing China 
before its Arab audience. Therefore, China's success in 
selectively re-equipping the PLA and enhancing the
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marketability of its miltary wares by virtue of Israeli 
assistance must be viewed in the light of the political 
awkwardness it created.
Certainly the commercial aspect of Chinese military 
involvement in the Middle East has been the PRC's most 
sensational activity in the region: providing by far the 
most foreign exchange and producing by far the widest 
international repercussions. Still, China's economic role in 
the Middle East has included a multitude of other 
activities, participation in construction projects chief 
among them. The Gulf war tapered China's expanding building 
activity in Iraq but did not terminate it. Moreover, the 
reputation that Chinese laborers and later, Chinese 
engineers, acquired principally in Iraq and in adverse 
conditions helped to project China further afield in the 
Middle East; namely, in Jordan and Egypt. China's success in 
winning engineering contracts which provided for the export 
of machinery and materials and not merely manpower, in an 
ever-widening field of construction activity, is a notable 
achievement in itself; perhaps more important, it helped to 
establish a track record that can improve China's 
competitiveness in other regional markets.
Downward-moving oil prices have had mixed effects on 
China's relations with Gulf producers, with Kuwait in 
particular. On the one hand, the soft oil market has 
drastically cut into the foreign exchange earnings of the 
PRC which urged a more competitive posture by China among 
oil producers. However, China has supported Kuwait's
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production and pricing policies rather consistently, and by 
doing so has preserved the good relations conducive to 
cooperation in other areas. Despite declining oil prices and 
the shrinking value of the dollar which has thinned the 
availability of petrodollars for recycling, Kuwait has 
continued to invest significant sums in China. These 
contributions of course have not been sufficient in 
themselves to propel Chinese modernisation. But then, they 
were not intended to be. Instead, they have breathed life 
into select areas of the Chinese economy at a propitious 
time.
The political dimensions of Chinese invlovement have 
deliberately taken a back seat to Chinese economic 
activities in the region. Even so, as has been indicated, 
strictly economic relations often result in politically 
complicating outcomes. During this period, China has not 
entirely abandoned its search for political leadership. 
Instead, given the priority assigned to modernisation, China 
has placed primary emphasis on promotong and protecting its 
own development, confident that the political benefits will 
follow accordingly.
What political fire China has attempted to breathe into 
the Middle East has been independent of, yet dependent upon, 
the changing tactics and fortunes of the superpowers. The 
Soviet effort to seize the diplomatic initiative on the 
Arab-Israeli issue by extending feelers to all interested 
parties has challenged Beijing to display comparable 
flexibility. In some ways this has been advantageous to 
China. Following rather than beating the Soviet Union to
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normalisation with Israel, for instance, enables China to 
preserve its credentials with the Arabs. Supporting PLO 
factional reconciliation rather than endeavoring to engineer 
it allows China to maintain its revolutionary posture in the 
absence of revolutionary activity, at no risk of failure. 
Championing the cause of an international peace conference 
under U.N. auspices without actively engaging in its 
organisation permits the PRC to parallel the positions of 
the superpowers, without being harnessed to them; to profit 
from eventual participation without becoming embroiled in 
the difficult negotiations for its initiation. Perhaps more 
consciously than ever before, China has chosen the political 
sidelines in the Middle East, and thus enjoys a position 
relatively uncontaminated by superpower alignment or 
unpopular revolutionary doctrine.
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Conclusion
A. China, the superpowers, and the Middle East:
China has tended to view Middle East developments 
in a global context. Beijing has, for example, always 
attributed the lack of improvement in the region's stability 
and economic well-being primarily to superpower competition or 
connivance. Typically, therefore, China has defined its 
status and mission in the region in relation to the 
superpowers, with overriding attention to opposing, 
offsetting, competing with or seeking to distinguish itself 
from the policies of either or both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
During the years 1955-57 (when China first became involved 
in the region), the Sino--Soviet alliance was intact; 
Sino--U.S. relations, on the other hand, were generally 
hostile. In collaboration with the Soviet Union, China 
cultivated relations with nationalist leaders in the region 
and supported their policies in the expectation that, by 
doing so, Western influence would be undermined.
In the latter part of the 1950s Beijing's tactics with 
respect to nationalist leaders changed, as did its attitude 
regarding Soviet policy in the Middle East. These changes 
reflected a general trend in Chinese foreign policy: from 
'peaceful coexistence' to 'militancy'. U.S. interventionism 
in the Middle East, and the confidence that it could be 
safely and successfully opposed, was greatly responsible for 
producing these changes. Yet, despite reaching new 
conclusions about the 'correlation of forces' and adopting
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new tactics to reflect these changes, the substance of 
Beijing's strategic aims in the Middle East remained 
essentially the same: to oppose the United States.
As, by the early 1960s, the Sino--Soviet relationship 
deteriorated, the Middle East became for China not only a 
strategic buffer (vis-a-vis the United States), but also an 
arena of competition for influence with the Soviet Union.
The Middle East therefore acquired special significance 
to China by virtue of its growing importance to both 
superpowers and China's hostile relations with both 
superpowers.
By the end of the 1960s, the Sino--Soviet relationship had 
further degenerated: from a competitive to a confrontational 
relationship. Related to this - though related also to 
developments within China - a thaw in Sino--U.S. relations 
occurred. Again, China's relations in the region reflected 
these broader strategic considerations. Initially (ie. until 
1972) the revival of China's diplomacy in the region was accom­
panied by a continuation of its support for revolution and armed 
struggle in the region. By the middle of the decade these 
'contradictions' began to be resolved -- as the debates 
within China themselves were resolved, and as the relative 
dangers posed by the superpowers to China were clarified.
Soviet--American detente came to be seen by the Chinese as an 
opportunity for the expansion of the Soviet presence and 
influence in 'strategically crucial' regions, including the 
Middle East. The '73 war and subsequent enlargement of the Soviet 
naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean 
coincided with Soviet troop build-ups on the Chinese border,
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and with the development of closer ties between the 
U.S.S.R. and India as well as Vietnam. This combination of 
circumstances increased the strategic salience of the Middle 
East to China, and helps to explain China's efforts to 
cultivate relations with the leaders of the Gulf countries.
Between 1979 and 1982, events external to China (together 
with the end of the Mao succession crisis) resulted in a 
foreign policy in which some of the trends of the preceding 
period crystallised. The normalisation of Chinese--U.S . 
relations was based to a large extent on the common 
strategic aim of countering the Soviet Union. China's 
relations with the Middle East were designed chiefly to 
serve that purpose. Cooperation with the Gulf countries, the 
U.S. and Pakistan to assist the mujaheddin in Afghanistan 
and support for the Camp David peace process (whatever its 
shortcomings) reflected the aim of undercuting the U.S.S.R.
By 1982 the need for strategic cooperation with the U.S. 
had become less urgent; that is, the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union to China had begun to diminish. Policy 
divergences between Washington and Beijing, including 
their respective positions on the Palestinian question, 
were less tolerable in an atmosphere of declining strategic 
pressure from Moscow. This is not to suggest, however, that 
after 1982 the Middle East had become strategically 
irrelevant to China.
The Middle East has retained its strategic importance to 
China for two reasons. First, China has recently enjoyed, 
and is committed to preserve, unprecedented good relations
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with both superpowers. Yet, there is no indication that the 
Chinese leadership assumes this favorable climate will 
inevitably and indefinitely prevail.
Second, China's commitment to modernisation has ultimately 
led to a redefinition of Chinese 'security'. 'Security' has 
come to include the continued health and growth of the 
Chinese economy, not just the defense of China's borders. 
That China's economy has become enmeshed in the global 
economy has in turn produced on the part of the Chinese an 
increasing interest in global stability. Even though China's 
own economic interests in the Middle East are only modest, 
there is little doubt that the region's stability and the 
well-being of the global economy are inextricably linked.
It is this link that gives the Middle East a new kind of 
strategic importance to China.
B. China and Middle East Regional Politics:
Historically, there has been a tight interaction between 
external powers in the Middle East and the politics of the 
region. Rivalries and confrontations at the local and 
regional level have been notoriously difficult to 
disentangle. Nevertheless, some generalisations can be 
offered with respect to the ways in which developments 
within the Middle East might have facilitated or constrained 
China's efforts to build relations in the region.
In the 1950s the power of ideology, personality and policy 
merged to make the Middle East attractive to China. At that 
time, 'revolutionary' Arab nationalism, consisting chiefly 
of two forms - Nasserism and Ba'thism - was the prevailing
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ideological trend in the Arab Middle East. Nasserism, 
originating in Egypt, drew a wider following in the region 
than Ba'thism (which struck roots in Syria and Iraq). Both 
ideologies were anti-monarchist and anti-colonial. In 
addition, both Nasserists and the Ba'thists (though neither 
were communists) espoused socialist principles. Thus, there 
was a degree of convergence between these ideologies and the 
principles advocated by China.
Nasser led a successful revolution, resisted U.S. 
overtures to join a pro-Western defense pact, nationalised 
the Suez Canal, and withstood a combined French-British- 
Israeli invasion. The Chinese communists too had made a 
revolution, had successfully struggled to overcome 
foreign occupation. Thus, there appeared to be a great deal 
that Egypt and China possessed in common. The concept of 
'Afro-Asian solidarity', however ambiguous, struck a 
responsive chord in both capitals.
China's early success in cultivating relations with Nasser 
and other Arab leaders must also be attributed to Chou En- 
lai, who made China's commitment to 'Peaceful Coexistence' 
credible. In addition, China's leaders astutely used trade, 
economic aid, and timely statements of encouragement to 
show support for Nasser.
Yet, as this study has shown, this period of cordiality 
and cooperation was short-lived. 'Radical' Arab nationalists 
shared China's concern about and displeasure at the U.S. 
willingness (in conjunction with Britain) to intervene 
militarily in the region's politics. However, Nasser and
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China, like China and the Soviet Union, differed on the 
question of how to oppose the West, and what risk to assume 
in doing so. In addition, China's continuing contact with 
local communist parties (regardless of the scale or impact 
of its support) strained relations between the PRC and Egypt. 
Thus, unlike in the earlier period, China's preferences and 
tactics diverged from those of Nasser; to an extent, the 
constraints under which China operated were therefore self- 
imposed .
Communist activity Iraq, and to a lesser degree in Syria, 
in the late 1950s might have appeared at first to offer 
China an opportunity to expand its influence. However, there 
is no indication that these local communists were 
subordinate either to the Soviet Union or China; or for that 
matter, dependent on them. In addition, the 'success' which 
the communists in these two countries attained was 
relatively fleeting. The combination of pressure from the 
Ba'th Party (and military elements within it) and Nasserists 
emasculated the communist movement. Thus, the relative 
autonomy of the communists, coupled with the strengths of 
its rivals, constrained China's efforts to strengthen ties 
with the Middle East through these channels.
China sought to revive its relations with the region in 
the early 1960s, relying on the tactics which it had 
employed relatively successfully a decade earlier. Beijing 
made a fresh commitment of economic aid and trade (with a 
balance in favor of its Middle East partners), coupling it 
with Chou's personal diplomacy. Yet, China sought to draw 
support not only against the U.S. but also in its polemic
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than that the traditional leadership might be overthrown.
Despite the commonalities between China and the groups 
with whom China sought to curry favor, the local and regional 
political environment in which they operated was decisive - 
and less favorable to China. There were, for example, 
instances in which Chinese arms intended for Palestinian 
commandos were confiscated by Arab governments intent on 
keeping a tight rein on the movement. The fragmentation 
within the Palestinian movement and within the governing NLF 
also dimmed their prospects for success, and the Chinese 
interests entwined with them.
In general, China was in no position to dictate the course 
of events in the Middle East. For example, Beijing could 
not, had it wanted to, compelled Egypt and Jordan from 
acceding to the Rogers Plan; nor prevented Egypt and Syria 
from relying on the Soviet Union for arms. China could not 
satisfy the military needs of the Arabs; nor could it 
conceivably bring pressure to bear on Israel. China was 
simply not a superpower.
If not being a superpower had its drawbacks, it also had 
its advantages. One of the by-products of China's re-emphasis of 
intergovernmental relations and the thawing of Sino-U.S. 
relations was the PRC's admission to the United Nations.
There, China was able to champion the Palestinian cause and 
support resource (in the Middle East context, oil) power.
China from the mid-'70s afterwards became not so much a 
substitute for the superpowers, but an alternative. The 
distinction is slight but important, and rfequires some 
further elaboration.
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When Sadat expelled Soviet advisers and later abrogated 
the Soviet--Egyptian Friendship Treaty, it cannot be said 
that Beijing stepped in to replace Moscow. But, the breach 
between Cairo and Moscow provided Beijing with an 
opportunity to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate with 
Egypt on Egypt's terms. In instances where Middle East 
leaders have been unable to obtain support from the East or 
West bloc, they have either solicited China's assistance or 
welcomed it when Beijing has offered to provide it. Some 
further discussion of this point - as it relates to 
Sino--Middle East economic and military cooperation -- will 
follow.
C. The Domestic Setting and China's Middle East Relations:
Noticeable fluctuations or interruptions in China's 
pattern of engagement in the region are directly traceable 
to its inadequate capabilities, or general conditions of 
domestic political or economic turmoil.
In the late 1950s the failures of The Great Leap Forward, 
compounded by the termination of Soviet economic assistance, 
greatly contributed to China's retraction from the Middle 
East.
A second time (in 1966) domestic upheaval reinforced the 
trend towards the curtailment of China's activities in the 
region. This trend received its primary impetus from the 
collapse of the United Front in 1965: a string of foreign 
policy defeats that demonstrated the bankruptcy of China's 
plan to build a global coalition against Western imperialism 
under its own aegis.
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On a third occasion, the persistent influence of Lin Piao 
(until his fall in 1971) postponed the burial of China's 
emphasis on the support of revolutionary and national 
liberation movements, lending little credibility to its 
efforts to build relations with Middle Eastern governments. 
Similarly, the political factionalism that led to the 
eventual demise of the 'Gang of Four' (1976--1978) delayed 
China's decisive shift to the cultivation of economic and 
military cooperation in the Middle East.
D. New Interests and New Aims:
Prior to the Cultural Revolution China pursued neither 
economic nor military cooperation with the Middle East 
strictly for its own sake. Rather, China's trade with, and 
aid to, the region (limited though it was) functioned as 
instruments to further its strategic and/or political 
ambitions: to assist China to break diplomatic isolation; to 
induce local regimes to join China's campaign to reduce 
Western predominance in the region; to enlist supporters in 
its rivalry with the Soviet Union; to combat presumed 
superpower bids to partition the region between them; or to 
impede an apparent Soviet strategic advance.
These politico--strategic objectives have not been 
abandoned. China continues to be interested in countering 
superpower influence in the region, as in earning a Third 
World leadership role. The overarching priority of 
modernisation, however, has gradually eclipsed these aims.
In its day-to-day practice, China's policy in the Middle 
East is a series of loosely connected bilateral
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relationships, emphasising chiefly economic and military 
cooperation. Thus, while the Middle East's strategic 
importance is never totally beyond consideration nor is 
China's long-term political ambition, China's primary 
interest is in discovering ways to integrate the region into 
its overall modernisation scheme and determining how best to 
accomplish it. Yet, this is not meant to suggest that the scale 
of Sino--Middle East relations is at present more than 
modest, or that it is likely to expand substantially in the 
foreseeable future. [See 'Prospects' and Table 1 for further 
details . ]
E. A Durable Network of Relations:
For twenty years (i.e. during the 1950s and '60s), Chinese 
involvement in the region had been spasmodic and 
superficial. China's exertions in the Middle East alternated 
with periods of disinterest or disillusionment. Its partners 
were few in number (e.g. Egypt and the Yemens); its 
relations were typically short-lived and highly charged 
with political controversy.
Gradually since 1969 China has cultivated a wider array of 
partners, almost exclusively at the intergovernmental level. 
Emphasis has been placed on sustainable relationships; 
accordingly, China has practiced preventative politics (i.e. 
that politics which least impedes the conduct of business), 
steering clear of political controversy.
Following in the slipstream of regional politics has 
required that in important instances China has had to alter
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the terms of longstanding commitments. In particular, China 
has: (1) quietly withdrawn any political precondition to
doing business (e.g. Saudi Arabia); (2) pursued amicable 
business partnerships while maintaining a facade of 
acceptable hostility (e.g. Israel); and (3) reissued its 
prerequisites for the settlement of grievances as well as 
the preferred means of attaining it (e.g. the Palestinian 
question).
More than ever, China has pursued trade with whomever is 
willing to engage in it, and on flexible terms. Prior to the 
launching of the Four Modernisations, China's imports from 
the Middle East were (with the exception of crude oil 
purchases) primarily political gestures of goodwill; exports 
to the region, similarly, were largely intended to maintain 
a rough balance of trade. Since 1978, however, China has 
probed the Middle East market in order to extend the 
external component of its own modernisation drive and has 
selectively imported those products particularly helpful to 
its own development (e.g. chemical fertilisers).
Particularly in the construction field, China has exported 
manpower on a substantial scale in the 1980s. Increasingly, 
it has competed successfully for engineering and not merely 
labor contracts in the region, providing openings for the 
possible sale of construction machinery and materials.
Concomitant with its need to generate foreign exchange, 
China has developed the commercial arm of its military 
production and pursued weapons sales in the Middle East on a 
large scale. This has resulted, among other things, in a 
shift in the nature of Chinese aid practices. Whereas
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formerly China transferred arms to the Middle East largely 
as a form of foreign assistance, it now does so as a form of 
business. China has also begun to acquire more than just 
foreign exchange; namely, military technology and expert 
assistance (especially from Israel); and Arab loans and 
investments (particularly from Kuwait).
F. Prospects:
Sino--Middle Eastern economic cooperation:
China possesses an enormous population and an abundance of 
natural resources. The conventional wisdom argues that a 
country thus endowed is not a natural candidate for an 
export-reliant economy. China's traditional emphasis on 
self-reliance likewise argues against the development of a 
national economy deeply and extensively committed to 
international trade.
If indeed exports can never claim the role of the driving 
force of Chinese economic growth, this is not to say that 
they cannot serve as its lubricant. If the flow of foreign 
goods and foreign capital is restricted by political and 
economic choice - as well as China's absorptive capacity - 
that is not to suggest that the introduction of loans, 
investments, particular commodities and technology cannot be 
usefully assimilated (i.e. helpful in spurring the 
development of the Chinese economy). Thus, there is nothing 
that precludes Sino--Middle Eastern economic cooperation 
save a willingness to cooperate, a degree of 
complementarity, and the pressures and possibilities
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provided by the international economic system.
_LaJ China and Gulf reconstruction; The postwar
reconstruction of Iran and Iraq is a process directed by 
unforeseeable developments, not just fixed choices. Even if 
the sustainability of the Gulf cease-fire and the stability 
of the two regimes were a certainty, world oil market 
conditions - upon which the successful rebuilding of the two 
countries' economies so crucially depends - would not be 
predictable. Thus, the prospect for China's cooperation in, 
and its deriving benefits during, Gulf reconstruction is a 
hostage of circumstance.
Nevertheless, some things can be said with reasonable 
certainty about the current situation. First, what China 
needs is precisely what Iran lacks; namely, foreign exchange 
and chemical fertilisers. Presently, Tehran cannot pay cash 
for Chinese imports nor can it supply in great quantity a 
single product that would make Sino--Iranian common interest 
in countertrade attractive to Beijing. Furthermore, the soft 
oil market reduces the probability that Iranian crude oil, 
bartered for Chinese imports, could be profitably resold by 
Beijing. However, were Chinese crude oil production to fail 
to meet rising domestic demand (which has occurred in the 
past), Iranian crude oil would be useful for China's own 
consumption.
Iranian chemical fertiliser production was in danger of 
being dealt a severe blow until Japan's Mitsui agreed to pay 
nearly $2 billion in exchange for abandoning the Bandar 
Abbas petrochemical complex. The failure to revive and
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complete this project, whose largest facility had been 
designed to produce considerable quantities of chemical 
fertilisers further narrows the possibility for Sino-- 
Iranian economic cooperation.
These observations suggest that whatever China is able to 
offer Iran will have to be offered on terms less than 
optimally beneficial to Beijing. In the past, however, China 
has scraped together generous foreign assistance packages, 
particularly when its political and/or strategic interests 
were at stake. Despite the overall softening of Sino--Soviet 
relations, the recent upsurge of Soviet--Iranian economic 
cooperation might qualify as sufficient incentive for 
Beijing to devote greater consideration to Iran's 
reconstruction, and how China could contribute to it. In the 
early hunt for postwar reconstruction business in Iran, the 
Shanghai China Trade Enterprise is regarded as being among 
the top ten most favored, highest potential competitors in 
the world (and the only non-European enterprise so rated).1
Iraq's future begins with its recent past. During the Gulf 
war, Baghdad accumulated an estimated $65 billion debt. In 
slightly less than an ideal oil market, it is conceivable 
that repayment of debts and the rebuilding of the economy 
could operate in tandem. Today's oil market is, however, an 
especially poor one. Moreover, while a substantial portion 
of its debts are likely to be forgiven by its Arab 
creditors, the same is unlikely to be true in the case of 
the approximately $14 billion owed to Western sources.
Iraq's cash shortage and debt problem has implications for
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China which cut in opposite directions. As with Iran, Iraq's 
inability to pay cash is a dampener on China's business 
enthusiasm. On the other hand, China's experience finding a 
flexible formula for cooperation, in the presence of risk 
and in the absence of hard currency, is its advantage over 
other competitors for Iraq's business.
Sino--Iraqi economic cooperation, under these 
circumstances, is likely to depend more on the partners' 
willingness than on their ability to pursue mutually 
beneficial relations. Iraq has the present capacity and the 
past record of selling chemical fertilisers to China.
Second, Chinese construction activities in Iraq, which ante­
dated the Gulf conflict, proceeded despite it. Third, the 
degree of privatisation introduced in Iraq in order to prime 
the war economy opens opportunities for economic cooperation 
below as well as at the intergovernmental level. All of 
these factors form an encouraging basis for Sino--Iraqi 
economic cooperation.
(b) Kuwait: Today, the Kuwaiti regime is comparatively 
stable and reasonably safe. Of all the Arab Gulf states, 
Kuwait's downstream capacities are perhaps the most 
impressively developed. Kuwait has appeared to have overcome 
its recent budgetary chaos. Therefore, there are no visible 
impediments to the maintenance or possible expansion of 
Sino--Kuwaiti trade other than the size of Kuwait's market. 
In fact, in such a hospitable climate for Sino--Kuwaiti 
economic cooperation, Beijing can be expected to solicit the 
assistance of Kuwait in opening up other parts of the Arab
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market to Chinese exports.
The outlook for substantial Kuwaiti loans and investments 
in China is not necessarily less optimistic. However, the 
dramatic increase in Sino--Soviet border trade might slow 
Beijing's search for Arab funds. The cross-border trade, 
which is a function of Sino-Soviet detente, is based on the 
two countries' common interest in ensuring that their 
respective frontier Muslim populations remain tolerably calm 
by being adequately fed. Still, these efforts do not 
preclude the desirability of Arab funds, which could be used 
as a hedge against deteriorating Sino--Soviet relations or 
as a stimulus to other parts of the Chinese economy.
Active solicitation of Kuwaiti money does not guarantee 
its availability. On the positive side, Kuwait's successful 
transition from a lop-sided dependence on crude oil sales 
argues for the continued availability of funds for loans and 
investments, despite the soft oil market. Western insistence 
(e.g. Britain) that Kuwait limit its investment shares is an 
incentive for Kuwait to retarget its loans and investments. 
However, there is an upsurge of competition for Kuwaiti 
money that could cut into the amounts made available to 
China: from Egypt and Algeria (both susceptible to 
fundamentalist unrest) as well as the reformist Soviet Union 
(with whom Kuwait has steadily improved relations) .
(c) Saudi Arabia: Sino--Saudi trade has occurred despite 
the failure to establish diplomatic relations, and has 
remained an open secret because of it. The unprecedented
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publicity attaching to Chinese missile sales to Saudi Arabia 
provided an opportunity for the two countries to air out 
their relationship. Hints of Saudi Arabia's readiness to 
forge official ties with China surfaced before and after 
this transaction. Though insubstantiable, one could argue 
that these signals were deliberately floated by Riyadh to 
test the international climate before proceeding with 
normalisation. In any case, the indications of a formal 
Sino--Saudi thaw encountered strong resistance from Taiwan, 
with whom Saudi Arabia has also enjoyed fruitful economic 
cooperation.
It remains to be seen whether Riyadh can find a political 
climate congenial enough to embark on open and direct 
relations with the PRC; that is, relations which will not 
simultaneously undermine its ties with the ROC. Until such 
time, economic relations between Beijing and Riyadh are 
likely to develop, though not without periodic displays of 
caution and hesitancy on the part of Saudi Arabia.
(d) Egypt; Egypt has traditionally been regarded as the 
'center' of the Arab world, and China's consistent attention 
to Egypt acknowledges that tradition. Contemporary Egypt, 
moreover, has potential assets that form an encouraging 
basis for the future development of Sino--Egyptian economic 
relations: an industrial base; a relatively skilled worked 
force; a large population (export market), and a 
comparatively good infrastructure.
Still, the Egyptian economy is in disarray. Compounding 
its problems, the World Bank and USAID recently decided to
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withhold structural loan disbursements totalling $580 
million. Egypt's present situation - caught between the 
economic necessity for rationalising prices and the 
political necessity of maintaining subsidies for basic 
commodities and services - invites and discourages Chinese 
economic cooperation. Perhaps likely to tilt China in favor 
of assuming some financial risk is the Soviet Union's 
resumption of interest in Egypt. Recently, Moscow has 
rescheduled Cairo's $3 billion arms debt over 25 years; has 
signed a deal valued at 120 million Egyptian pounds for the 
expansion of the Helwan Iron and Steel Works; and has agreed 
to expand bilateral trade to an annual value of £500 
million. Above all, Egypt's readmission to the Arab League, 
in conjunction with its readoption of an 'active' foreign 
policy both within the Middle East and as a member of the 
African community of states, provides a strong incentive for 
China to search for ways to further consolidate its 
relations with Cairo (despite the disincentives to rush to 
compete with Moscow).
_CeJ Israel;
China's 'invisible' trade with Israel has produced no 
'visible' adverse political side-effects when it has 
attracted notice. Both partners continue to draw benefits 
from the politically shrunken market for Israeli products 
and expertise.
Israel manufactures highly desirable items which China has 
an interest in buying, including advanced medical equipment,
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electronics and computer technology. Access to sophisticated 
medical equipment is not only a boost to China's own health 
care system; also, because building hospitals and 
dispatching medical teams and supplies has traditionally 
been an important component of China's foreign assistance 
program, the availability of such equipment lengthens the 
reach of China's aid projects. In the case of computer and 
electronics technology, Israel offers a convenient 
alternative to Western suppliers, particularly the U.S., 
much of whose products are subject to more stringent export- 
licensing restrictions and tied to political preconditions. 
Israel's experience in soil cultivation, herbicides and 
pesticides is an important complement to the Arab countries' 
supply of chemical fertiliser in the development of China's 
agriculture.
Sino--Middle Eastern military cooperation:
in the Middle East requires addressing three basic 
questions. First, what is China willing and able to sell, 
and for how much? Second, who else is willing and able to 
supply, and at what price? Third, who is willing to buy what 
from whom, and why?
The quality and variety of China's military equipment has 
already improved while its prices remain competitive. The 
military technology made increasingly available to China - 
directly from the U.S. and other Western sources, as well as 
through Israel and Pakistan - has been incorporated into its 
weapons systems, increasing their sophistication. The
Assessing prospects for Chinese military sales
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weapons sold to Iran and Iraq were combat-tested, providing 
their own advertising; the controversy associated with these 
sales, ironically, provided further free marketing. The 
civilianising of many of China's military factories might 
impinge on economies of scale, working to the detriment of 
China's price competitiveness. Still, as China's existing 
military enterprises become competitive with each other for 
overseas business, they will probably be able to deliver 
more attractive products.2
China's involvement in arms sales to the Middle East is 
not limited to the role of principal arms supplier. 
Coproduction arrangements are another avenue into the 
region's arms market. Still another mode of access has 
recently been used by China -- that of intermediary between 
European suppliers (France and Italy) and customers with 
whom direct arms deals were constrained by Western alliance 
politics (Syria and Iran).
Yet, particularly in the missile field, China has numerous 
competitors: Argentina (Condor II) and Brazil (Avibras SS- 
300 and Orbita MB/EE-600) have already entered the Middle 
East market; Taiwan (Skyhorse) is developing the capacity 
to join them. Egypt, if it is successful in reviving the 
Arab Organisation of Industries (AOI) will contend for the 
Middle East market from the position of insider, in a number 
of weapons categories. Emergent Soviet--American detente, 
coupled with budgetary constraints among producers and 
potential customers indicates a temporarily contracting 
global arms market that will stiffen competition.
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The strength of competition for the Middle East arms 
market also depends heavily on how the superpowers resolve 
their current ambivalence. Both the United States and the 
Soviet Union, for reasons of improvement in East--West 
relations, have a strong incentive for stabilising arms 
transfers to the region. Equally, they share a parallel 
economic interest in, to the extent possible, retaining a 
relative arms 'monopoly' in the Middle East. Furthermore, 
the superpowers seek to retain political influence in the 
region irrespective of the amelioration of relations between 
them. This, one can argue, is contingent on reliably 
servicing clients' military requests.
The end of the Gulf war is not necessarily the end of the 
the Gulf arms trade boom. Iran's defense remains a self­
avowed priority of its reconstruction. Iraq retains the 
world's largest standing army; its power and prestige in 
inter-Arab politics depends to an extent on the 
uncertainties that its maintenance of a large military 
capability can project. For Saudi Arabia, purchasing 
security by purchasing arms from suppliers besides the 
United States is not only a political imperative, but 
increasingly a military one. Syria, for whom strategic 
parity with Israel is a priority not shared in Moscow 
(despite the weaknesses of the Syrian economy) is also a 
potential customer.
Apart from the unresolved Arab--Israeli dispute and the 
renewal of inter-Arab rivalry following the cessation of the 
Iran--Iraq war, there is also the pervasive condition of 
regime insecurity which makes the Middle East a fertile arms
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market. To the extent that local regimes aim to preserve 
domestic order by turning weapons on discontented elements 
of the domestic population (or by merely threatening to do 
so), the demand for weapons is that much greater. Thus, 
whereas the global arms market as a whole may indeed be 
shrinking, there is every evidence that the Middle East arms 
market is stable, if not expanding.
(b) Acquisitions: Sino--Soviet detente might lessen the 
urgency, but it does not erase the need for China to 
continue to selectively reequip and modernise its military. 
Doing so on a tight budget requires that China solicit help 
from those sources which offer the best mix of low cost, 
high sophistication, and no political preconditions. Israel, 
and to a lesser extent, Egypt, are the two countries in the 
region with whom China has traded in the past who most 
suitably match this formula.
Early in the 1980s, China had already obtained valuable 
military hardware in swaps with its Middle East partners. 
These items included MiG-21s, Sukhoi SU-20s, export versions 
of the MiG-23, a MiG-23 engine, T-62 tanks, SAM-3 and SAM-6 
anti-aircraft missiles as well as Sagger anti-tank missiles. 
Many of these items, moreover, were delivered intact, 
complete with manuals and spare parts.3
Israel is gradually moving into new arms markets - the 
South American one, for instance. A larger market for 
Israeli military equipment, however, is not necessarily 
harmful to China. Additional customers enable Israel to 
prime its defense industry to produce even more
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sophisticated materiel which China might gain access to.
Egypt's emergence as China's potential competitor for arms 
sales to the Middle East does not negate the contribution it 
could continue to make to China's military modernisation. 
Egypt/ for instance, could serve as yet another back door to 
Western military technology, as Cairo succeeds in 
integrating European countries into the development of its 
indigenous arms-producing 
industries.
G. Closing remarks:
Up to the time that Yitzhak Shichor formulated his 
argument (the late 1970s), it was generally accurate to say 
that China's involvement in the Middle East had alternated 
between periods of 'expansion' and periods of 'contraction.' 
Then, the observation that China had been a low-impact, 
marginal player in the Middle East was strongly borne out by 
the facts.
Extending the historical record forward an additional ten 
years, however, urges the revision of some of this thinking. 
Agreed, China today, as in the 1950s, has no 'vital' 
interests in the Middle East: it obtains nothing essential 
to its survival from the region that it cannot otherwise 
acquire elsewhere. Yet, what explains China's persistence in 
'returning' to the Middle East following its several 
'retreats' in the 1950s and '60s? And why has China, since 
its emergence from the Cultural Revolution, 'remained' in 
the Middle East, without the curtailment or interruption of 
activities that previously characterised its involvement in
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the region?
From its revolutionary beginning, China's leaders have 
sought a role for China larger than its objective capacities 
to immediately achieve and sustain. Furthermore, China's 
security has been consistently defined in global terms, even 
though its primary strategic focus has always been East 
Asia. Also, the more recent political tension over the 
character of Chinese modernisation has been resolved in 
favor of linking China to, rather than distancing it from, 
the world economy. There is, then, a Chinese 'cosmology' 
that invests its conception of 'interests' with a broad 
meaning. One needn't dichotomise Chinese ideology and 
Chinese national interests to see that China's apparent 
notion of 'interests' makes no clear distinction between 
'needs' and 'wants.' (Perhaps no country's does.) Thus, the 
Middle East has never been as far away from China as its 
geography or its culture might otherwise indicate.
The Middle East has always occupied a place in China's 
strategic calculations and figured, sometimes prominently, 
in its political ambitions. More recently, the region has 
been fitted for certain roles in China's modernisation. 
Ultimately, then, it is incomplete to emphasise the 
interests that China does not have without considering the 
interest that China takes in the Middle East. Because China 
resides in a changing international strategic, economic and 
political environment, Beijing has from time to time 
reformulated how much the Middle East means to China.
The question of interests momentarily aside, can it be
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said that China has always a had a presence in the Middle 
East? Since the early 1950s, China has never totally 
disengaged from the region, even during those periods when 
the temporary diminution of its interest has justified the 
curtailment of its activities, or adversity has virtually 
compelled it. China has maintained a presence in the Middle 
East at some level and sometimes at several: state-to-state, 
party-to-party, and people-to-people. In the long-run, this 
'trichotomisation' of Chinese policy has made shrewd sense, 
enabling China to demonstrate a continuous, if fluctuating, 
commitment of interest and resources.
Confronting ponderous economic challenges that neither 
could possibly solve for the other, China has not assumed 
responsibility for the economic development of the Middle 
East, nor has the Middle East been targeted as a major 
catalyst of China's modernisation. The separate economies of 
China and its Middle Eastern partners might not be 
immediately complementary, and might in fact prove 
eventually to be competitive. Still, recent events 
demonstrate a mutual recognition that each has a role to 
play in the other's development.
Particularly in its construction activities, China has 
made noticeable contributions to the development of the 
infrastructure of North and South Yemen, Iraq, and to a 
lesser extent, Egypt and Jordan. Chinese labor contracts in 
the region have been cash earners, advertisers, and escape 
hatches for surplus labor. Although trade with the region 
has not been extensive, it has not been negligible. It has 
been growing; and it is very useful in diversifying China's
353
tirade contacts and filling in important commodity areas.
Chinese--Middle Eastern economic relations may not as yet 
have produced a visible improvement in China's global status 
and prestige. Yet, it has confirmed in practice China's 
rhetorical commitment to South--South cooperation. The now- 
routine business of offering what is wanted in exchange for 
what is useful, on mutually affordable financial terms and 
without political preconditions, is not bound to generate 
political influence for China, but it is apt to. Moreover, 
what China is unequipped to furnish directly and 
exclusively, it is willing to collaborate with others in 
providing. Similarly, Middle Eastern partners can be useful 
channels of access and not mere targets for the direct 
absorption of Chinese products. Again, there is no evidence 
that such an elaborate scheme is yet in place. The 
implications, however, are clear, even if the plans are not.
China's military sales have had more wide-ranging effects 
than perhaps any other facet of China's involvement in the 
region. It is an exaggeration to argue that China has itself 
caused a new round of arms competition in the Middle East; 
however, it understates China's role to contend that the 
revelation of its missile sales in the Gulf merely exposed a 
single event in a broader development that would have 
occurred regardless of Chinese participation.
China's rapid emergence as the world's fifth largest arms 
exporter is directly linked to its weapons sales in the 
Middle East. Its earnings were boosted by its transfer of 
'big price tag' items to the Gulf, but not limited to them.
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Iran and Iraq were its principal customers, but not its 
exclusive ones. The context for China's largest recorded 
arms sales was the 1980s' Gulf war, but China's military 
cooperation with Middle Eastern regimes ante-dates that 
conflict and has not been confined geographically to the 
Gulf. Perhaps most important, its prospects for future 
military cooperation are not conditional upon the outbreak 
of war; moreover, it is not necessarily confined to the role 
of direct supplier.
Competition for business and influence in the Middle East 
is a continuous dance with frequent changes of partners. 
China's recent behavior displays a unique appreciation of 
this fact and a willingness to take cues from the changing 
rhythms of the region's politics. This willingness to 
accomodate change rather than to seek either to preempt it 
or to conform it to China's preferences is the product of 
both choice and necessity.
China, unlike Japan, for instance, enters the Middle East 
from a position of relative strength. It has only as much to 
lose as it seeks to invest psychologically, for its material 
stake in the region is cushioned by its modest scale, non- 
essential character, and diversified packaging. Unlike the 
United States and the Soviet Union, China enters the Middle 
East from a position of relative weakness. Yet, this 
weakness is offset in part by the fact China has, at best, 
only secondary strategic interests in the region; moreover, 
it has neither promised nor pursued military victories or 
negotiated settlements. Thus China has never been the 
culprit of disappointed expectations. On the contrary, for
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nearly twenty years, China has cleansed and improved its 
political image by deliberately avoiding political 
controversy, by burying political aspirations in reliable 
commercial activity. Beijing has accepted its temporary 
relegation to the political sidelines, discovering in 
apparent weakness the comparative advantage of making no 
claims that it cannot defend and no commitments that it 
cannot fulfill.
3 5 6
Notes
(1)Middle East Economic Digest (23 September 1988).
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Offensive' in The Pacific.. Review, vol. 1, no. 3, 1989. pp. 320--3
(3)The Economist (14 May 1983).
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P.R.C. Economic Aid to the Middle East1
1 9 5 6 - 1 9 8 7
Table 1. Aid to Developing Countries bv Region (in millions of US$);
Region Number of 
Countries
Amount %  Share
Africa 41 4188.8 55%
Asia 10 1750.4 23%
Middle East 15 1378.2 18%
Latin America 10 287.5 4%
Totals 76 7604.9 100%
Table 2. China's Leading Middle East Recipients Tin millions of US$1:
Rank Country Amount %  Share
1 Iraq 270.0 19.6%
2 Sudan 210.2 15.2%
3 North Yemen 131.2 9.5%
4 Algeria 126.9 9.2%
5 Afghanistan 124.5 9.0%
6 Tunisia 117.0 8.4%
7 South Yemen 112.8 8.2%
8 Syria 99.4 7.2%
9 Egypt 85.2 6.2%
10 Libya 35.0 2.5%
1 1 Jordan 30.0 2.2%
12 Morocco 30.0 2.2%
13 Turkey 10.0 .1%
14 Kuwait 5.0 .07%
15 Iran 1.0 .01%
S o u rce: Adapted from W olfgang Bartke, The Economic Aid o f  the PR China to D eveloping and Socialist 
Countries. 2d cd. (Munchcn: K.G. Saur Vcrlag, 1989), pp. 7-14.
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Table 3. China's Average Annual Aid to Developing Countries fin millions of US$);
Years All LDCs ME  %  Share
1956-57 27.8 8.4%
1958-62 65.2 6.4%
1963-65 124.9 34.0%
1966-69 51.2 5.7%
1970-72 661.9 26.0%
1973-76 203.0 17.2%
1977-80 210.2 6.5%
1981-87 447.7 16.1%
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P.R.C.  Trade with the Middle East
1 9 6 4 - 1 9 8 8 2
Table 4. China's Trade with the Middle East 3 (civilian goods in million of US$):
Years Aver. Annual Exports ME  %  Share
Aver. Annual 
Imports M E  %  Share
Aver. Annual 
Trade 
Balance
1964-65 33.1 3% 64.8 6.2% -31.7
1966-69 85.8 6% 43.1 2.9% +42.7
1970-72 84.6 4.2% 45.7 2.3% +38.9
1973-77 165.8 2.9% 112.6 1.9% +53.2
1978-81 541.7 3.4% 216.5 1.3% +325.2
1982-88 2358.0 7.7% 292.3 1.0% +2065.7
2Sources: IMF Direction o f Trade Annual. 1964-68 and 1969-73; and IMF Direction o f  Trade Y earbook. 
1980, 1985, 1990.
^Thc 'M iddle East' is confined lo Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, U AE, North and 
South Yemen. This reflects the scope o f the present study. 'Indirect trade' (primarily channeled through Hong 
Kong) is not represented in these tables, nor is Sino-Isracli trade (much o f which is indirect trade).
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Table 5. China’s Leading Middle East Customers. 1978-88 (civilian goods in millions of
mil:
Rank .Country. Aver. Annual 
Exports
Share %  of M E
1 Jordan4 1066.0 44.6%
2 Syria 202.5 8.4%
3 Saudi Arabia 151.8 8.7%
4 Egypt 150.7 8.6%
5 Iran 118.1 6.7%
6 Kuwait 106.7 6.1%
7 Iraq 105.3 6.0%
8 N. Yemen 104.5 5.2%
9 UAE 89.4 3.7%
10 S. Yemen 34.5 1.4%
^Figures on Chinese exports to Jordan, Syria, and the U AE for the years 1978-80 arc not available. The 
average annual exports to these countries arc computed over an eight, rather than an eleven  year period to 
reflect this.
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Table 5a Exports in M illions o f 
DollarsPRC Exports
1 2 0
I
00
80
1964 1965 19671966 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
■  E gyp t H  J o r d a n □  I ran B  K u w a i t E  Y em en
H  S y r i a H  I raq ID S a u i  Arabia E2 UAE aE PDR Yemen
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Table 5b
PRC Exports Exports in Millions of Dollars
1600
1400
1 2 0 0
1 0 0 0
800
600
400
200
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
■  Egypt H  J o r d a n □  I ran §  K u w a i t 3  Yemen
H  S y r i a H  I raq HD Sau i  Arabia 0  UAE 3  PDR Yemen
China's  Arms Sales to the Middle East
Table 6. Values of Exports of maior weapons bv supplier fin millions of USS. at constant 
1985 prices) where A=vearlv figures and B=five-vear moving averages);5
Supplier 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
USSR A 1001
0
1112
6
9277 8370 7565 7578 7537 8563 1032
7
1075
9
8238
B 8502 9274 9270 8783 8065 7923 8314 8953 9085 9280
USA A 6850 3961 5637 6155 6989 6205 4906 4024 4925 6270 3649
B 6607 6425 5918 5789 5978 5656 5410 5266 4755 4279
France A 2131 3033 2617 3511 3181 3070 3212 3588 3355 2518 1312
B 2299 2714 2894 3082 3118 3312 3281 3148 2797 2460
U K A 1214 766 725 1101 1594 676 1083 903 1020 1530 1165
B 1038 1092 1080 973 1036 1071 1055 1042 1140 1122
China A 465 418 625 334 700 890 1210 1017 1193 1960 1781
B 372 393 509 593 752 830 1002 1254 1432 1334 --
Table 7. China's Third World Arms Customers. 1981-85 (by region, in millions of USS):
Reeion Aexeeements %  Share Deliveries %  Share
East Asia 395 3.57% 355 4.08%
Middle East & 
South Asia 10200 92.27% 7880 90.52%
Sub-Saharan
Africa 300 2.71% 470 5.40%
Latin America 160 1.45%
11055 100% 8705 100%
-’Source: SIPRI Yearbook. 1990: World Armaments and Disarmament, pp. 252-253.
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T able 8- C h in a's U a dingM i.dd .lg. E ast C u stom ers, ,19.8Q.-.8Zi6
Customer Deals Share of PRC
Share of 
Total Deliveries
Share of 
PRC
Share of 
Total
Iraq 5115 46.3% 10.3% 4185 48.1% 9.6%
Iran 3040 27.5% 20.8% 1815 20.8% 15.4%
Total 8155 73.8% 13.0% 6000 68.9% 11.0%
Table 9. China's Main M E  Arms Customers, 1981-85 (bv country in millions of USS):
Country Value
%  of PRC 
(bv region)
%  of PRC 
(of total) %  of Total PRC Rank
1. Iraq 3100 71.7% 56.7% 12.96% 3
2. Iran 575 13.3% 10.5% 8.94% 1
3. Egypt 525 12.2% 9.6% 7.37% 3
4. Pakistan 350 83.3% 6.4% 15.98% 2
5. Libya 320 63.4% 5.9% 3.10% 5
6. N. Korea 210 95.5% 3.8% 21.20% 2
7. Syria 110 2.5% 2.0% 1.20% 3
6Sourcc for Tables 7, 8, and 9: Yitzhak Shichor, 'Unfolded Arms: Beijing's Recent Military Sales Offensive', 
The Pacific R e v ie w , vol. 1, no. 3, 1988, pp. 320, 322 [adapted from Richard G rim m elt, 'Trends in 
Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier, 1980-87', C ongressional Research  
Service Report 88-352F. W ashington, D.C., 9 May 1988).
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The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
Between the P.R.C. and the Middle East7
Egypt 30 May 1956
Syria 1 August 1956
N. Yemen 23 August 1956
Iraq 25 August 1958
Morocco 1 November 1958
Sudan 1 December 1958
Algeria 3 July 1962
Tunisia 10 January 1964
S. Yemen 31 January 1968
Kuwait 22 March 1971
Turkey 5 August 1971
Iran 16 August 1971
Lebanon 9 November 1971
Jordan 7 April 1977
Oman 25 May 1978
Libya 1 August 1978
UAE 1 November 1984
7Sourccs: The China Official Yearbook, 1985-86; China Facts and Figures Annual. 1989 . 
no. 12, edited by Charles Greer.
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